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ABSTRACT

Cooperation or Competition with China:
Interest Groups and US Policy on Climate Change
by
Lucia Green-Weiskel
Adviser: Professor Yan Sun
This dissertation analyzes the existence of two constellations of political forces,
emphasizing their relationship to each other and the link between their interests related to
China and climate change. It argues that two China-related alignments on climate issues
are driven by their opposing approaches to US China relations in general in such a way
that the latter predicts the former. These broad but opposing coalitions of political
forces—one favoring and one opposing cooperation with China—are made up of think
tanks, NGOs and industry groups, which have demonstrated a convergence in policy
preferences over the course of two presidential administrations, democrat Barack Obama
(2009-2017) and republican Donald Trump (2017-2021). The divergent alignments are
illustrated in three case studies: (1) the Paris Agreement; (2) development of renewable
energy; and, (3) electric vehicle technology and deployment. The case studies
demonstrate that these industry-plus-think tank lobbies amplify one another and make
policy recommendations with the following characteristics: (1) a reduction of the climate
problem to serve the greater security concerns of the US-China relationship; and, (2)
opportunities for industry lobbyists to pursue narrow business interests over the broader
climate concerns and solutions recommended by scientists.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

This study is a descriptive analysis that considers the political forces that lobby
US policy on China—the range of interest groups, think tanks, trade groups, and industry
representatives that drive the United States either towards a closer relationship and more
trade with China or, in the opposite direction, towards isolation and decoupling. This
dissertation argues that two related alignments of policy groups are driven by their
opposing approaches to US-China relations as well as their perspective on energy and
climate policy in such a way that the former explains the latter. In other words, think
tanks and policy centers that view China’s rise as a positive opportunity for the US and as
a result adopt a view that supports increased cooperation with China also tend to advocate
for US leadership on climate change and a general transition to more climate-friendly
energy policies domestically. On the other side, think tanks and policy centers that view
China’s rise as an existential threat to the United States and seek to undermine China’s
economic and political power through a decoupling of the US and Chinese economies,
also tend to view climate change as an unimportant policy issue and instead promote a
return to fossil fuel-based energy including the removal of all government support for
green technology.
Thus this study shows that the policy position of a given interest group on the US
response to the rise of China often correlates with their position on climate change. In
other words, if an interest group advocated for the liberal, internationalist vision on USChina relations, including increased engagement with China with the goal of drawing
China into compliance with global norms, then that interest group tends to favor policies

on climate change that emphasize the climate issue as an area for positive global
collaboration, increased diplomacy and integration through international institutions.
Particularly, these groups emphasize the need for the two largest economies, the US and
China, to work together collaboratively at the UN climate conferences and beyond on
global solutions to the climate crisis that rely on technology sharing, bold diplomacy and
strong multinational leadership and collaboration.
In contrast, interest groups that view China’s rise as an existential threat to US
power internationally and to the US economy domestically, tend to see climate change as a
distraction from more important security demands or even as a fabricated and fictional
issue in the first place. This view coalesces around the idea that climate change is either not
real or not urgent and that it is either created to benefit the economic elite or provides a
policy area for the expansion of globalization and global governance. The climate policy
recommendations from these interest groups include increased use of often domesticallysourced fossil fuels and an end to all government or other financial support for renewable
energy and electric vehicles as well as combative and competitive approach to China rather
than one that seeks cooperation. More simply put, the China agenda of key interest groups
has shaped the national debate on climate change.
Analytical framework
The analytical framework that is applied is an extension of the “engagement vs.
containment” dynamic that originates in the 1950s and dominated US China policy during
the Cold War (see Chapter 2). It is a historical analysis that examines the evolution of two
divergent alignments over time and how they were shaped by historical events. These two
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approaches to US-China relations have continued into the present day, influencing climate
change policy in a new division between “cooperation vs. competition.”
This study identifies two broad sets of political coalitions –the China-asopportunity lobby that favors an approach to US-China relations marked by engagement
and increased trade between the two countries, and, the China-as-threat lobby that favors
economic nationalism, US-China decoupling, and believes engagement with China
undermines US strength and independence. This study traces the history of these lobbies
as well as their policy positions from the end of World War II to two recent presidencies,
Barack Obama (2008-2016) and Donald Trump (2016-2020). This dissertation focuses on
the impact of these two lobbies on a key issue in US-China relations: climate change. It
does so through three case studies, one each on renewable energy, electric vehicles and
US-China cooperation at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
annual Conference of the Parties (COPs) particularly in the drafting of the 2015 Paris
Agreement.
Both lobbies comprise think tanks, trade and business groups as well as industry
lobbyists. But each category plays a different role in the lobby. Many think tanks and
interest groups work in parallel on specific issues despite having different motivations for
doing so. Some think tanks adopt positive or negative rhetoric related to China or climate
change for reasons that do not directly relate to those specific issues. For example, some
think tanks may adopt an anti-China position in order to find political concordance with
partisan allies. Likewise, some industry lobbyists may find that an anti-China stance help
advances a short-term political goal—for example solar panel companies that want to be
protected from short-term competition from China but may benefit in the long term from
3

increased engagement between the two countries.
While think tanks often play the broadest role of framing policy responses, the other
groups mentioned above find leverage in the larger China-related narrative to advance what
is often a single issue campaign—for example working condition in factories in Xinjiang,
or, intellectual property theft in the renewable energy sector. Determining the motivations
of various groups is a difficult if not impossible task. Therefore, this study focuses on the
configuration of these alignments while also noting what holds them together.
Industry groups, most often, are concerned only with their bottom line. But they
advance or thwart China-related policies when these policies overlap with their economic
goals, and thus join the lobby not necessarily as shapers of the larger ideological agenda,
but as “fellow travellers,” and as such provide important political traction and visibility to
each lobby. In both the China-as-threat and China-as-opportunity lobby, industry
lobbyists—companies like ExxonMobil, Duke Energy, or any of the fossil fuel or mining
companies that hire professional lobbyists to influence policy outcomes—leverage their
narrow economic interests onto this larger security policy debate adopting the security
narratives to justify their own business interests. This study finds that corporate lobbyists
have a special kind of power when they align themselves with broader political coalitions.
The study concludes that the impact of this bipolar arrangement of political alliances
includes the amplification of industry interests in the climate debate as well as a narrowing
of policy recommendations on climate change in the US. The conflation of business and
security interests reduces US climate policy to a serving component of the larger security
questions posed by China’s rise in political, economic, and military power.
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Also at play is some degree of partisanship—the tendency for Democrat-leaning
think tanks to align with Democrat-leaning industry groups and interest groups. However,
relying on partisanship as a glue across interests produces an inadequate explanation. Most
obviously this is the apparent in the constellation of forces that constitute the China-asthreat lobby, which includes left Democrat human rights groups as well as right-Republican
security think tanks. The same is evident in the case of the China-as-opportunity lobby,
which has long included moderates from both parties and is reviled by challengers from the
left and right.
Even with different motivations and degrees of loyalty to the larger ideological
orientation of each camp, these constellations of political forces amplify each other. This
study aims to demonstrate that the China factor in the climate debate becomes an issue so
powerful that it constricts—and shapes—the debate over how to manage the climate crisis.
Here, this study makes two observations: (1), there is a convergence of rhetoric and
messaging used by think tanks and industry groups over time as they begin to identify each
other as part of the same China-related agenda; and, (2), this convergence simplifies
climate policy discourse such that climate policy becomes a serving component of the
larger debate about China as a security threat to the United States.
The China-as-opportunity presents the liberal and free market views embraced by
Wall Street and much of the business-oriented parts of both political parties. The rival
camp, China-as-threat, has evolved from the military and ideological forces that once made
up of what writer Walden Bello referred to in 1990 as an “unholy alliance” that drew
human rights activists into serving defenders of what is essentially a right-wing cause: the
pentagon’s anti-communist campaign to undermine and contain China between 1950
5

through the 1980s, into one based in industry protectionism and the ideological forces
behind the conservative anti-climate movement. In their mission to undermine the Chinese
Communist Party, once again, they drew on untraditional “unholy” allies, finding common
ground with disparate segments of the political spectrum including human rights activists
appalled by Beijing’s abuses, labor activists that revile China’s working conditions,
environmental activists that demonize Beijing’s role in creating the pollution crisis there,
pro-life Christians rejecting China’s abortion practices and parents and consumers angered
by toxic or poor quality Made-in-China toys. While these more narrow or even single-issue
organizations do not play a major role in the shaping of the larger China-security debate,
their particular campaigns often reify or substantiate the China-threat concept.
Thus, the alignment of political forces identified in this dissertation has a somewhat
sprawling nature. It coheres only around a central perspective regarding the implications of
China’s rise. The two tables below list some of the members of each lobby as well as
central positions they hold.
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Figure 1: The China-as-Opportunity Lobby

Positions:
Engagement with
China will help Beijing
comply with
international norms.
Increased trade with
China is essentail to
American economic
growth.
Protection of US
companies against
Chinese competition

China-asOpportunity
Lobby

American global
leadership, projection
of US values abroad
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Think Tanks:
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Council on Foreign
Relations
Brookings Institution
Asia Society
Pew Center for Global
Climate Change
National Committee on
US-China Relations
Environmental Defense
Fund
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace

Figure 2: The China-as-Threat Lobby

Positions:
de-coupling,
underminging of
Chinese economic
growth, US
supremacy, national
sovereignty, economic
nationalism, fossil fuel
based growth, energy
independence

Individuals and Internest
Groups:
Heritage Foundation
Committee on the
Present Danger
Heartland Institute
American Enterprise
Institute
Manhattan Institute
Steve Bannon

China-asThreat
Lobby

Fred Gaffney
Marco Rubio
Tucker Carlson
Bernard Marcus
Peter Navarro
American First Policies
and American First
Action (PACs)

These coalitions and their views on China are not frozen in time. Inherent in the
“cooperative vs. competition” framework, is the evolving response to China’s rise as
China’s economic position in the world impacts different people and industries. The
options for US policies makers change as China’s capacity and power become more
obvious. This framework reflects the shifts in relative power between the two countries as
well as the nature of their economic relationship. Cooperation, unlike the word
“engagement,” entails more parity or equality between the two parties. Embedded in the
policy of “engagement” was the assumption that the United States was in a position to
choose—to initiate and to offer—the type of relationship it preferred. The contemporary
policy of “cooperation,” on the other hand, connotes that the United States no longer has
8

those options. Indeed, it cannot avoid China when it comes to climate issues. At the same
time, precisely because of China’s rising position and approaching parity in capabilities, the
competition camp raises legitimate and real concerns about the risks both to national
security and economic wellbeing inherent in the US-China relationship. “Cooperation” and
“engagement” represent the same political forces, but each represent a different political
moment. They respond to the changes in China’s capabilities and the new era of necessary
cooperation but inevitable competition. The old China-as-threat, with its military
orientation, was rooted in a belief that the US could constrain China’s rise through military
posturing. The new China-as-threat lobby has shifted it defensive focus to a much smaller
scale: protecting American manufacturing. With that downgrade in mission comes an
acknowledgement that China’s rise cannot be constrained.
This dissertation argues that both the China-as-threat and China-as-opportunity
lobby react in different ways to China’s rise and their assessments of the security concerns
inherent in China’s rise shape their positions on climate policy. The China-as-threat lobby
believes that the threat from China is based in the belief that China does not play by the
global rules and “cheats” to find ways to achieve global economic domination. In this view,
China will never change or be reformed. Thus, policies that advance free trade and
otherwise reduce barriers and promote increased exposure of the US to the Chinese
economy will ultimately undermine US economic strength as well as its ability to protect
itself against China’s aggression. Globalization, in this thinking, is a slow erosion of state
power, benefitting global economic elites who increase their personal profits by taking
advantage of China’s cheap labor market and relaxed regulatory environment at the
expense of sovereignty and the power of the nation state. Many in this camp believe that
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the “China Threat” can only be addressed on a military level and that continued
engagement between Washington and Beijing on diplomatic and economic levels, only
results in further US exploitation.
The China-as-threat lobby promotes the decoupling of the US and Chinese
economies and a discontinuation of diplomacy and cooperation regarding climate change
between Washington and Beijing, or between US and Chinese companies. Instead, the
China-as-threat lobby has largely promoted “climate denialism” and a preference for a
return to a fossil fuel-based economy. The China-as-threat lobby’s approach to energy and
climate policies is rooted in national security and economic protectionism. Overall, they
believe the US must rely on the energy sources that are abundant domestically: coal, oil,
and natural gas. Likewise, the United States—for strategic reasons—should not engage in
alternative sources of energy, like solar and wind power, or spend resources to advance
energy efficiency, because China is dominant in those industries and the United States will
risk further exploitation by attempting to enter those markets.
The China-as-threat lobby overlaps with some fossil fuel industry objectives
including those of the climate denial campaign as well as other industry goals such as
maintaining US reliance on oil as the primary fuel for the transportation industry and coal
and gas for electricity generation. As such, the China and industry lobbies align in their
joint interest in undermining government support for the development of renewable energy,
including US imports of solar and wind panels and US-Chinese public and private
partnership designed to advance the development of renewable energy and electric vehicle
markets and technologies.
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The China-as-opportunity lobby also views China’s rise as a potential threat to US
interests, but takes a different approach. According to this view, because the US and
Chinese economies are inextricably linked, each can benefit from a shared complex
interdependence. China has the potential to be a strategic competitor and partner but in
order to protect domestic interests in the relationship, the United States must work
multilaterally to pressure China to work within global institutions and adopt the rules and
norms of what they view as an emerging “global community.” There is an assumption that
the United States cannot survive without China as a trading partner simply because it would
be impossible for the US to manufacture the equivalent products at competitive prices.
The China-as-opportunity lobby has a different approach to climate change.
According to this view, the United States must “catch up” with China. Through government
incentive programs and regulations, the United States must jumpstart clean technology
industries in the United States. Electric vehicles and the solar and wind power industries
must also be able to capitalize on cheap manufacturing and labor in China in order to
become competitive in the global market. The China-as-opportunity lobby is concerned
with the potential risks associated with exposure to the US including intellectual property
rights and the potential for being marginalized by Chinese competitors. However, the
China-as-opportunity lobby solution to these issues is to pressure China to play by the rules
by offering US market benefits in exchange for reform.
It is important to note that the China-as-opportunity does not seek cooperation
simply for short-term economic gain or to appease industry lobbyists. Nor does it only rely
on the belief that engagement with China will force Beijing to adopt the global rules and
norms established by international organizations. They also subscribe to a long-term vision
11

that includes a zero-sum competitive calculation. The China-as-opportunity lobby believes
that the United States must not let China get ahead on key global issues—such as the
technological and policy responses necessary to combat global challenges like climate
change. Behind the policy of “catching up” with China, is a concern about China’s rise that
somewhat overlaps with the China-as-threat lobby. In both views, the United States must
remain dominant in the global economy. For the China-as-opportunity lobby, green
industries are a key part of the global economy. An important difference between the
lobbies is that the China-as-opportunity lobby believes China’s cheap labor and low
regulatory environment present the United States with a key resource with which to
leverage American power. For China-as-threat, the green economy should be avoided
because it is inherently and irrevocable dominated by China. In contrast, the China-asthreat lobby holds a more pessimistic view about the US outcome. It sees the threat from
China as unquestionably existential, immune from the influence of the pacifying powers of
the liberal global system.
The key distinction is in the way the two camps define American supremacy. The
China-as-opportunity lobby sees an American supremacy told from the perspective of
American companies, whose power lies in a global marketplace with rules defined by
global institutions. The US government makes the world a good place for US companies to
do business. The China-as-threat lobby has a vision of American supremacy that is rooted
in the nation-state and the physical boundaries of the United States, whereby US citizens
are protected from all threats beyond its borders whether they be from a rising China or the
forward progression towards globalization. To the China-as-threat lobby the role of the
government is to protect the perceived American identity, the American way of life, based
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in a vision of America as resource-independent and economically self-sufficient, with all
sectors of the economy thriving, from manufacturing to services. It imagines an American
economy marked by coveted ingenuity and balance, an economy that shapes the world
rather than being shaped by it.
The China-as-opportunity lobby overlaps with energy industry goals because it
seeks to secure potentially lucrative public-private business agreements between US
companies and their Chinese counterparts to further develop and promote clean technology.
These agreements can produce increased profits for US companies and also provide
politicians with examples of positive carbon reducing initiatives for which they can take
credit in elections. While these partnerships may not reform the clean technology industry
in the US it does contribute to its growth and can result in emissions reductions that enable
the US to meet carbon reduction goals.
Climate Change
To understand the nuances of the issues involved at the intersection of China and
climate policy, it is worth noting some basic facts about climate change. First, regarding the
climate problem, China and the United States play both perpetrator and victim. The climate
crisis is caused by collective, but not equal, economic and anthropogenic activities of all
nations and all people; each person is both a perpetrator and a potential victim. However,
this is a similarity that includes substantial differences. The impacts of climate change are
felt disproportionately depending on one’s social or economic status (Posner and Sunstein
12). The United States and China have contributed the largest portion of emissions to the
atmosphere. Since 2006, China has become the largest emitter of greenhouse gases
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(Rapier). However, the United States has historically been the largest emitter over time
(Irfan). And even while China is the leading emitter of greenhouse gases today, on a per
capita basis, China’s emissions are still relatively small, and notably smaller than the per
capita emissions rate in the United States (“Each”). Moreover, the majority of China’s
emissions are considered “subsistence emissions.” These are emissions that come from
things that would be hard to live without, such as electricity in homes, food production, and
transportation for 1.4 billion people. On the other hand, the United States has a large degree
of “luxury emissions.” These are emissions that come from oversized residences, second
homes and garages, air conditioning and leisure travel. To complicate the issue further,
experts have estimated that nearly one-quarter of China’s emissions can be sourced to the
manufacturing and shipping of products that are made for export markets, most of which
are consumed in the US (Wang 1). While emissions are falling in the United States,
American consumers are still buying high-carbon goods, with carbon price tags that go on
China’s ledger, not that of the United States. In other words, while many Americans lament
the loss of jobs to China, as those jobs go overseas, so too do the factories and climatealtering emissions generated in their production. And the fates of all nations are linked. One
nation cannot escape dangerous sea level rise without the other changing its polluting
practices (Posner and Sunstein 9). Thus the fates of both (all!) nations are inextricably
linked. No matter how one parses the degree to which each country is to blame for the
climate crisis, it is abundantly clear that both countries are vulnerable to its impact.
Argument
This dissertation provides an historical and descriptive generalization about the
characteristics and constitution of both the China-as-threat lobby and the China-as14

opportunity lobby. It argues that interest groups that view China’s rise as an opportunity for
the United States also tend to favor policies that prioritize green technologies. On the other
side, interest groups that view China’s rise as an existential threat to the United States and
encourage policies that undermine China’s power also tend to adopt a view that climate
change is not a serious threat and likewise advocate for policies that increase reliance on
fossil fuels and deemphasize green technology and climate change leadership. This
dynamic is an extension of the old China Lobby dichotomy that dominated US China
policy during the Cold War. The interest group dichotomy polarizes the policymaking
environment on China and climate change and reduces policy questions regarding climate
change to a mere component of US-China relations. This dissertation concludes that the old
dynamic of China policy being driven by US lobbyists is not defunct, but rather persists in
a replay of the past: a the twenty-first century iteration of the China Lobby dynamic. This
dynamic ultimately constrains the possibilities for climate policy by holding the climate
issue hostage to the greater dichotomized subset of a growing geo-political competition
between the United States and China. It does so in ways that cause the following results: (1)
a reduction of the climate problem to serve the greater security concerns of the US-China
relationship; and, (2) the creation of opportunities for industry lobbyists to pursue narrow
business interests over the broader climate concerns and solutions recommended by
scientists.
Many studies show that interest groups have driven key aspects of US-China
relations (Sutter; Ross) as well as, separately, the US response to climate change (Mayer;
McKibben; Krugman; Klein). But how do these political forces operate in tandem?
Thousands of interest groups exist, each with different agendas and resources. Existing
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literature demonstrates that the interest groups with the most money, political capital, and
access are more likely to see their preferred policies manifested in official policy. But this
finding does not illustrate the ways in which multiple competing interest groups navigate
each other and leverage political power through a convergence of agendas.
Literature Review
Who drives US foreign policy? This perennial question has been put forward by
political scientists beginning with the Founding Fathers. The question gets at the heart of
US democracy and sheds light on the US government’s ability to identify and represent the
interests of the people and the nation at large. This study sets aside the question of domestic
policy and look at the sources of influence behind the making of foreign policy, particularly
the role of organized interest groups.
According to liberal theories on international relations, foreign policy making is a
multi-step process that embraces input from many different sources. In contrast to realism’s
conception of the unitary state, liberal theorists stress the role of domestic interests in
foreign policy making. The President is the final executer, but members of the President’s
cabinet and other government officials including members of Congress as well as other
government agencies take part in the decision-making process. The individuals and groups
responsible for crafting policy can be influenced at any point in the process by interest
groups, from business to labor to environmental and human rights groups, even foreign
governments, diaspora groups, religious communities and policy centers.
While interest groups are the subject of many academic studies, they have been
poorly and inconsistently defined. In an effort to bring clarity to the muddied definition,
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one scholar wrote, “interest groups are actual organizations, they are private in nature, they
attempt to influence public policy, and they are not political parties—i.e., they do not
nominate candidates for public office” (Yoho 231). Interest groups have always been a part
of American politics. James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, “By a faction, I understand a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”
(Madison et al. 200). An interest group can be defined as “a set of actors who share a policy
goal” (Baumgartner et al. 6) or an “association of individuals who act to influence public
policy autonomously from the government or political parties” (Bloodgood 27). Milner and
Tingley note that most interest groups are seeking material benefits and in fact interest
groups activity should be greater when the policy at issue has greater “distributional
consequences” (18). However, they also note that there are some interest groups active in
foreign policy that are not motivated by material gain, for example, religious and ethnic
identity groups and sometimes NGOs (35-39).
This study uses the broadest definition of interest groups. Interest groups include,
first and foremost, think tanks, policy centers, and NGOs. It also includes industry groups,
Political Action Committees (PACs) and registered lobbyists as well as their client
organizations; foreign, domestic and multinational corporations and even agencies within
the US government. Also included are business associations, religious groups, labor
organizations, and the foundations that support them. Related to China, the NGOs are
mostly environmental and human rights groups because those are key issues in the USChina relationship. There is a long list of American trade and industry associations that
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lobby heavily on China policy, from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAMA)
to the US-China Business Council and the US Chamber of Commerce. This definition
includes any group that hires a lobbyist to promote their political interests or takes on the
activities of lobbyists themselves. This can include direct contact with politicians including
meeting with members of Congress or the executive branch, endorsing a candidate or
making campaign contributions. It can also include indirect or more diffuse sources of
influence aimed at raising awareness, influencing public opinion, or shaming or praising
politicians in newsletters or op-eds, conducting independent research and political analysis
or holding conferences or other events.
My literature review covers two separate but overlapping bodies of work. The first
comes from the discipline of foreign policy studies and covers the role of organized interest
groups in the foreign policy process. The second is more interdisciplinary and covers the
role that interest groups have had more broadly on US-China relations over time.
The Role of Interest Groups in the US Foreign Policy Process
Analysts of foreign policy study the stages of foreign policy making—from the
initial assessment of the political situation, to goal setting and the determination of policy
options, culminating in the final steps of decision-making and policy implementation.
Analysts also study which actors contribute at each stage. Public actors include: the
Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury and Justice, the President, Congress,
the National Security Council and the intelligence agencies. But there are also private
actors, and many of these are interest groups.
Interest groups impact policy outcomes through a range of activities that take place
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at different times during the foreign policy making process. Interest groups perform three
key functions. They: (1) set the terms of debate; (2) perform policy oversight, serving as a
“watch dog” group; and, (3) provide relevant and sometimes new information and fill gaps
or provide alternative policy analyses. As one author notes, “With their ties to constituent
members and their ability to conduct studies focused on particular issues, interest groups
often can generate information faster and more completely than can government agencies”
(Dietrich 283).
Interest group influence has grown over time. Historically, foreign policy
responsibilities have fallen solidly into the president’s domain and even while the president
may take domestic politics into consideration, foreign policy remains a separate area of
policy, often isolated from the president’s other domestic-oriented responsibilities (Putnam;
Wildavsky). From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, influence from
interest groups was “slight” or “indirect and diffuse” (Milbrath 231; Hero 20). Later, the
foreign policy world embraced a growing pluralism. Many studies on the role of interest
groups focus on the “explosion” of groups since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, over the
last 70 years, interest groups have experienced an increase in the sophistication, capacity,
and scope of general ambition and expectation. Why is this the case? There are several
answers.
The first has to do with the bureaucratic expansion in Washington. The National
Security Act passed in 1947 created a new position for a Secretary of Defense who oversaw
the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force.
It also created the National Security Council and the CIA. Suddenly there was a huge
increase in the number of players involved in US foreign policy. Moreover, structural
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changes in Congress and in the Executive branch, made it easier for interest groups and
lobbyists to have more contact. And members of Congress themselves began to take a
keener interest in America’s relations abroad with as much as 16 Congressional committees
(each with a growing staff) taking some role related to foreign policy including the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
House and Senate Armed Services Committees expanded to include not just budget issues
but also issues related to strategy (McCormick 170; Ripley and Lindsay 156-161).
Second, in the post-World War II era, as a byproduct of other trends including the
rise of the regulatory state and social welfare, growth in social movements and affluence,
there was an explosion of civic engagement across America. More recent studies produced
more detailed information on this general trend (McCormick; Tichenor and Harris; Verba et
al.). For example, Tichenor and Harris concluded that when examined through a long-term
historical lens we see that increased interest group activity is negatively correlated with
party trust, and periods of time when party authority was eroded by reforms (594).
A third reason for the interest group explosion is the emergence of two new factors
in shaping foreign policy: public opinion and the media. The war in Vietnam resulted in
greater attention paid to public opinion in official policy (Dietrich 281-282). As televisions
became common in American households, TV news and other sources of media emerged as
important forces in shaping public opinion (Jordan and Page 237; McCormick 170).
However, while public opinion can provide a check on public accountability, some political
elites—either elected representatives or political leaders representing interest groups—can
use the media to reframe policy to shape public opinion to their advantage (Baum and
Potter 15-18). Public opinion matters more when it is part of coalition building that
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includes political elites—often featured in the media—many of whom found a home base
in interest groups (Risse-Kappen 480-483).
Fourth, the trend toward pluralism expanded in the post-Cold War era when new
space was carved out to rethink America’s grand strategy. An increase in partisan and
ideological divides created more room for interest group activity (McCormick 172, Dietrich
280, Destler et al. 89). No longer did all of foreign policy revolve around a counter-Soviet
logic and strict security calculations (Holsti and Rosenau 1). Broader and more nuanced
and complicated issues came across the desks and entered into the discussions of the
foreign policy elite, for example, like the environment, human rights, refugees and
economic issues (Dietrich 281, Sutter 10). Over the last thirty years, there has been a
change in the type of issues considered part of foreign policy, namely, a shift away from
purely military and strategic issues to issues with more variables like trade and economic
policy, immigration and drug control, issues that generally enjoy more public engagement
(Dietrich 280).
Finally, some studies take a different tack altogether and challenge the assumption
that there has been more civic engagement in recent decades. They argue that citizens have
become less engaged since the end of the Cold War because they are living more isolated
lifestyles (Putnam 15) and that interest groups have been taken over by professionals with
ample funding and extensive lobbying capacity (Skocpol 7). In one version of this
argument, public attention to especially foreign policy issues has decreased so much over
time that interest groups and other non-elected political forces have been able to get away
with much more influence without democratic oversight, thus resulting in the privatizing of
US foreign policy (Davidson 5-10).
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The role of interest groups in US China policy
There are fewer published works that focus on the role of interest groups in the
creation of China policy in Washington. This section reviews those that do.
Similar to the trends observed in American foreign policy more generally, US China
policy also entered a period of pluralism following the end of World War II. This
intensified during the Cold War. With respect to China, there are three unique factors
driving this trend. The first of these factors came about when the Cold War ended,
dissolving the anti-Soviet rationale that underlay the US official policy regarding China up
to that point in time. New space opened up for big-picture debate on what US policy toward
China should be (Harding 300-301). An even larger shake-up occurred in the aftermath of
the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incidents (Dumbaugh 4-5). These events ruptured the
consensus in Washington, DC, on national China policy. Congress was no longer
convinced of what had been the basis for US policy up until that point, namely, that
political reform would follow economic reform in China. Suddenly, new tactics were
needed (Dumbaugh 4-5, Dietrich 284, Sutter 10). Interest groups were “able to play a
greater role in influencing US policy because of the greater fluidity and pluralism in US
foreign policy, including policy towards China, in the post-Cold War period” (Sutter 2).
A second factor that animated the expansion of interest group activity in China
policy was the fact that Congress became unusually involved in US-China relations.
Foreign policy is predominantly the domain of the executive branch. But with regard to
China policy, especially after World War II, this was not the case. Many studies focus on
Congress and China, and particularly on the role that interest groups and lobbyists played in
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the policy-making process regarding China. Congress has been unusually active in China
policy, more so than in other regions or issues (Xie 7; Lubman 541). One study on
Congress and China policy concludes that “congressional committees, bicameralism and
presidential veto make it virtually impossible for Congress to legislate on China, despite its
intense preferences, and therefore Congress often turns to informal—but no less effective—
means to exert influence on China policy, such as framing public opinion and generating
situations that result in anticipated reactions by the executive branch or Beijing” (Xie i). As
such, one can imagine how Congress may be more open to the lobbying of interest groups.
A third factor that intensified the role of interest groups in China policy is that
despite the fact that China is often at the center of domestic partisan attacks, within
Congress itself, China policy enjoys relatively wide bi-partisan agreement and cooperation
on key issues. Democrats and Republicans alike tend to be unified against China’s
authoritarian style of government, the growing trade surplus, China’s human rights record,
and China’s military buildup in the South China Sea and elsewhere (Xie). As such the
China issue is often used as a tool in domestic political campaigns, where China is cast in
negative terms (Trubowitz and Seo 189). One study concludes that US politicians “foster
unconstructive moralizing” and engage in “demonizing” “caricatures” of China for political
gain often using partisan and sometimes racist language (Lubman 541). Further, US
politicians will leverage that China issues, even “contorting the truth” to launch political
attacks against rivals. Moreover, party leaders use foreign policy in highly selective and
discriminating ways, “surgically targeting” specific voting blocs and regional electorates
(Trubowitz and Seo 211). Trubowitz and Seo also trace the Republican Party’s emergence
into foreign policy issues to the period after World War II when they could not win
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elections by opposing the New Deal and instead focused campaign rhetoric on fear
mongering about the rise of communism (200-201). The increased their electoral success,
particularly in the South. Democrats made a similar move in 1989 after Bush’s conciliatory
response to post-Tiananmen Beijing was viewed negatively by many Americans.
From whatever perspective one examines the United States’ process for making
policy regarding China, it is impossible to avoid the so-called “China Lobby,” or, as it is
sometimes called, the “Taiwan Lobby.” The ideological origin of the China Lobby’s values
and policies can be traced back to the end of World War II. In his 1974 treatise, The Logic
of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World
Politics, Franz Schurmann concludes that a group of like-minded politicians came together
in the wake of World War II to form a pro-Taiwan lobby in the United States Congress.
The group originally focused on Chiang Kai-Shek's defeat in the Chinese Civil War in
October of 1949. Schurmann describes a post-World War II world in which Washington,
DC, was pursuing two distinct foreign policies. The first, under President Harry Truman,
was the policy of “containment” (151). This policy was applied to the European theater of
the Cold War. Those who believed in tougher US policies on communism in Asia favored a
policy known as “roll-back.” They joined forces with the US Navy, which at the time was
underfunded and politically marginalized due to a renewed focus on the nuclear power in
the Air Force. The roll-back supporters and the Navy were given Asia as their domain and
carried out the secondary policy there. This temporarily solved a political turf battle in
Washington. The “China Lobby,” also referred to as the “Committee of One Million,”
attempted to shape American policy towards a more favorable relationship with Taiwan,
including defending its seat on the Security Council at the United Nations (Bachrack).
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Some studies on the China Lobby conclude that Congressional support for Taiwan is linked
to an increase in trade between the United States and Taiwan, and in particular to the
United States’ export of arms. Others conclude that, to the contrary, support for Taiwan is
linked instead to “shared norms” of democracy and human rights (Wu 380).
The China Lobby and the Committee of One Million were fixtures of US policy
debates regarding China from the 1950s through the 1970s. In the post-Cold War period,
vestigial elements of those lobbying structures reemerged. They were prominent during the
Congressional debate of Most-Favored Nation trade status with China that occurred in
1993-1994. Of the following published works, none focus directly on the role of interest
groups. Lubman makes it explicit, “This article examines only a highly specific component
of US policy, congressional rhetoric, and does not address tactics that members use to
affect that policy. No attempt is made to ascertain the extent to which congressional
utterances have been influenced by lobbies and campaign contributions” (543). Trubowitz
and Seo avoid the role of interest groups altogether. They assign the president’s mercurial
attitudes towards China solely to political efforts to win partisan battles and gain votes
using the other party’s foreign policy failures in China as a wedge issue (209). While Xie
finds that there does seem to be a “significant gap between public opinion and
congressional attitudes” he does not look at interest groups as an influencing factor.
Instead, he sees political in-fighting and concludes that Congress (with or without the
influence of interest groups) does indeed play an important role in shaping the US-China
relationship (141).
Each of the four studies (Teles, Sutter, Dietrich and Dumbaugh) that do deal
directly with the role of interest groups in US China policy, leave some important questions
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unanswered. The studies are more narrowly designed and do not look at the larger trends
related to interest groups in US-China relations. And none include studies on climate
change. For example, Dietrich’s study focuses on the role of interest groups in the MFN
debate in 1993-1994. In the study, he is only looking at non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)—e.g., Human Rights Watch—and not the impact of the more powerful lobbyists,
like trade groups and industry representatives. Likewise, Teles’ study shows the ways in
which opposing interests find common ground, e.g., human rights groups and economic
interests. As a short chapter in a book, the study is not designed to consider broader policy.
Teles examines public opinion and interest groups and the relationship between them with
regard to US policy on China. He brings the study into so-called “unchartered territory,”
examining the relationships between different interest groups and attempting to map out the
ways in which they relate to each other and jockey for power.
None of the works adequately answer the key questions addressed in this study. For
example, Dumbaugh’s study is not an analytical work with a conclusion or overall
assessment of the role interest groups play. Dietrich concludes that interest groups were
limited in their influence on policy outcomes, but the scope of his study is narrow and
focuses only on human rights NGOs in the MFN debate. Sutter’s book is thorough, but it is
out of date and lacks a larger narrative of US-China relations. And much has changed since
its publication: There is now more lobbying in the United States. China is involved in more
issues, climate change being a major example—Sutter does not include any environmental
groups in his study. And since China has changed its laws on NGOs operating within that
country, NGOs now have a new status in the bilateral relationship. Dietrich concludes that
NGOs are relevant only on the “softer” issues like human rights, fair labor practices, the
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environment, and abortion, but do not impact more important issues like security or trade.
Sutter draws a related conclusion: that Presidents must not bow to the demands of interest
groups lest they lose sight of the country’s more important national security issues with
regard to China policy. What Dietrich and Sutter omit, however, is that the winning side of
the argument—those who promoted engagement with China for the purposes of long-term
business interests and engagement with China through Containment—were also influenced
by lobbyists and special interests.
The four studies do, however, provide helpful information related to the
categorization and classification of clusters of interest groups. The Dumbaugh chapter was
originally written as a testimony before Congress and as such is a helpful resource in
mapping the different interest groups and their positions. Teles identifies three “clusters” of
interests on China policy. The first is strategic and military. The second is economics and
trade. And the third is the human rights lobby. These are categories that fit well with the
categories used in this study, except that this study emphasizes the ways in which the
strategic and military lobby often joins forces with the human rights lobby, both advocating
for stricter policies against China. The human rights lobby and the military lobby come
together in the China-as-Threat lobby with the business and economic lobby standing in
opposition.
To draw out the larger narrative—i.e., to look at the role of interest groups in
historical context—this study turns to several other large-scale accounts that illuminate
these more complex networks of power and influence as it pertains to US China policy over
the decades. For example, Schurmann’s The Logic of World Power describes the origins of
American power and influence in Asia, especially the right-wing effort to rollback
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communism, including in China. Schurmann’s book is long and sweeping, providing a
journalistic and narrative account of a complex political concept: the China Lobby, which
he describes as a collection of individuals and groups reflecting a political sentiment of the
time that permeated the entire Republican Party, dividing the country and the government,
and which got at the heart of national identity, animated by American imperialism and
ideas like manifest destiny. Written over 30 years later, Lawrence Davidson’s book Foreign
Policy, Inc. argues that interest group activity amounts to the privatization of foreign
policy, the hijacking of the public interest by private forces. He states that in fact there is a
history of foreign policy decisions that clearly do not benefit the country as a whole,
including the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. The United States, he surmises, is a
“factocracy,” a democracy of factions but not of the people. Interest groups fill the void left
by an uninterested and unengaged public. Bruce Cumings and Chalmers Johnson have both
published extensive work on the military industrial complex, the perceived China threat in
the United States and the political coalitions that have formed around that threat. Finally,
the journalistic books of Bob Woodward (The Agenda, The Choice, Plan of Attack, Bush at
War, State of Denial, Obama’s Wars, and Fear), Patrick Tyler (A Great Wall) and James
Mann (About Face) demonstrate that each side of the debate over China policy is driven—
at least in part—by lobbyists and special interests, entangled in a messy web. Tyler and
Mann describe in great detail the sometimes dramatic and mercurial battles and series of
trade-offs and negotiations between the various interests at play.
These accounts focus on individuals and illuminate their political skill and personal
networks: “the flesh and blood humans, often scoundrels, who harbored vengeance and
bias, who fought trivial, bureaucratic turf battles over strategic issues, and who practiced
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the lowest form of partisan warfare which threatened this important relationship for
domestic partisan advantage” as one reviewer described, in fact noting that this analysis
was lacking from Sutter’s book (Lilley 305). It is not just the earnest and well-meaning
human rights organizations using various tactics to get the ear of members of Congress or
better yet the President. It is a multivariable, many-leveled game of complex competing
interests hashing it out across several planes of bargaining.
Given the important questions posed by the literature in the first half of this
review—Do interest groups drive US policy? Do interest groups effectively “privatize” our
national interest and foreign policy discussions and processes?—it seems an urgent task to
examine more closely the way interest groups operate in the context of US climate change
policy. China is the United States’ largest and most important trade partner. It is the only
nation which stands to challenge US dominance in Asia and perhaps even globally. It is the
factory of the world and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. As Robert Sutter states,
“US policy makers must avoid catering to such (interest) groups. Good policy will continue
to require the careful attention to important international as well as domestic concerns”
(Sutter 3). To do that, the private interests must be untangled from the public interests, and
the commercial interests from those that are construed with the larger public in mind.
Contribution
This study straddles the work presented above and provides new insight and
analysis regarding interest groups and climate change policy within the context of USChina relations. While the earlier China Lobby literature presented in this review
(Schurmann, Cumings, Johnson, Bachrack) provide large-scale sweeping accounts of forces
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that shape US foreign policy and a narrative that describes America’s role in international
relations more generally, this study is also rooted in the more recent—and smaller in
scope—literature on the impact of organized interest groups on US foreign policy. This
second group (Teles, Dumbaugh, Dietrich, Sutter and Ross) shifts focus to the political
process itself—not national identity and the big questions about America’s role in the
world. Their research narrows in on the interest group as the unit of analysis. All of these
studies adopt an assumption that there has been a major reshuffling of China policy
predominantly altered by the loss of the anti-Soviet rationale for US-China relations, and,
in its place, the emergence of a new rationale for the China engagement camp: US
economic interests in China. These studies shift focus to the intermestic issues—domestic
aspects of foreign relations. They also begin to include both the executive and legislative
branches as critical parts of foreign policy making (whereas the earlier studies focused only
on the executive branch). They also reflect a post-Cold War political environment that was
marked by an “explosion” of interest group activity and a more pluralistic foreign policy
making process that included not just a wider role for interest groups but also public
opinion. Thus each of these studies provide more case evidence for an expanded “unholy
alliance”—in this case the addition of human rights groups but also consumer protection
groups, labor and US manufacturing interests, proponents of economic nationalism and
protectionism as well as some of the old “fellow travellers”—the Navy, anti-Communists,
pro-lifers, the Taiwan lobby, as well as advocated for independence and civil rights in Hong
Kong, and Xinjiang.
All five accounts are written as if there were no history of the China Lobby and that
the history of relations between lobbyists on either side of the China debate do not exist.
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The question remains: how do the interest groups described in these five accounts grafts
onto partisan politics at the time? Where do these political forces come from? Moreover,
these five accounts use as their starting point of analysis the idea that there was a “collapse
in consensus” over China policy following the end of the Cold War. However, after reading
the China Lobby accounts by Shurmann and Bachrack, it is clear that there never was a
consensus on China policy and that the tension in those debates had huge impacts on US
policy more generally. This study aims to bridge these gaps. First, it provides an update,
extending and applying the descriptions put forward in the China Lobby literature to a more
contemporary time across three case studies. Second, it fuses the journalistic and historical
accounts of the China Lobby with the post-Cold War interest group literature described
above. This study adopts the interest group analytical approach but traces the broader
interests identified in the earlier China Lobby accounts that are neglected in the post-Cold
War literature. Third, it introduces climate change as an issues area of focus for US-China
relations and the study of these lobbies and their impacts.
Research Design
The methodology used here is determined by the scope of the project as befits a
descriptive analysis. The focus of the research is to classify, describe and compare the
two broad lobbies primarily through analysis of the documents that members of each
lobby produces as well as speeches and op-eds related to my three case studies. The focus
is on the following questions: What are the characteristics of these political forces? How
do they relate to one another? How have they evolved over time?
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This is a qualitative and descriptive study organized around process-traced case
studies. It builds on existing quantitative and qualitative studies. Instead of recreating the
studies that show that interest group drive both China and climate policy, this dissertation
uses those studies as a starting point and probe deeper into a historical analysis to
examine how interest groups interact with each other, create enduring political coalitions
and define the policy making environment. The most difficult methodological question
presented in this study is how to measure the influence of an interest group’s activity on a
particular policy outcome. Baumgartner and Leech contend that there is significant
confusion about how to do so (3) and Cigler and Loomis state that it is “exceedingly
difficult” (17). Dur and DeBievre add that it is “notoriously difficult to operationalize the
concepts of influence and power” (2). And indeed, this is increasingly true as theoretical
studies on the origins and nature of political power become more complex. Yet, the
majority of study accept unquestioned the basic assumption that interest groups do
influence policy, even if they cannot find a way to measure that influence.
Rather than attempting to measure the direct influence of interest groups on policy
outcomes, this study seeks to describe and understand the behavior and policy positions of
interest groups in a historical context particularly focusing on the relationship between their
views on China’s rise (negative or positive) and how that impacts their position on climate
policy. Mapping out the policy-making environment provides more texture to the larger
task of understanding what drives US climate policy and ultimately, what prevents the US
from acting more swiftly and decisively on an issue that is deemed by most American
voters as critical to human survival.
This dissertation is based on historical methods including content analysis,
32

discourse analysis, and process tracing. In the historical contextual analysis, this study uses
a comparative historical approach, especially valuable here because of its three distinctive
features: causal analysis, processes over time and systemic and contextualized comparison
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 6). The study follows the guidelines for periodization
outlined by Pierson, which is the idea that each event tracked in the development of USChina relations is related to the past and part of a continuum and flow of events (181).
Chapter 2 divides the recent history of US-China relations into the periods with the
following critical junctures dividing the periods. The first period is from the 1949 founding
of the People’s Republic of China to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. The second period
runs from 1972 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The third period starts with China’s
economic reforms and ends with the passage of Most Favored Nation trade status with the
US. The fourth and final period runs from China’s entry intro the WTO to the end of the
Donald Trump administration. Thus, the opening of diplomatic relations between the US
and China, represented by the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, the fall of the Soviet Union
and China’s subsequent period of economic liberalization and the passage of Most Favored
Trade status, are all critical junctures in US-China relations. The Shanghai Communiqué
and the fall of the Soviet Union are bookends to the era of US-China relations defined by
the Cold War security dynamic, particularly the anti-Soviet rational for US-China
engagement. The end of the Cold War and China’s emergence as a trade partner mark
another period of transformation and the rise of the business rationale in the China-asopportunity model.
Sources for the comparative historical analysis section include eye-witness
accounts, written testimony, Congressional records, and journalistic accounts. Journalistic
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accounts of foreign policy making include detailed narratives of the lobbying that took
place, chronicling the full pivot of a various groups’ and individuals’ policy positions.
Historical records show the positions interest groups took on China and when they changed
their positions and what factors contributed to those changes. Records of conversations
between members of Congress and the executive branch offer insights into the ideological
discussions behind China policy and illuminate which factors were considered and which
were dismissed.
The analysis section of Chapter 2 draws links between lobbying activity and the
political and historical narrative used by the China Lobby, relying on historical documents,
written testimonies, journalistic accounts, opinion articles in newspapers and magazines,
official government policy documents and the lobbying data listed on websites like
OpenSecrets.org, the Center for Responsive Politics, the Environmental Integrity Project,
the Sunlight Foundation, the lobbying database, Washington Representatives, and the
Senate Office of Public Records.
For Chapters 3-5, a key goal of the methodology is to be able to identify the ways in
which interest groups interact and form coalitions to advance their interests. To achieve this
methodologically speaking, the study adopts a content analysis approach, focusing on
policy papers published by interest groups. The focus here is on two variables: coalition
building and the evocation of the remnants of or versions of the full political narratives
outlined in Chapter 2, especially regarding issue-linkages, for example between the security
implications for the US and the rise of China and China’s human rights records. Or
between China’s dominance in green technology industries and its labor practices. Also
considered, is the way interest groups work together and reinforce pre-existing narratives
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about US-China relations. These narratives—described in detail in Chapter 2—have created
deep grooves in Washington’s political culture and couple certain groups together as odd
bedfellows—or sometimes short-tern fellow travelers—on policy related to China.
Organization
Each chapter of this dissertation provides descriptive analysis and elaborates on the
patterns outlined in the hypothesis. The chapters show how these divergent alignments of
interest groups—that include both threat assessments from think tanks, as well as the
narrow business interests of industry lobbyist—cohere around a unified policy position in
ways that: (1) flatten complex policy debates into a dichotomy of US-China relations; and,
(2) advance narrow, parochial business interests over the recommendations of climate
scientists.
Chapter 2 traces the ideological and political roots of the two clusters of interest
groups emerging from the famous China Lobby that first cohered around support for
Taiwan’s new government after China’s civil war that ended in 1949 with America’s
perceived “loss” of China to communism. This chapter maps out the political reach and
influence of the China Lobby, not just the pro-Taiwan, anti-communist lobby, but also
those groups with which the China Lobby found common ground: human rights and
democracy advocates, Christians, and the US Navy. Second, it tracks the rise of the probusiness lobby that emerged in opposition to the China Lobby after US economic
engagement increased in the 1980s and new voices in US foreign policy advocated for
increased engagement with Beijing. The following is identified in each group: (1) narrative
and identity; (2) coalition building strategy; and, (3) tactics or preferred policies. These
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lobby groups expanded during the Cold War and have persisted since.
Chapter 2 describes the ideological origins of the lobbies. This is important because
it demonstrates the longevity of these political forces, even as they have evolved over time.
It also shows the ways in which these lobbies have worked in collaboration with other
forces. For example, the human rights and Taiwan lobbies have often sided with the mostly
Republican-based China-as-threat lobby. Likewise, seeking access to Chinese markets, the
fossil fuel lobby has sometimes sided with the mostly Democrat China-as-opportunity.
However, the predecessors of these “unholy alliances” were formed in the years following
World War II, and as such have had a long political legacy as powerful policy shapers in
Washington.
Chapters 3 through 5 include case studies focusing on policy initiatives to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Chapter 3 focuses on renewable energy, and, using empirical
evidence shows a conflation of interest groups aligning pro-climate and groups that favor
engagement with China on the one hand, and, anti-climate and anti-China groups on the
other. Through this polarizing divide, it is clear that policy discussions among interest
groups on solar and wind power are ultimately hemmed in by the broader security concerns
related to the US relationship to China. Aligning with the China-as-threat lobby, fossil fuel
trade and interest groups aimed to block renewable energy citing energy independence,
decreased reliance on Chinese-sourced green technologies as among the reasons to
emphasize fossil fuels. The two sets of groups—industry lobbyists and policy think tanks—
sought a mutually beneficial policy of US-China decoupling and reinvestment in
domestically-produced fossil fuel as a source of American energy. Under Trump, US
security concerns, particularly about intellectual property, Chinese espionage, and
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perceived “predatory” trade practices, obstructed any meaningful progress on US-China
cooperation on the development of renewable energy such as wind and solar and create
“separate technology spheres” in the US and China.
On the other side, aligning with the China-as-opportunity lobby, other energy and
trade companies lobby for limited advances in renewable energy in order to secure
government grants. Think tanks were divided over the question of how the US should
engage with China on issues related to trade and technology transfer. While carefully
securing lucrative business opportunities for American green energy companies, the Chinaas-opportunity lobby also aggressively advocated for policies that ultimately increase the
corporate power of US-based wind and solar energy companies, such as stronger protection
of intellectual property rights, even if those measures conflicted with the goal of
widespread dissemination of green technologies.
Chapter 4 applies the model developed in Chapter 3 to the development of electric
vehicles in the United States, which was a major component of the US nationally
determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement and a central policy of the Obama
administration. The China-as-opportunity lobby comprised industry groups that advocated
for increased government support for electric vehicle development in the United States,
believing this was the way to “catch up” with China and propel the United States into a
position of climate leadership globally, ahead of China. Through that policy initiative,
industry lobbyists sought a series of US-China business opportunities for auto
manufacturers with the goal of achieving short-term gains for US auto companies but with
no plan to fundamentally shift to a climate-friendly model of transportation. Under the
Trump administration, China-as-threat think tanks overlapped with fossil fuel industry
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lobbyist to promote a policy of US isolation from China and return to internal combustion
vehicles in the United States. These policy goals neatly aligned with Trump’s economic
protectionist policies, specifically the trade war with China. Some of the protectionist
language used by interest groups to advance this set of policies evolved into a culture war
about ideas and images rather than the soundness of specific policies. For example, electric
vehicles were characterized as “elite” and an ideological aversion to green technology was
cultivated by interest groups and republican political activists, equating a return to fossil
fuel based transportation and a decoupling of the US and Chinese transportation industries
with nationalism, patriotism, and “standing up to China” and the Trump slogan, “Make
America Great Again.”
Chapter 5 demonstrates how this model extends to the interest group approach to
the UNFCCC climate talks, culminating in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Here again there is a
conflation of interests between the think tanks that were advocating for bolder US-China
cooperation at the UNFCCC and the US-based industry groups that sought government
contracts with their Chinese counterparts to expand renewable energy and other forms of
energy efficiency in the United States. Similarly, on the other side, think tanks that have
long advocated for more aggressive policies against Beijing found themselves in common
cause with industry lobbyists pushing for a return to fossil fuels and a scrapping of the Paris
Agreement (a policy that Trump eventually heeded). Even while supposedly supporting US
leadership on climate change, China-as-opportunity interest groups under the Obama
administration advocated for the elimination of the main enforcement mechanism from the
Paris agreement, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which
supported business interests but at the same time undermined the main enforcement

38

mechanism of the deal and significantly weakened the Paris Agreement. Those same
lobbyists pushed Obama to seek diplomatic cooperation with China and to sign a deal that
would allow US and Chinese corporations to work together to meet these less ambitious
goals.
The study concludes by explaining how this model helps us understand the context
for US policy on climate change. It shows how the two clusters of interest groups, the
China-as-threat and China-as-opportunity lobby, create a policy environment that shapes
opportunities for the US and China to work more collaboratively and effectively towards
climate solutions. Finally, it makes some predictions about how interest groups might drive
climate policy in the future.
Areas of future study
The patterns observed in this study show that interest groups present a narrow
spectrum of policy options on both China and climate change policy in the United States. It
shows that the conflation of industry lobbyists with advocates for different approaches to
China policy has the potential to shape US policy on China and climate change.
Considering that interest groups have been shown to have a significant and growing impact
on policy outcomes, it is important to ask, what does this mean for the ultimate direction
and outcome of US climate policy? What does this mean for democracy? James Madison, a
proponent of democratic pluralism, argued that interest group politics expands democracy.
Any citizen is equally able to form a group and leverage their interest, so the presence of
groups serves to enhance the voice of the people. But what happens when these groups
become too powerful and drown out the voices they are supposedly competing against?
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What happens when these groups are inherently biased—disproportionately favoring the
interests of certain industries or the wealthy and well-connected elites such as is the case
with the powerful industry lobbyists studied here? Having mapped out these political
arrangements and provided and explanation for their policy positions, the next step in this
research would be to find a way to measure exactly how much influence these enduring
coalitions wield in the foreign policy making process as well as what impact that influence
has on US policy.
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CHAPTER 2
Enduring Political Coalitions: The Ideological and Political Origins and
Characteristics of Groups that Lobby US-China Relations

This chapter focuses on the political coalitions that impact US-China relations
that developed during the Cold War and have persisted since. Since World War II, China,
unlike any other country with which the United States has relations, has captured the
energy of domestic tensions and ideological divisions in American society. Chapters 3
through 5 show how these coalitions, animated by interest groups, have created a specific
policy-making environment during the Obama and Trump administrations. In order to
understand the economic interests, ideology, and long-standing narratives that define the
climate change policy arena, the origins of these political forces must first be examined.
This chapter observes that the lobbying forces around China policy fall roughly
into two major camps, China-as-threat and the China-as-opportunity. For each lobby,
three factors are identified that define its evolution over the years, leading up to their
roles in the Obama and Trump administrations. First, the common characteristics and
traits including policy goals. Second, the lobby’s identity and political narrative. And
third, coalition-building strategies, including areas of bipartisan agreement and issues
where the far-left and far-right overlap.
This chapter concludes that these political coalitions, and the lobbies they formed,
can be characterized by their consistency and political endurance over time. However,
there are also ways in which these lobbies have changed, in some cases pursuing different
policy goals to meet similar ideological ends. The changes reflect the ways in which the
lobbies were shaped by events in history, recently, China’s rise and the evolving political
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and economic parity between Washington and Beijing including what was believed to be
achievable or realistic in the policy arena. For example, the economic protectionism
recommended by the China-as-threat lobby focused on a different segment of the
economy in the years following World War II and during the period studied here.
Initially, the lobby sought to protect US regions associated with Navy manufacturing. By
the time of the Obama and Trump administrations, the same coalition of political forces
had evolved to protect economic sectors that were had lost jobs to Chinese competitors—
a political campaign that allowed appeals to a much broader segment of the population
but one that fit a fairly narrow and specific socio-economic profile. This created an
opportunity for the China-as-threat lobby to adopt class-based arguments and economic
language later used by the Trump administration.
The China-as-opportunity lobby began as an elite group of policy influencers that
sought economic opportunity through increased trade and investment in China—despite
the fact that the common perception of China at the time (1972-2001) was not overtly and
decisively supportive of the idea that China was a good or worthwhile economic partner.
Later, after China joined the WTO and US investment in China skyrocketed, the Chinaas-opportunity lobby shifted away from narrow arguments about economic returns and
began to use language that appealed to broader US values such as the spread of
democracy, global leadership, multilateralism via international institutions.
This chapter shows the original fusion of the China lobby components that
occurred during the great shifts in global power that occurred in the wake of World War
II and the way these components fused themselves to domestic political alignments
becoming proxies for broader political narratives and identities. The rest of the chapter
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illustrates how these political forces not only evolved and expanded but also how they
applied their influence from 1949 to 2008.
The China Lobby
The first part of this chapter traces the ideological and political origins of the
China-as-threat lobby, known since the end of World War II as the China Lobby. The
China Lobby rallied around the idea of providing political and military support for
Taiwan and blocking Beijing’s membership to the UN Security Council. Adopting an
“underdog” status, the lobby associated with the right wing of the Republican Party as
well as the defense industry. Second, the chapter turns to the counter lobby, the China-asopportunity lobby, which emerged in opposition to the China-as-threat lobby by creating
the case for increased political and economic engagement with Beijing. The China-asopportunity lobby began in the context of US-Soviet détente with its first political victory
culminating in Richard Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 1972 to initiate the process of
normalizing relations between the US and China. Since then, the lobby amassed support
behind the idea of engagement with China both as a strategic political goal—to balance
the Soviet Union—but, later, as an opportunity for US economic expansion.
The political forces behind normalization later evolved into a campaign that
pushed through permanent trade relations during the Clinton administration. It allied
itself with Wall Street and the Democratic Party, adopting an elitist identity that explicitly
protected US business interests in China while at the same time adopted the principles of
globalization and liberalism. The lobby pushed for global solutions to global problems
like climate change, preferring policies that emphasized diplomacy and US engagement
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with China, often in the form of working with China through international institutions.
The lobby’s response to China rise was to bring China into compliance with the norms
and regulations of those institutions. This was the lobby that sought engagement with
China through the Paris Agreement and partnership and technology-sharing in the electric
vehicle and renewable energy industry. It attempted to roll back Trump’s trade war,
citing the ways in which tariff hurt US multinational corporations.
Although on the surface it dealt with foreign policy, the China-related lobbies
served an important domestic function. Indeed, there is a unique way in which China
policy captures domestic political tensions and ideological divisions. According to Robert
Ross, “In the absence of strategic necessity and possessing little else in common with
China, domestic interests have often prevailed in the making of China policy” (ix). And,
“China … [is] a proxy issue for presidential strength in foreign policy” (48). Robert
Sutter added, that on China policy, “US leaders need to be sensitive to the more
important role of domestic interests in the post-Cold War environment. Otherwise, they
may fall from power as did George Bush” (5). And, he continues, “much more important
in determining US policy was the battle among competing US interests using lobbying
tactics and other legal means to persuade policymakers to support their point of view”
(5).
China Lobby – characteristics and policy goals
The China Lobby—or the origins of the China-as-threat lobby—animated a new
political alliance that reinforced a broader mission that it advanced through US-China
relations. Although the central event uniting the alliance was the perceived loss of China to
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communism, Franz Schurmann, in his 1974 book, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry
into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics, argued that the forces
uniting the far-right wing politicians on the issue of Taiwan were not merely ideological.
The impetus was larger than a desire to lobby the administration to take an
uncompromising stance against Mao’s communist regime in Mainland China. Nor was the
alliance simply organized to promote Republican criticism of a Democratic president.
Schurmann writes that “the only phenomenon in recent American history comparable to the
rising of the right in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the rising of the left in the late
1960s…[w]hat China was for the right, Vietnam was for the liberals,” (150). Indeed, the
rise of the right in the 1940s resulted from a collaboration of the political, ideological, and
social forces that existed at the time, motivated by the perennial human desire for greater
power, influence and wealth. As Schurmann stated, “[t]he two countries [Vietnam for the
liberals, and China for the neo-conservatives] came to symbolize what were essentially
inter-American struggles,” (151). The goal is to map out these inter-American struggles to
assess the ways in which the vestigial, or in some cases, reinvigorated aspects of the
struggle over US-China policy impacts the US response to climate change today.
Since the 1950s, US policy towards China has been influenced by a motley group
of politicians, party activists, former intelligence officers, academics, legislative aides
and their respective organizations, which formed in Washington to warn of the dangers
posed by the Communist Party that took power in 1949 in Beijing. Although the China
Lobby existed prior to World War II, its associations with political forces in Washington
that form the foundation for contemporary US-China relations didn’t emerged until after
the war. Although members came from different political traditions, the China Lobby
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cohered around the shared belief that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) represented a
powerful threat to US interests and that the economic prosperity and the rise in power of
the People’s Republic of China placed it on a hostile collision course with the United
States. The China Lobby emerged into a formidable, but unusual, political force in
Washington in the 1950s into the 1970s, resulting in the transformation of China policy
into a tense ritual of political bargaining, that balanced the China Lobby’s military and
political support for Taiwan with the push for détente and normalization of relations with
Beijing.
The China Lobby first came together even before American entrance into World
War II to convince Washington to donate money and weapons to the Nationalist army
under General Chiang Kai-Shek in his war against, first, the Japanese in mainland China
and, later, in the Chinese civil war that pitted the Mao Zedong’s Red Army against
Chiang’s Nationalist Army. Following Chiang Kai-Shek’s defeat in the Chinese civil war in
October of 1949, and the subsequent Nationalist exodus to the island of Taiwan, the
group’s focus shifted to providing diplomatic, financial, and military support to Chiang’s
government in Taiwan and blocking Beijing’s legitimacy in the international community.
One characteristic of the China Lobby that remains unaltered in the future
incarnation of the China-as-threat lobby is its preoccupation with assuming a traditionally
losing identity in Washington politics. Events from 1949 to 2008 reaffirmed these
perceived losses, hardening the victimhood narrative. The first example of this was
Truman’s containment policy. Many perceived losses followed, including the 1972
Shanghai Communiqué that paved the way for the 1979 normalization of relations between
Washington and Beijing, described later in this chapter. When Secretary of State Dean
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Acheson issued a White Paper in 1949, he revealed to the China Lobby that the Truman
administration was not fully committed to the security of Taiwan and that it was
considering eventual relations with Beijing. In a letter to Truman, Acheson stated: “The
unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was
beyond the control of the government of the United States .... Nothing that was left undone
by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces
which this country tried to influence but could not” (“Government White Pages”). In short,
Acheson said that Truman had accepted that there was a limit to American power
(Schurmann 151). By doing this, Truman challenged the nation-state based security
calculation and began to open up the possibility of US power through economic
opportunity.
Humiliating as it was, the loss during the Truman administration emboldened the
China Lobby. Many of its “losses” were understood by the China Lobby as concessions to
non-ideal and precarious security situations. They also felt that their ideas were undermined
by pro-status quo herd-mentality bureaucrats in Washington, an idea similar to Trump’s
concept of the “swamp.” And, like Trump, the China Lobby viewed the dominant political
powers in Washington as elite insiders that operated in environments with little oversight
from their constituents particularly on foreign policy. Elections could put new leaders in
power, but the political elite of the status quo would prevail and the China Lobby was left
on the outside. Their goal then became to upset the insider-based status quo, to form a new
agenda on China.
The China Lobby found reassurance in the idea that concessions were temporary,
forced compromises that would be eventually overturned. Truman’s containment policy on
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China reflected his fear of the mutually assured destruction that would occur in the event of
a nuclear war, but that did not mean it was the right policy. Thus, it was clear that the China
Lobby would remain the disenfranchised minority as long as the “greater evil” of the Soviet
Union existed, and as long as the fear of nuclear war ensured support for the less aggressive
policies of containment. The China Lobby would have to wait for a more favorable
international political environment before it witnessed its own ascendancy in any
administration.
China Lobby – identity and political narratives
The China Lobby had an important role in American political history in the way
that it built and reified political fault lines that continue to define Washington. It
represented something that is not just the product of partisan bickering. It was beyond
departmental competition for power, and deeper than ideological differences. It reflected
ongoing tension between two visions of American identity: one of American supremacy
and empire, a policy based on principles of human rights and democracy, and the values
of Christianity; and another of American restraint and internationalism, that preferred
expanding trade and the development of global capitalism. The difference lay between
whether one viewed the China relationship as commercial or conflictual at its core. The
China-as-threat lobby represented a national vision, based in the security concerns of the
nation state. The China-as-opportunity lobby grew to represent a global vision rooted in
the values of liberalism, internationalism, and security concerns of the multinational
corporation.
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One common characteristic that links the China Lobby of the 1950s with the
China-as-threat lobby from 2008-2016 is its identity as simultaneously a traditionally
losing political class amongst the political elite, but one that was also backed up by
powerful and sometimes covert political forces. For example, when two members of
Congress proposed an investigation into China Lobby activity, a donation of $800,000
from Nationalist Chinese officials in Taiwan reportedly was made in exchange for calling
off the investigation. Later, the publication of a book on the China Lobby was suppressed
by allies to the Eisenhower administration (“Consortiumnews.com”). The lobby worked
with the support of the CIA, which funded anti-communist groups that advanced China
Lobby causes (Cohen). In return, the Nationalist government in Taiwan gave more than
$2 million into Republican political campaigns in 1948 (“Consortiumnews.com”).
But the China Lobby was also viewed as corrupt and, according to the
Congressional investigation wielding “brazen power” (“Consortiumnews.com”). The China
Lobby weaponized a victim identity to justify questionably legal activities. Their underdog
status served as a war cry and fired up their resilience and righteousness, providing them
with a kind of us-vs-them narrative, “them” being the moderate Democrats and Republican
elites who held increasingly convergent views on American grand strategy. According to
Schurmann, these individuals felt estranged even in their own Republican Party. They were
“small-town provincial businessmen” who resented big government, the elitism of
internationalism, and “foreign-minded academia.” According to Schurmann, “… [for these
individuals] … the essence of America was the small town with its white, middle-class
population, its generally Protestant, or decently Catholic religion, its values of
individualism, private enterprise and national pride” (151).

49

The China Lobby’s political estrangement eventually drove them to adopt policies
of covert military action. While Truman pursued the policy of Containment in the years
following World War II, engaging in a limited war against communism, the China Lobby
felt betrayed and sought new channels of influence inside Washington. They advocated for
a “rollback” policy imbued with the American concept of Manifest Destiny, which
envisioned American expansion beyond the Hawaiian Islands, ultimately aiming for a
policy of global domination and hegemony. Crucial to this goal was the establishment of
American military bases in Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam, which would
facilitate the encirclement and eventually “roll back” communist expansion. The
rollbackers believed that turning away from established communist regimes exposed
American weakness, and would ensure the expansion of Soviet influence. Instead, they
argued for policies that demonstrated American toughness and resolve. They argued that
the United States should engage in a more confrontational and militaristic strategy, which
would eliminate the communist threat altogether. An American grand strategy that
promoted an increased military presence and American dominance in Asia was essential in
the rollback calculation. Taiwan was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and part of a “floating
chain-link fence” which the Navy used to contain Chinese regional influence (Nathan and
Ross 60).
China Lobby – bipartisan coalitions
One of the most powerful features of the China Lobby was its ability to attract new
allies and create multipolar, and bipartisan coalitions. Members may not agree on anything
else, but they came together in their belief that China represents an existential threat to the
United States and to the world order built by the United States, and that it must be stopped.
50

It was not just an ideological force. It drew together disparate political entities, creating a
piling-on effect and widening the reach of the China Lobby into the American political
culture. It is and was an alliance that is unlike anything else in Washington then or now.
The first coalition member was the US military, particularly the US Navy. Later, human
rights, labor, pro-democracy, Christian, and anti-abortion advocates also piled on. First, the
Navy.
With the advent of the nuclear bomb, US military policy shifted its focus to
prioritize the Air Force over other branches of the military, which resulted in the Navy
joining forces with the China Lobby (Schurmann 154). Regions in the United States
heavily dependent economically on manufacturing weapons and Naval machinery faced
economic decline. Members of Congress that represented these areas found political reason
to support the China Lobby: emphasis on the Pacific Theater would alter national policies
sufficiently to reinvigorate the Navy and their constituent economies. A worldview
emphasizing China as a threat would justified the need for a stronger Navy in the Pacific.
Thus, the China Lobby began to count on the support from members of Congress that
represented industry related to the Navy. Joining forces created the political clout they
lacked separately (154). Today, the Navy maintains this political orientation and holds the
same influence in Congress. Similarly, in the intervening years as the perceived threat from
China has evolved from military to economic, the China-as-Threat lobby has picked up the
support of members of Congress that represent segments of the economy that have lost
manufacturing jobs to China (Zhang et al. 103).
The China Lobby, and later, China-as-threat lobby, was also able to build coalitions
with other political forces in Washington. Christianity, and those who believed in the
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spread of Christian ideas, including later anti-abortion advocates, became the next force to
join the China Lobby coalition. Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-Shek was not only anti-communist,
he was also a converted Methodist Christian. Although missionaries flooded China
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when Chairman Mao Zedong came to
power in 1949, Christianity was abolished by communism. At this time, the existing
converted Christians and religious organizations fled to Taiwan along with the Nationalist
Army. Although Christians only make up 3.9% of the population in Taiwan, half protestant
and half Catholic, many early Taiwanese leaders converted to Christianity including
Chiang, his wife, and son, Chiang Ching-kuo who were Methodists. Lee Teng-hui was a
Presbyterian, a denomination that, in America, historically has shown support for Taiwan’s
independence. Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president from 2008-2016 was baptized into the
Catholic tradition as a teenager. Indeed, Christians have developed social and educational
programs in Taiwan and constructed institutions to support these programs. In addition,
Christian organizations in Taiwan provide a link between Taiwan and international and
American Christian organizations (Clart and Jones).
Slowly, as the China Lobby expanded its political agenda, it appealed to greater
sectors of the American electorate. Time and Life magazines founder, Henry Luce, born
in China to missionary parents, devoted himself to supporting Taiwan in his magazines.
Businessmen William Pawley and Alfred Kohlberg and military officials such as Claire
Chennault and Admiral Charles M. Cooke also supported the rollback policy. New
Hampshire Senator Style Bridges and California Senator William Knowland, whose
home state economies depended heavily on the Navy, were also supporters (Bachrack 6,
37).
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The above describes the character and some specific policy goals of the China
Lobby, as well as its self-described identity and political narrative and its ability to create
cross-partisan coalitions. The next section turns to the China Lobby’s role in Washington
politics starting with it the lobby reaching political maturity around 1955 up until the period
of time examined in this work. Crucial here is the idea that the China Lobby was a
traditionally losing minority. It was an underdog, but understood itself to be in a constant
state of compromise, muted and marginalized by the immediate political convenience of a
few elites in Washington. As such there was a sense to this lobby that they felt entitled to a
political comeback of sorts and, or some kind of moment of reckoning.
Shaping the China Lobby through wins and losses, 1955-2008
The political life of the China Lobby, as it existed through different
administrations from Truman to George W. Bush, was a story of compromise and
rededication. To trace the full lineage of the China Lobby’s role in US China policy, it is
essential to look at the China Lobby as it was shaped by three critical junctures in USChina relations. The first is the passage of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué followed by
the 1979 subsequent normalization of relations. The second critical juncture is the end of
the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US-led unipolar
world order. The third critical juncture is the passage of MFN trade status with the US
and China’s entrance into the WTO. All three junctures were experienced as political
losses by the China-as-threat lobby. At each juncture the coalition broadened, bringing in
new political forces resulting in the enduring coalition that operates today.
Likewise, each juncture shaped its opposition, the China-as-opportunity lobby,
which was the main political justification behind the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. In
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tracing the evolution of the China-as-threat lobby, it becomes apparent how the China-asopportunity lobby followed its own path of compromise and rededication shaping it into
the political force that existed during the Obama and Trump administrations.
Juncture #1: The Shanghai Communiqué
The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué signed by Richard Nixon followed by the
normalization of relations in 1979 under Jimmy Carter, solidified the China Lobby as a
second-tier force in Washington. The lobby was not powerless—both presidents were
forced to make major political concessions because of it—but they were asked again to
concede to those who sought a more conciliatory relationship with Beijing. Again,
decisions were made as part of larger security calculations and perceived opportunities
that the China Lobby viewed as disproportionately benefitting the elite. Again, the China
Lobby was marginalized and weaponized their perceived victimization as a call to fight
harder.
Nixon faced tremendous challenges from the China Lobby in Congress. They
considered Nixon’s relationship with Beijing as evidence that the United States had “sold
out” Taiwan (Tyler 153). Nixon, a conservative Republican, believed a Sino-US alliance
would be effective in deterring Soviet expansion, and could help distract from the
impending US defeat in Vietnam. Following the 1956 diplomatic split between the PRC
and the Soviet Union, the United States took the opportunity to further isolate Moscow by
reaching out to Beijing. Nixon advisors warned about the mounting force of the China
Lobby in Congress, which was had sent senators to visit Taiwan and had supported
Taiwan’s request for additional weapons sales for the upcoming year (117).
In 1979, when Jimmy Carter abrogated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with
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Taiwan in order to carry through with normalization of relations between Washington and
Beijing, he faced considerably kickback from the China Lobby. In response to the
abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, on Christmas Eve of 1978, George H. W. Bush
wrote in a Washington Post commentary, “For President Carter, who professes a strong
belief in Christian ethics, it should be a tormenting thought that by his hand, the United
States has put an entire people [the Taiwanese] adrift in a cruel hostile sea—and scarcely
for any purpose” (qtd. in Tyler 173). Likewise then future president Ronald Reagan called
Carter’s actions a betrayal and made a subsequent personal trip to Taiwan (Tyler 117).
Both Nixon and Carter took tremendous political risks to establish ties with Beijing,
and both were forced to pay the price by making some political concessions. Nixon did not
have the political strength to ignore the right-wing criticism entirely, and consequently, he
was forced to construct a strategically ambiguous policy on China and Taiwan, an
unofficial policy that persists today. Nixon had to frame the US-Taiwan relationship in
such a way that it was acceptable to Beijing. At the same time, he had to abide by the
wording of the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. Nixon’s then foreign policy aide,
Henry Kissinger admitted this dilemma directly to Mao in November of 1973: “Our
difficulty is that we cannot immediately sever relations with Taiwan, for various reasons,
all of them having to do with our domestic situation” (qtd. in Tyler 173).
Averell Harriman, Carter’s assistant Secretary of State feared that Carter would be
unable to normalize the relationship because of the pressure coming from the China Lobby.
Specifically, Senators Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), Henry Jackson (D-WA), Jim Schlesinger
(Secretary of State under Carter), and Ronald Reagan (then governor of California) all
believed in a rollback policy in Asia and put significant pressure on Carter (Rodman).
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However, Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that the
Carter administration should complete the process of normalization, including abrogating
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty without the consent of Congress, if need be. The criticism
from Congress was hard for Carter to ignore, particularly words coming from Sen. Barry
Goldwater, who called for Carter’s impeachment and later challenged Carter on legal
grounds in Carter v. Goldwater (Gwertzman).
The process of normalization of relations with Beijing was a painful one for the
China Lobby, but its legacy was clear. The China Lobby managed to find new ways to
leverage power, albeit not through official channels. It forced Nixon to adopt a policy of
“strategic ambiguity” towards Taiwan setting a precedent inherited by every president
since. Above all, the normalization was understood by the China Lobby as a temporary
arrangement, a necessary response to appease Soviet aggression, a departure from
American values but, again, only for the short term. Thus, the China Lobby’s position was
to sit and wait until the paralysis of the Cold War and mutually assured destruction
subsided and American could redirect its foreign policy to align with its true grand strategy:
American hegemony and domination.
Juncture #2: The End of the Cold War
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union untethered the Beijing-Washington
relationship from the anti-Soviet security calculation and shook the foundations of USChina relations. At the same time, Washington entered a new period of pluralization and
unprecedented interest group activity, adding new voices to the debate of American Grand
Strategy in general and relations with China in particular. The 1989 Tiananmen Square
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incident galvanized and strengthened the China Lobby in Washington during the George H.
W. Bush administration. But as China began to reform and liberalize its economy, creating
new economic opportunities for American and international businesses in China, a new
political lobby formed to represent big business. Instead of the China Lobby finally
succeeding in rupturing the Washington-Beijing relationship, President Bill Clinton, largely
influenced by pro-business interest groups and animated by an ideology of international
liberalism and trade, passed permanent trade relations with China, paving the way for
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, the biggest China Lobby loss yet. In this
period, the China Lobby’s focus shifts from security and ideological concerns to economic
ones.
Without the anti-Soviet rationale, new voices and opinions emerged out of the
China policy milieu that had been silenced for decades. Interest groups, including NGOs,
emerged as new, powerful, and sophisticated forces in Washington prepared to shape the
debate. These interest groups presented new information and framed concerns in ways that
quickly drew national attention to an issue and changed the way the public viewed issues,
often having profound effects on politicians their behavior. Human rights groups were a
major part of this development. So too were NGOs concerned with the political status of
Tibet and Taiwan, labor organizations, farm groups, and, later, environmental and climate
groups and pro-trade lobbyists (Ross 46, 54). At the same time, government structural
changes resulted in the development of new agencies within the executive branch that
directly or indirectly dealt with foreign policy, thus creating new points of entry and
influence for lobbyists (Ross).
For the China Lobby, this was the political opening they had been waiting for.
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However, that opening never came. In June 1989, China’s People’s Liberation Army
engaged in a violent suppression of a student-organized pro-democracy rally in Tiananmen
Square, drastically changing US perceptions of the human rights situation in China. These
events galvanized the China Lobby and opened up new political pathways to a right-wing
emergence in Washington. Within twenty-four hours of the Tiananmen crisis, the Bush
administration stated that it “deeply deplored the decision to use force against peaceful
demonstrators” (qtd. in Harding 225). In the following week, Bush imposed sanctions on
China, suspended all military sales to Beijing, offered humanitarian assistance to the
students through the Red Cross, and asserted that the state department would be
sympathetic to Chinese students in the United States requesting visa extensions (226).
Although the China Lobby was initially pleased with Bush’s denunciation, they
became increasingly disappointed, as Bush seemed to back off his stern rhetoric in the
weeks that followed. Washington non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch
criticized the Bush administration and called for a policy that included the withdrawal of
the US ambassador in Beijing, the revocation of China’s most-favored nation trade status,
and the prohibition of weapons and related technology sales to Beijing (230). A bipartisan
group in Congress also grew increasingly disenchanted. Senators Jesse Helms, Clairborne
Pell, and Congressman Stephen Solarz criticized Bush’s “weak” policies and called for
further imposition of sanctions on Beijing. In late June of 1989, Senate Democrat and
Republican leaders George Mitchell and Bob Dole demanded that Washington be more
punitive towards Beijing. Mitchell called on Bush to “…give voice to the feelings of the
overwhelming majority of American people who are outraged and revolted…[by the
killings at Tiananmen Square]” (qtd. in Harding 231).
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The China Lobby thought the demise of the Soviet Union would end the long-used
excuse of the anti-Soviet security rational that had buoyed the China-as-opportunity lobby
all these years. After the Tiananmen Square incident, with the human rights community
amplifying their cause, it seemed even more certain that the China Lobby would finally
find meaningful leverage in Washington politics—no longer an appeased secondary
force—but, for once, the dominant force. However, this did not come to be true. Although
both paid some important lip service to the China Lobby position, Republican George HW
Bush and Democrat Bill Clinton were both ultimately influenced by the China-asopportunity lobby. Whereas before the opportunity was strategic in nature, for a policy like
détente with the Soviet Union and the de-escalation of the Cold War, the “opportunity” was
now economic, with China as a key trade partner.
One of the reasons for the transformation of China from balancer of Soviet threat to
essential trade partner was the change in US labor. During the Cold War, the US labor
movements were more active and powerful because they were able to point to Soviet labor
models as examples. US businesses were forced to comply with demands from labor unions
because they feared it would make the Soviet model look better creating labor disputes and
potential revolts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the labor movement lost considerable
power and influence. At that time, American companies began to look to China’s cheap
labor as a way to expand profits. As a result, under the Clinton administration, China
emerged as a global economic force, a trend that rapidly accelerated with China entrance
into the World Trade Organization in 2001.
The China Lobby became even more marginalized as the US solidified its trade
relations with China. As the justification for cooperation with Beijing increasingly hinged
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on US economic opportunity through trade and benefitted US multinational corporations,
the China-as-threat lobby gained new forces of opposition: those connected to segments of
the US economically hard-hit by the growing trade imbalance with China.
Juncture #3: China and MFN Trade Status
In 1992, the Clinton White House, created the first China policy of engagement
without the justification of the anti-Soviet strategy. Without the strategic context provided
by the Cold War, the rationale for engaging Beijing became heavily dependent upon the
interests generated by US business investments in Mainland China. But Clinton’s proeconomic policies on China were challenged and his leadership excoriated by the same
China Lobby that operated during the decades before. Sometimes called the “Blue Team,”
the China Lobby in the Clinton administration objected to his passing of Most-Favored
Nation trade status with China and worked to link a human rights review to the US-China
trade relationship. Instead, Clinton entered American into a new phase of WashingtonBeijing relations, driven by economic opportunity, growth, and mutually beneficial
business relations.
Although Clinton came into office denouncing the “Butchers of Beijing” (referring
to the Tiananmen incident), he soon did an about face and spend the rest of his
administration building deep economic ties between Beijing and Washington and ensuring
China’s entrance into the WTO. Clinton argued that strengthening US political and
economic ties with China would place that country on a path towards political reform and
compliance with international regulations and gradual democratization. In a speech at Johns
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Relations on March 9, 2000,
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Clinton said:
The WTO agreement will move China in the right direction. It will advance the
goals America has worked for in China for the past three decades. And of course it
will advance our own economic interests. Economically, this agreement is the
equivalent of a one-way street. It requires China to open its markets with a fifth of
the world’s population, potentially the biggest market in the world—to both our
products and services in unprecedented ways. All we do is to agree to maintain the
present access China enjoys …. For the first time our companies will be able to sell
and distribute products in China made by workers here in American without being
forced to relocate manufacturing to China, sell through the Chinese government, or
transfer valuable technology – for the first time. We’ll be able to export products
without exporting jobs (The New York Times).

As a result of Clinton’s policy, the impetus for US engagement with China shifted
from a military to an economic justification. And likewise, the China Lobby shifted its
counter-argument from a military one to an economic one. A key way to undermine
China’s rising ambitions, in the China Lobby calculation, was to avoid participating in its
economic growth. Indeed as Michael Klare showed in his article “‘Congagement’ with
China,” printed in The Nation’s April 30, 2001 issue, the right wing of the administration
was opposed to increasing trade with China. He wrote, “[the neo-conservatives
believe]…the last thing that Washington should do is to promote trade with China, thereby
assisting in the growth of its economy…the bigger the Chinese economy, it is claimed, the
greater will be Beijing’s capacity to buy or develop advanced military systems” (Klare).
The China Lobby retaliated with a new theme of anti-China arguments designed
to deter US-China economic engagement. These political campaigns emphasize China’s
role in illegal acquisitions of US military and nuclear technology through espionage. One
example of this was the Cox Report, drafted by a bipartisan Congressional committee
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headed by Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA) and submitted to Congress on January
3, 1999. The report claims “China is not America's strategic partner. China is a
competitor, a competitor which does not share our values but now, unfortunately, shares
many of our nuclear secrets.” Cox’s not-so-subtle claim in the report was that espionage
had only been successful because of Clinton’s “loose” policies on Chinese academics and
technicians visiting and working in the United States. The report concluded that China
acquired large amounts of “classified design information on the United States’ most
advanced nuclear weapons” (“Full Text”). The Cox Report resembled many of the Trump
administration memos about China’s technological modernization especially around the
use of 5G technology and Chinese “theft” of American intellectual property.
A slew of publications were released around this time doubling-down on the socalled “China threat” message. The Pentagon Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 1993 and
1997 both list China as a primary threat to US national security (“1993 Quadrennial
Defense Review”; “1997 Quadrennial Defense Review”). The neoconservative Project
for a New American Century issued a statement signed by many people who would later
become members of the Bush White Houses that read, “It has … become essential that
the United States make every effort to deter any form of Chinese intimidation of the
Republic of China on Taiwan and declare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan’s
defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan” (“The Defense of
Taiwan”). In the same vein, the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act created the
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, part of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The goal of the center, as stated in
the introductory page of their website, was to research and analyze the “national goals
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and strategic posture of the People's Republic of China and the ability of that nation to
develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument in support of its national
strategic objectives” and help inform the “Department of Defense, Congress and other
government agencies” (“Institute for National Strategic Studies”). According to a
February 2000 Washington Post article, “…the Blue Team hopes the center will be more
willing than traditional intelligence agencies to share raw intelligence with Congressional
staff” (Kaiser).
The 1993-1994 debate over Most Favored Nation trade status with China that
occurred during the Clinton administration became the perfect example of a policy issue
that was reduced to a battle between interest groups. Clinton, under pressure from human
rights groups on the left, and security hawks warning of the China threat on the right,
managed to pass permanent trade relations with Beijing in 1994. But the debate was
spiritedly energized by wide participation and input from many different interest groups,
pulling policy in different directs, making increasingly more exaggerated claims.
Describing the forces involved in the MFN debate in 1997, Pat Buchanan wrote, “[there
exists] …a great coalition of human rights activists, Christians appalled at China’s
persecution of fellow Christians, a right-to-life movement sickened by Beijing’s barbaric
population policy, union members concerned over export of factories and jobs and foreign
policy realists who see in China a rising menace to Asian peace and America’s position in
the Pacific” (Buchanan). Several studies have examined the role of interest groups in the
MFN debate. Dietrich (1999) concluded that human rights NGOs framed the debate in its
early stages, but ultimately Clinton yielded to the more powerful business and commercial
interests. Ideological groups formed another wing of the debate, arguing against
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engagement with communist China. Public and contentious as it was, high profile
individuals such as Hong Kong governor Chris Patten and the Dalai Lama visited the
Clinton White House to help sway the MFN debate (“Clinton Backs”).
Thus, the China Lobby, strengthened by new alliances with human rights and prodemocracy groups following the Tiananmen Square incident, re-emerged in the post-Cold
War era more powerful than ever. It was able to reach deeper into new pockets of American
society, gathering strength in powerful bipartisan alliances. But there was also a new focus
of anti-China rhetoric: economic nationalism. The characterization of the China Lobby
opposition had altered too. The enemy was no long the Truman containment strategists and
Cold War realists. The China-as-opportunity lobby in Washington was now defined by
their position on China’s role in trade and globalization.
The next three chapters show how these political forces shape climate policy in two
recent administrations, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican Donald Trump. Under
Obama, the China-as-opportunity lobby saw an opportunity in the administration’s lip
service to the values of expanding the US role in free trade and global capitalism. The
China-as-opportunity lobby continued, much as it did in the 1990s, to represent the interest
of US corporations that benefited from trade with China—including its cheap labor,
manufacturing, and supply chains. This vision of US-China relations was backed up by
think tanks and trade groups that framed these approach in terms of American values: free
trade, internationalism, prosperity and innovation. Regarding climate change, they offered
policies that aligned with these goals, from the Paris Agreement, to electric vehicles, to
renewable energy. As such, rather than meeting the needs of the climate crisis, their policy
recommendations catered to the needs of specific industries as well a broader American
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ideology of globalization, while at the same time providing short-term gains on energy
efficiency. Following historical precedence, the policies recommended by the China-asopportunity lobby were met with challenges from the China-as-threat lobby that feared
China as an economic competitor and sought advantages against Beijing by doubling down
investments in the industries where the US prevailed: the extraction, refining and
transporting of fossil fuels. Likewise, the China-as-threat lobby sought to discourage
industries in which China had the competitive advantage, for example electric mobility and
renewable energy. From their perspective, the US would lose against China, in those
industries so it was better to avoid them. As such, the climate debate under Obama was
carefully circumscribed and underpinned by a much more commanding dynamic in
Washington: the debate over US China policy.
On the other hand, the China-as-threat lobby during the Trump administration
transformed climate change into an issue of the elite versus the working class, and by so
doing altered the political composition of the China-as-threat lobby. The political tensions
around China and climate change were already simmering when Trump came into office,
but his presidency solidified the link between China and climate policy and further
polarized the American electorate around these issue. To the China-as-threat lobby, the
liberal, democratic position placed climate change before the interests and wellbeing of the
class of American workers who had lost their manufacturing and industry jobs to China,
who blamed globalization and Wall Street. With death rates among middle-aged whites
rising as a result of jobs losses, and huge swaths of rural and industrial parts of America
succumbing to diseases of despair (alcoholism, suicide, obesity and opioid addiction), it is
hard to argue that climate change is more important than economic stability (Kolata). By
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amplifying these voices, the China-as-threat lobby made broader arguments and found new
support, including from the president, that connected the dots between the hollowing out of
America’s manufacturing jobs and climate change. The China-as-threat lobby argued that it
was the elite politicians who both enabled and profited from globalization and China’s rise
who were now pushing the climate change agenda to bring the world into a fully globalized
state, undermining the rights of the working-class American. According to one Trump
supporter, “Elitists have created the myth of climate change to eliminate national
sovereignty” (“Elitists Have”).
Two of the central pillars of the Trump administration, “economic security through
national security” and “Buy American” were rooted in a concern over America’s trade
relationships particularly the imbalance with China. This key pivot—the merging of
economic security with national security—was a defining characteristic of the Trump
administration and gave new political power to the China-as-threat lobby. As one New York
Times article put it, “While previous administrations tried to deal with economic and
security threats separately, Mr. Trump has deliberately mixed the two, viewing another
country’s trade practices as dangerous to the United States as its military abilities”
(Swanson and Mozur). The inclusion of economic threats as national security expanded the
political domain of the China-as-threat lobby, providing opportunity for it to leverage its
anti-China agenda into the economic sphere.
So it became China vs. climate change, with climate change representing all the key
points of economic vulnerability: manufacturing, technology, and intellectual property. US
action to buy inexpensive green technology from China to support better climate practices
at home, seemed like a furthering of the exploitation that animated the China-as-threat
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lobby. Obama’s successes on US-China cooperation on clean technology were likewise
perceived by the China-as-threat lobby as losses for American workers and weaponized to
re-build a newly empowered China-as-threat lobby, fueled by economic nationalism, antielitism and a heightened and even exaggerated threat from China. The China-as-threat
lobby made efforts to block all progress on US-China climate cooperation and, with
support from the fossil fuel industry, aimed to return the US to an independent and fossil
fuel-based economy. The next three chapters show how interest groups that focus on China
used climate change policy to achieve their anti-China goals. Focusing on three policy case
studies—the Paris Agreement, electric vehicles, and renewable energy—the convergence of
climate and China policy in think tank literature with industry groups amplifying and
supporting these policy goals becomes visible. Thus interest groups and industry lobbyists,
together in the two lobbies outlined, have polarized climate policy, reducing it to one
variable in the larger security concerns related to China’s rise.

67

Table 1: China-as-threat lobby markers: ideology and narrative, party affiliations,
coalitions and policy goals, 1949-2020.

Critical Juncture

Ideology and
Political
Narrative

Party
Relationship

Coalitions?

Policy Goals

Founding of the
PRC to 1972
Shanghai
Communiqué

Anti-communist,
isolationist

Mostly far right
Republicans,
some alienated
from their party

Navy,
Christians

US support for Taiwan

Normalization to
the End of the
Cold War

Anti-communist,
isolationist

Mostly far right
Republicans,
some alienated
from their party

Navy,
Christians

Defending Taiwan’s seat
at the UN General
Assembly, Arms sales to
Taiwan

End of the Cold
War to Obama
Administration

Anti-communist,
isolationist

Republicans and
Left Democrats

Human
Rights
Lobby/Labor

Arms Sales to Taiwan,
Democratization of
China, blocking China’s
entrance into the WTO,
regime change in China
(neocons)

Consumer
safety
advocates

Obama and
Trump
Administrations

Economic
Nationalist, trade
protectionism,
anti-globalization

Most of the
Republican Party
and some
Democrats
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Human
Rights
Lobby/Labor
Consumer
safety
advocates

Rollback policy in China

Arms sales to Taiwan,
Protecting US industry
from China’s unfair trade
practices (Trade War),
Curbing CCP power

Table 2: China-as-opportunity lobby markers: ideology and narrative, party
relations, demographics, coalitions, and policy goals 1949-2020

Critical Juncture

Ideology and
Political Narrative

Party
Relationship

Coalitions?

Policy Goals

Founding of the PRC
to 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué

Internationalism,
détente with the
Soviet Union,

Democrats and
some moderate
Republicans

None

Diplomatic relations
with the PRC,
Containment

Normalization to the
End of the Cold War

Internationalism,
anti-Soviet

Democrats and
some moderate
Republicans

None

Balancing the Soviet
Union, Normalization
of Washington-Beijing
relations

End of the Cold War
to Obama
Administration

Globalization, free
trade, expansion of
capitalism

Democrats and
some moderate
Republicans

Wall Street/

Increase trade with
China, MFN trade
status

Business
Lobby

Obama and Trump
Administrations

Globalization, free
trade, expansion of
capitalism

Democrats and
some moderate
Republicans

Wall Street/
Business
Lobby
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Ending Trump Trade
War, Cooperation with
China on climate
change

CHAPTER 3
Clean Energy:
Solar, Wind, and “Clean” Coal

This chapter builds on the argument that two divergent alignments on climate issues
are driven by their opposing approaches to US-China relations in general. That is, the latter
explains the former. This chapter focuses on renewable energy, observing that the Chinarelated lobbies outlined in Chapter 2 continue to be active during the Obama and Trump
administration and impact US discourse on renewable energy. This chapter makes the case
that interest groups that favor increased cooperation with China and generally hold a
positive view about China’s rise and US-China relations also tend to support the
development of renewable energy in the United States. On the flip side, interest groups that
view China’s rise in negative terms or even as an existential threat to the US and as a result
seek to undermine China’s economic and political power, also tend to adopt views that do
not favor renewable energy and instead support a return to fossil fuel use in the United
States. In both cases, solar and wind energy as well as cleaner burning coal technologies—
industries that are essential components of any climate policy—are reduced to serving
components of US-China relations.
Analytical Model: Dynamics of US-China Relations and Lobbying
To the China-as-threat lobby, the renewable energy industry was already dominated
by China. In addition, if US companies tried to compete with China in the manufacturing
and deployment of wind and solar power or in low-carbon coal burning techniques, the US
would be forced to become more dependent on foreign countries particularly China for the
natural resources needed to make such technologies. To the China-as-threat lobby, the way
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to preserve American power was not about renewable energy but about reinvigorating the
domestic fossil fuel industry. Many in the China-as-threat lobby—for example the Heritage
Foundation, Manhattan Institute, the Heartland Institute and the American Enterprise
Institute—had for years been against renewable energy. Adding the China angle—
particularly with regard to American competitiveness and energy-independence, politicized
the issue creating a rally-around-the flag effect that directed anti-China energy into fossil
fuel regeneration. Moreover, by expressing some of the anxieties associated with the ceding
of power to international institutions and the forces of global trade, this argument echoed
some of the anti-globalization, anti-internationalist sentiments of the China Lobby of the
1950s. Similarly, the China-as-threat approach to renewable energy adopted the old tropes
of the China Lobby by casting renewable energy as elitist and foreign-minded. Finally,
again following precedence, the China-as-threat lobby sought support from the
untraditional allies, in the case the evoking the human rights based argument shaming the
poor labor practices of China’s solar and wind power industry.
On the other side, the China-as-opportunity lobby, largely associated with the
Democratic Party and was embodied in think tanks like the Asia Society, the Brookings
Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, held positions that
supported renewable energy as it aligned with their own previously held ideological beliefs.
However, the new development was that the China-as-opportunity lobby tightened the link
between low-carbon development and deeper ties with China to the point that it was almost
impossible to consider a low-carbon future without it being based on made-in-China
technology and parts. Many in the China-as-opportunity camp made the argument that stiff
competition with China was good for the US because it would stimulate US innovation and
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force the US to catch up with Chinese industries. The China-as-opportunity camp viewed
climate change as an important frontier of their mission for global integration. Industry
lobbyists took advantage of this policy direction to seek government incentives and
lucrative public-private partnerships with Chinese firms. Like the China-as-threat, the
China-as-opportunity approach was too preoccupied with its own short-term goals to do
justice to the climate problem itself. The China-as-opportunity approach was primarily
concerned with short-term financial gains for US companies, in this case by working more
closely with China. However, this meant that protecting the US company become more
important than protecting the global environment. Therefore, the China-as-opportunity
lobby advanced policies such as strong intellectual property rights, patent protectionism,
and economic nationalism, which ultimately impaired the global ability to respond to the
climate crisis.
Although standing in opposition to each other, these two approaches to renewable
energy actually shared a lot in common. Both approaches were driven by the larger security
concerns and the US response to China’s rise rather than the climate problem itself. Both
represented a continuation of previously established political alignments on US-China
relations. And both approaches justified, and made room for, advances in narrow industry
interests. As such, the positions held by both sides fell short of what was needed to address
the real role of renewable energy is solving the climate crisis. Instead, both approaches
produced policies recommendations that represented: (1) a reduction of the climate problem
to serve the greater security concerns of the US-China relationship; and (2) opportunities
for industry lobbyists to pursue narrow business interests over the broader climate concerns
and solutions recommended by scientists.
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The flow chart in Table 3 maps the relationship between think tanks and industry
lobbyists on both sides as well as the policy positions each held and preferred policy
outcome. The table also shows the party affiliation overlap between the China and industry
lobbies with the China-as-threat lobby largely overlapping with the Republican Party,
members of which are disproportionately the recipients of campaign contributions from the
oil and gas industries. Likewise, the China-as-opportunity lobby largely overlaps with the
Democratic Party, where there are also more links to the renewable energy industry. In the
table, the red arrows indicate influence that is primarily through political connections and
influence. The green arrows indicated influence through financial means, including
campaign contributions and lobbying of Congress or the White House.
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Figure 3: Mapping the Relationship between Think Tanks and Industry Lobbyists

Actors

China-asThreat Lobby

Positions
Held

China is an
existential threat
to the US and must
be stopped

Preferred
Policy
Outcomes

Containment
Decoupling

Impact on
Climate
Policy

Energy
Independence

Republican
Party

Oil and Gas
Industry Lobby

China-asOpportunity
Lobby

Climate Denial

China's rise should be
met with engagement,
pressuring China to
reform andadopt
international norms

Climate change is
an opporunity for
growth and
economic
prosperity

Energy Indpendecnce
Increased reliance on
fossil fuels for energy
consumption in the US

Engagement
Cooperation

Increased access to
cheap imports from
China,
Governement
incentives, MOUs

Marginalizaiotion of
renewabale energy and other
clean energy technologies

Democratc
Party

Clean Energy,
Solar and Wind
Industry Lobby

Public-private partnerships with Chinese
companies, government incentives to
stimulate growth in renewable and clean
energy, but no reform of the ndustry.

Note: Red arrows indicate influence through political connections and influence. The green arrows indicate
influence largely through campaign contributions and lobbying.

The chapter that follows shows the ways in which the China-as-opportunity group
found common ground among industry lobbyists that benefitted from carbon reduction
polices, namely, companies that generate solar and wind power, or coal companies seeking
government support to advance growth in “clean coal” technologies. It then goes on to
illustrate the ways in which the China-as-threat lobbyists found common ground among
traditional fossil fuel industry lobbyists that want to evade carbon regulation and maintain a
US economy dependent on fossil fuels. In mapping out these political alignments, the
similarities to the old China Lobby become clear as do the ways in which these narrowly
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circumscribed policy clusters manage to avoid any direct engagement with the actual policy
crisis at hand: the one involving the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate
climate change.
For both clusters of lobbying groups and in both administrations, a casualty of these
policies was renewable energy itself. The interests of the climate are lost entirely except in
the rare and often short-term occasion when climate-friendly policies overlap with industry
goals. For both the China-as-opportunity and China-as-threat, energy policy and climate
change are both policy areas to be manipulated in service of the great goals related to USChina relations.
Renewable Energy and Climate Change
Reliance on wind and solar power is a central part of a low-carbon economy. About
30% of US emissions come from electricity generation so this is an important sector to
target when trying to reduce overall emissions (“Sources”). Both sources of energy have
been growing over the years, with wind currently making up 6% and solar 1% of total
electricity generation in the US (“About”). In the last decade, China has emerged as a
dominant player in both industries. In 2010, China produced 26% of the world’s
polysilicon, the raw material used to make solar photovoltaic. In 2020, that number had
jumped to 82% while the US’s share of production went from 35% to just 5% in the same
time. Most analysts agree that Chinese dominance in this industry is a result of heavy
government investment in clean energy -- $83.4 billion in 2019 (Chiu). While Beijing’s
subsidies have created fierce competition for US manufactures of renewable energy
technology, US companies that work to generate electricity using renewable sources of
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energy have benefitted from inexpensive Chinese imports. China’s subsidies have brought
prices down for US consumers to $1 per watt of capacity in 2011 from $3.30 in 2008
(Bradsher). Even while US solar and wind installations are growing, and US manufacturing
capacity has increased tenfold in the last three years (Margolis and Smith), China’s market
is growing faster. Ninety-five percent of the solar panels made in China are exported, many
of them to the US, which still relies on China for about one-quarter of its imports of solar
equipment (“US Imports”). China is also a leader in both installed wind power capacity and
wind turbine manufacturing.
Both the wind and solar power industries presented US leaders with a critical
conundrum, a policy balancing act that goes right to the heart of the China policy debate
and increasingly divides China and industry lobbyists. While the China-as-opportunity
lobby sought increased collaboration with China through trade and public-private
partnerships to boost the US renewable energy industry, the China-as-threat lobby saw
opportunities for Chinese exploitation of US intellectual property, data, and trade secrets.
The China-as-opportunity countered with the idea that the risks to US intellectual property
were minimal against the benefits of trade that would come from an engagement policy.
They also believed that through policies of engagement, China would be forced to
increasingly adopt the norms and rules of the international community, and, over time,
become more closely aligned with those of the US trade regimes.
During both the Obama and Trump administrations, a trade war over solar panels
emerged creating a deep divide between the China-as-opportunity and China-as-threat
perspectives. The China-as-opportunity lobbyists pushed the US renewable energy industry
to “catch up” with China through government incentives and US-China public-private
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partnerships based in technology sharing, joint research and development, and increased
US trade with Chinese manufacturing companies. During the Trump administration, the
China-as-threat lobbyists advocated for a return to fossil fuels, citing the potential risks
associated with US exposure to China’s green energy markets, including “unfair”
government subsidies that skewed the market, theft of intellectual property, “predatory”
trade practices, and Chinese espionage. The China-as-threat lobby also joined forces with
human rights campaigns to block imports from Xinjiang-based wind and solar panel
companies.
Renewable Energy and the China-as-Opportunity Lobby
The China-as-opportunity lobby comprised both liberal policy think tanks and
industry groups that coalesce around the shared idea that increased trade and diplomatic
engagement with China is good for the US economy in general and the US renewable
energy industry specifically. They support increased engagement with China but also assert
important corporate rights and protections such as a strong intellectual property rights
regime. The China-as-opportunity lobby is the sum of these forces together—the think
tanks that envisioned a growing interconnectedness of the two economies as well as the
industries that benefitted from that interconnectedness. The interest groups that support this
position, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Society, Council
on Foreign Relations and the Brooking Institution, for example, have long histories of
advocating for US-China engagement, including, originally as a way to counter Soviet
power during the Cold War. These were the institutions that emerged in the 1950s, 60s, and
70s to direct US foreign policy away from the rollback camp (see Chapter 1). They
supported Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China and, later, sought to secure the
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economic links between the two countries during the debate over Most Favored Nation
status during the Clinton administration. To them, climate change presented a new policy
area to promote US-China cooperation and increasing the policy of complex
interdependence. A truly global problem, one that literally mixed together Chinese and
American carbon emissions in a boundary-free atmospheric stew, climate change offered
ample opportunities for cooperation across many sectors and industries, from research and
development, to adaptation planning and sustainable development, to technology and
manufacturing.
A common theme among these think tanks is that economic interconnectedness
reduces the chance for war. According to this perspective, globalization, or the tearing
down of barriers blocking the movement of capital leads to peace and prosperity.
Responding to the perceived grand strategy of these collective groups, John Mearsheimer
referred to their agenda as defenders of the “liberal international order” or “liberal
hegemony,” which adopts an individualist approach to the US role as defender of
democracy and human rights (14). For these groups, the rise of communist China has been
one of its most important events in US history precisely because it presented both a
challenge and opportunity to test their policies. For decades, these interest groups
advocated for policies that would expand diplomatic links to China in order to integrate it
into the so-called “global community,” slowly pressuring Beijing to adopt globally
accepted principles and norms. To this group, climate change had the potential to be a
driver of increased interconnectedness in the world, a new policy frontier for their old
positions.
These global outlooks suited the economic interests of certain industries and
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companies that benefit from globalized economic policies in their pursuit of renewable
energy growth and development. These were companies that relied on inexpensive imports
of Chinese made solar panels, wind turbines, or clean coal technology or that exported US
renewable energy technology to China. Examples of this include solar manufacturing
companies that rely on Chinese sources of the raw material polysilicon, used to
manufacture solar panels. Other examples include solar installations, including Solar Star,
Topaz, or Ivanpah Solar in southern California that rely on Chinese imports for raw
materials and parts. Or Oakland-based BrightSource Energy, which entered into a MOU
through the US-China Renewable Energy Partnership to build a 135 megawatt solar power
plant in Qinghai province (“The Future”). Also included in this category is Texas-based
wind energy giant Cielo, which entered into an MOU in 2009 with a Chinese wind turbine
manufacturer to build one of the largest wind farms in the United States (“A Power
Energy”). Fossil fuel companies also found ways to benefit from the renewable energy
policy mandates. Duke Energy sought government grants to enter public-private
partnerships with Chinese companies to expand clean energy production.
In the early days of the Obama administration, China-as-opportunity think tanks
published two major reports in January of 2009 advocating for closer US-China
cooperation on climate change. The first report was the “Roadmap for US-China
Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change,” published by the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change together with the Asia Society, and with contributions from experts at
other prominent think tanks including the Brookings Institution, the National Committee on
US-China Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Environmental Defense Fund,
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Carnegie
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Endowment, as well as several notable academics, Congressional staffers, business leaders,
lawyers and members of Chinese government and academic institutions. The report claims,
US-China cooperation “is essential if there is to be a solution to the daunting climate
change challenge.” It claims that the goal of the report is to “scale-up” US-China climate
cooperation and to “catalyze” new collaboration in order to “put Sino-US bilateral relations
on a more stable basis.” The report calls for “a path-breaking cooperative agenda” and to
use “funds invested by both governments in economic recovery” to “help address climate
change while also advancing ‘green technologies’ and industries that will lead to a new
wave of economic growth” (6). Specifically, it calls for cooperation on several policy areas
including renewable energy, the development of an advanced electric grid, developing lowemissions “clean” coal technology and “quantifying emissions and financing low-carbon
development.” On the renewable energy, electricity grid and clean coal programs, the
report foresaw government grants for private sector partnerships based on research and
development and the deployment of new markets and technologies (45).
A second report, also released in January of 2009, was called “Overcoming
Obstacles to US-China Cooperation on Climate Change,” published by David Sandalow
and Kenneth Liberthal of the Brooking Institution. The report claims “cooperation on
climate change can help move US-China relations to a new state,” and that “failure to
cooperate can introduce significant tensions” (Liberthal and Sandalow x). The report
suggests that the two countries build on existing channels of diplomacy and build new
structures for cooperation and through those channels highlight cooperation on clean
energy as a sign of overall improved relations (57). It identifies potential obstacles,
including, distrust and different “expectations” regarding technology transfer and finance,
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but to overcome these issues keeping sights on the “big picture,” building for the long term,
and focusing on economic opportunity (71).
A third report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies called “Smart
Power in US-China Relations” was published in March 2009 that calls on both
governments to “Launch an action agenda on energy and climate by establishing a ChineseUS public-private task force authorized to promote technology exchanges, initiate bilateral
projects on energy and climate issues” (McGiffert vi) The report also states, “Solving …
climate change … is difficult to envision without joint action by Beijing and Washington”
(vi ). One of the report’s authors, Maurice Greenberg, is CEO of AIG (American
International Group), an American finance and insurance corporation with extensive
investment in China. AIG, even more than other companies in the China-as-opportunity
camp, has a long-standing history in China. Founded by Cornelius Vander Starr in
Shanghai in 1919, it was one of the first American companies to do business with China,
breaking down a powerful of historical Chinese anti-internationalism. In the 1970s, AIG
worked with a Chinese government owned insurance company to create a deal whereby the
two companies would work together on reinsurance treaties paving the way for growing
trade between the two countries (“AIG’s Return”). Thus it was a natural extension of their
policy to view climate change as not only an urgent global issue, but also as an issue around
which the United States and China can and must find productive common ground.
The China-as-opportunity lobby expected president Obama to be a good ally.
Obama’s approach reflected on overall policy of engagement with China. He stated
occasionally the threats from China but consistently followed the idea that increasing
diplomacy with China was the best policy to reduce potential conflict. The Obama
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administration followed many of the specific recommendations in the reports including
“build[ing] on existing agreements and programs,” “Creat[ing] a new dialogue on climate
change and clean energy …” and “form[ing] a ‘US-China Clean Energy Partnership,’”
which would be the US-China Clean Energy Research Center, established in November
2009, and the climate change track of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue announced in
April 2009. Obama also borrowed much of the language about the positive mutual
outcomes inherent in cooperation in the report in his address to Congress and the nation.
Following the recommendations in the Pew report, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act that Obama signed into law in February 2009, enacts many of the goals
included in the report, including securing “funds invested by both governments in
economic recovery” to “help address climate change while also advancing ‘green
technologies’ and industries that will lead to a new wave of economic growth” (6). The Act
provided diverse investments in clean energy and energy efficiency, including investment
tax credits for wind and solar energy and allowing renewable energy development
companies to receive government grants. Following up on these commitments, in his 2011
State of the Union address, Obama pledged that by 2035, 80% of America’s electricity
would come from clean energy sources (Gardner “Obama Sets”).
One of the authors of the Brookings report, David Sandalow, went on to become the
acting Undersecretary of Energy and later the Assistant Secretary for Policy and
International Affairs at the Department of Energy. The co-Chairs of the Pew report were
John Thornton and Steven Chu. Thornton at the time was a board member of the Ford
Motor Company as well as HSBC and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, three
corporations with investments in Chinese markets. Chu later became Obama’s Secretary of
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Energy and framed the relationship between the US and China as a “Sputnik Moment”
referencing the first satellite launched by the Soviet Union in 1957 (“Secretary Chu”). Chu
characterized the US-China relationship as a clean technology race and warned of the
dangers of the US falling behind. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke noticed a similar trend
when he said, “10 to 15 years from now, we're going to be saying, 'How did Shanghai
become the Silicon Valley of clean energy?’” (Lim).
Industry Lobbyists
With obvious overlapping goals, industry lobbyists benefitted from the ideological
foundation established by think tanks regarding US-China cooperation on climate change to
promote their own narrow business interests. However they also sought protection from
Chinese competition and so the challenge became to establish an argument that both
enthusiastically embraced the logic of engagement but also noted US vulnerability to
Chinese competition, erecting appropriate policy protections in response. These were the
industries that stood to gain lucrative returns from unregulated access to the Chinese
market, whether through imports of inexpensive products or the export of US technologies.
They did not hold any particular ideological views on US-China relations or the rise of
China more generally, but they did subscribe to and benefit from a business philosophy that
promoted the idea that cooperation between the US and China increased the scale of
production and could potentially bring down costs by accelerating learning rates at all
stages of renewable energy production and development.
When the White House committed to “shifting to cleaner energy” under the Paris
Agreement in December of 2009 (more about this in Chapter 4), it planned to do so in three
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ways: (1) reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants; (2) bringing new sources of
renewable energy online; and, (3) increasing the share of natural gas in electricity
generation. From the China-as-opportunity perspective, this was both an opening for US
business interests as well as a way to further engage China diplomatically and fortify the
strategic interconnectedness vision and strengthen the liberal international order described
by Mearsheimer. They promoted policies including accelerating permitting process for
wind and solar installations, boosting reliance on solar and wind energy on military
installations, expanding and modernizing the electricity grid and supporting private
investment in clean energy. In this plan, the US government would set up incentives to
boost wind and solar projects, including buying parts and equipment from Chinese
manufacturers.
At the recommendation of China-as-opportunity think tanks like the Brookings
Institution, Asia Society, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Obama
created a series of high-level forums to expand discourse between the US and China that
created new opportunities for businesses to engage in US China and climate policy making.
The first of these frameworks was the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a series
of high-level talks between Obama and Chinese president Hu Jintao. Under this policy of
enhanced cooperation between the two countries, the US-China Clean Energy Research
Center (CERC), set up between the US Department of Energy and China’s National Energy
Administration, and the US-China Climate Change Working Group were established to
facilitate joint research and technology sharing between the US and China. These publicprivate organizations essentially functioned as a matchmaker between US and Chinese
energy companies, establishing dozens of lucrative MOUs and joint-venture projects
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(“Report”). Thus Obama reoriented the US-China relationship towards mutually beneficial
economic ties rooted in cooperation and trade. This new orientation recontextualized
Obama’s climate goals. No longer did he push for climate progress for its own sake, but as
a serving component of the larger agenda—to revitalize the economy through closer ties
with China. Lobbyists, having blocked climate legislation in Congress, now became
beneficiaries of Obama’s new plan to pursue climate policies without a bill.
Through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the Department of Energy under
Secretary Chu signed an agreement with China’s Ministry of Urban-Rural Development,
together investing $15 million to establish public-private partnerships between US and
Chinese firms to invest in renewable energy and clean coal technology among other energy
projects (St. John). The agreement set in motion hundreds of memoranda of understanding
(MOUs) between US companies and their Chinese counterparts, designed to produce
Sputnik-level breakthroughs in clean energy development (Cheng 149).
COAL
Leveraging this ideological foundation for US-China cooperation on climate
change, coal lobbyists sought government contracts to invest in new “clean coal”
technologies. Frequently these projects were set up as public-private partnerships between
American and Chinese coal companies, with US companies benefitting from cheap Chinese
imports. For example, the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity spent an average
of $93,000 per year between 2002 and 2007 on lobbying. However, when Obama took
office and began to develop his policies on climate change, that number leapt to $9.9
million in addition to spending $38 million on a “clean coal” ad campaign. The American
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Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, which spent $1.6 million on lobbying in 2009
including on this very bill, was given $3.5 billion as part of the 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act stimulus bill (“American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity
Lobbying Profile”). One billion dollars was intended for the Department of Energy Clean
Coal Power Initiative and $1.6 billion for carbon capture and sequestration at industrial
plants (Sheppard “House Passes”).
In 2015, following the policy prescriptions put forth by the China-as-opportunity
think tanks and led by some individuals who were authors of these think tank reports and
now cabinet members, Obama initiated the Clean Power Plan, the EPA’s proposal to
regulate emissions from coal-fired power plants, which laid the foundation for the US’s
commitment under the Paris Agreement, and aimed to reduce emissions by 32% below
2005 levels by 2030 (“Fact Sheet: President Obama”). Through this initiative, Obama made
“clean coal”—a nonsense concept to many environmentalists—a key part of his clean
energy pledge, allowing Obama to carry out his promise to reduce emissions from coalburning power plants in the electricity sector while also providing coal companies with new
opportunities for growth.
Duke Energy, an electric power holding company, is an example of a company that
thrived under China-as-opportunity policies, finding ways to express its bottom-line
business interests as aligned with the ideological goals and principles of liberal think tanks.
The former CEO of Duke, James Rogers, increased shareholders annual returns by more
than 12 percent during this time by shifting to a sustainable energy approach (The
Indianapolis Star).
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Duke claimed in a press release that Obama’s economic recovery strategy would
depend on a good relationship with China (“Duke Energy”). Out of the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue and related diplomatic channels between the United States and China,
Duke Energy entered into numerous lucrative public-private partnerships with Chinese
companies (“Working with China”), including a partnership with China Huaneng Group
and other state-owned coal companies to develop new technologies in coal gasification,
liquefaction, and carbon capture and storage technologies and another partnership with
Chinese company ENN to jointly develop solar energy projects in the US (“Duke Energy
Partners”). According to the Wall Street Journal report on the deal and the partnership with
China, “Duke Energy can slash the cost of deploying renewable technologies and mitigate
some technical risk through shared costs and allocation of other research-and-development
resources” (Johnson).
Duke Energy spent a record amount of money lobbying between the years 2009 and
2012, with spending in 2009 reaching $5.9 million and increasing each year to reach $9
million in 2012 (“Duke Energy Profile: Lobbying”). Duke Energy also made generous
donations to Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign and to the DNC Service Corp, the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee. In that same year, Duke Energy, also made large donations to the Republican
presidential challenger, Mitt Romney, and to the National Republican Senatorial
Committee, the Republican National Committee, and the National Republican
Congressional Committee (“Duke Energy Profile: Summary”).
Thus Obama’s Clean Power Plan coupled with the energy-related segments of the
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, encouraged US-China public-private partnerships and
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provided a policy context in which to showcase efficiency gains among coal-fired power
plants that were already underway (“Working with China”). As coal companies scrambled
to meet the regulations, many sought partnerships with Chinese counterparts to acquire the
necessary technology to make short-term gains in emission reductions in order to receive
preferential treatment in Washington. Duke Energy, which became the largest energy
company in the United States in 2012, through its China partnerships was able to comply
with Obama’s Clean Power Plan standards (“Merger”).
However, despite receiving Department of Energy investments targeting clean
energy, Duke remains one of the most polluting coal companies in the US. A 2020 Sierra
Club report claims that, in the midst of a large-scale phasing out of coal-fired power plants,
Duke leads all other US energy companies in operating coal-fired power plants that are not
committed to a 2030 retirement (Romankiewicz et al. 1). The study concludes, “while
electric utilities have pledged to decarbonize, they fall short of what is necessary to protect
people and the planet” (1).
WIND AND SOLAR
A consensus among liberal think tanks and democratic politicians claimed that
cooperation over renewable energy was a centerpiece of the US-China relations. The
Roadmap report by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and the Asia Society
recommends that the US and China “jointly refine and develop new renewable energy
technologies” including “joint projects in solar R&D” with an aim to “drive significant cost
reductions.” The partnership between the US should encourage the sharing of expertise and
that “priority areas for US-China cooperation” should be “promoting renewable energy”
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and “developing an advanced electric grid” among other things (“A Roadmap”).
Consistent with these recommendations, the Obama administration established
multiple public-private partnerships between US and Chinese renewable energy companies.
A Renewable Energy Partnership was proposed at the US-China presidential summit in
held in November 2009 in Beijing (“Fact Sheet: US-China”). The partnership established
public private, multi-year agreements between subnational governments to share best
practices, companies to set up joint projects, and researchers to travel to each other’s
countries to develop respective renewable power programs (“The Power of Renewables”).
The aspiration of these agreements was summarized in a 2015 report from the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission challenging the US and China to cooperate
and compete to develop a robust renewable energy sector that can “contribute to economic
growth, energy security, and climate change mitigation” (Koch-Weser and Meick 4). It
explicitly notes China’s industrial overcapacity in solar PV equipment and some wind and
solar power capacity that has been left to “stand idle” or remain unconnected to the grid as
a result of rapid deployment and government investment. The report claims that although
China has done well to produce inexpensive renewable energy technology, it can learn
much from the US about how to translate that technical capacity into generated power.
Thus on this basis, the committee see grounds for mutually productive cooperation. “USChina trade in renewable energy components is a ‘win-win’ that fosters supply chain
integration and mutual comparative advantages,” the report claims.
To support the partnerships and create government incentives for growth in wind
and solar energy in the US, Obama passed the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, the “largest single investment in clean energy in history,” which provided more than
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$90 billion for the renewable energy industry. Included in the package was solar and wind
power tax incentives, as well as job creation and training provisions (“Fact Sheet: The
Recovery”). However, while this approach helped double renewable energy production in
the US from 2008 to 2016, it also changed the composition of the solar and wind industries
in ways that impact the future of both industries. By setting targets for local renewable
energy use, the government policies under Obama largely helped companies that produce
solar and wind power rather than the US companies that manufacture solar panels and wind
turbines. The successful wind and solar companies relied heavily on Chinese imports of
parts, making them vulnerable to the Trump trade war tariffs initiated in 2018.
Some of the leading solar panel manufacturing companies that received government
loans during the Obama administration later declared bankruptcy. Solyndra, which received
more than $500 million in loan guarantees filed for bankruptcy in 2011. Abound Solar,
which had received a $400 million Department of Energy loan guarantee later declared
bankruptcy at an estimated loss of $40-$60 million for the DOE. Both companies cited the
dropping prices in solar panels and competition from imports as the reason for their failure
(Hargreaves). Drawing more attention to perceived US vulnerability to Chinese
competition, in 2011, seven US solar panel manufacturers appealed to the US Commerce
Department asking that Chinese imports be subjected to tariffs of more than 100% to
protect domestic manufacturers (Bradsher). Labor unions piled on to the fight in 2015,
when United Steelworker filed a complaint to the US Trade Representative and pursued
action in the WTO related to China’s allegedly “illegal” subsidies for renewable energy
technology, specifically the manufacturing of wind turbines (Barkley).
Rather than finding ways to stay afloat among fierce Chinese competition, the
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political debate around renewable energy became captive of the larger US trade insecurities
with China. After the highly publicized Solyndra bankruptcy, many climate activists noted
that Solyndra had been “collateral damage” in an unnecessary trade war with China
(Miller). While they agreed the US could not compete with China on manufacturing, there
was still an opportunity to pursue solar power generation—benefitting from inexpensive
Chinese-manufactured panels—but with profits of the power generation going to US
corporations and all the low-carbon benefits going to US consumers. A more refined policy
recommendation emerged in the wake of the Solyndra crisis that skirted the China-trade
issue, quickly becoming a third rail in American politics. The idea was that the US did not
need to beat China in the manufacturing of solar panels. It could do just fine importing
products and raw materials from China as long as the US could continue to lead as a
producer—a generator—of solar power and the resulting transformation of American
electricity grids. China-as-opportunity lobbyists also stressed the fact that the US was still a
leader in solar technology and patents and that the Chinese markets for these were hot.
They viewed the trade war as an unnecessary political detour. American consumers and the
climate could both be winners, benefitting from cheap Chinese imports. American
manufacturers of solar panels and wind turbines would be the losers. But, as the logic of
this view begged, was that so bad?
The debate over economic policy became increasingly politicized, resulting in the
polarization of politicians involved. This occurred as politicians began talking about the
solar panel manufacturing company Solyndra equating a combination of bad government
programs and US submissiveness to Chinese trade domination. The event became a
political battering ram and eliminated the possibility for balanced discussion around solar
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energy policy in the United States (Goldstein).
Largely because of Chinese imports, solar power generation doubled in 2011 and
2012, even while US solar panel manufactures declared bankruptcy (Miller). Solar power
generation was able to grow so rapidly because of cheap parts and government support.
This was clearly a success for the climate, at least in the short term. But China-as-threat
backlash against Solyndra, used as a tool against the Obama 2012 reelection campaign
against Republican nominee, John McCain, made government support for solar much more
politically risky with Democrats less likely to pursue similar actions in the future
(Goldstein). Thus, a policy that resulted in massive growth by all accounts was logged in
the political history books as a failure because of a political debate that is ultimately rooted
in US-China great power competition rather than any practical approach to reducing carbon
emissions.
Climate Change Policy and Intellectual Property
Despite their forward-thinking and bold political ideology and global vision, the
China-as-opportunity lobby was not naïve about the threats to the US renewable energy
industry posed by China’s prowess in this area. A key part of the vision of liberal
international order as envisioned by the China-as-opportunity lobby, was not just to
encourage China to adopt international rules and norms related to trade and economic
development, but also to protect US companies in case they didn’t.
These areas of corporate vulnerability included intellectual property rights
protections, protection from Chinese theft of patents, trade secrets, research and
development and other IP information that was perceived by US energy companies as

92

essential to their competitiveness. The China-as-opportunity lobby was also concerned
about competition from foreign companies, especially ones that received state support, like
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were protected from bankruptcy and granted
land and financial capital from the government. However, the goal of the China-asopportunity lobby was to help the US industries catch up with Chinese counterparts while,
at the same time, facilitating China’s adoption of international trade practices that would
discourage reliance on government subsidies over time. But American industries also
wanted to maintain inexpensive and efficient supply chains and natural materials from
China, like the rare earth metals and other minerals that are essential for the manufacturing
of wind turbines. To these companies, China provided a irreplaceable system of integrated
supply chains with components manufactured in factories that were geographically close
and which enjoyed an established relationship with one another to create an ultra-efficient
and flexible supply chain hub considered a competitive advantage for many US companies
(“China is Changing”). Summarizing this complicated web of interests, the chief executive
of a European-based wind energy trade group said of the US wind industry’s balance of
interests: “It sounds a bit paradoxical to say, ‘we need to import Chinese materials to
compete with the Chinese manufacturers,’ but that is how it is” (Hook).
In response, many China-as-opportunity think tank and lobbyists, for example, the
Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies as well as
multiple trade and business organizations such as the American Chamber of Commerce
China and the International Chamber of Commerce advocated for stronger regulatory tools
to protect the patenting, copyrights, and trademarks of US companies in a more robust
intellectual property rights regime. Multiple policy reports and briefings published by these
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organizations present what is essentially a two-part strategy—reduce barriers for increased
cheap imports from China and exports of US technology to China but, at the same time,
ensure stricter protections against intellectual property theft through the TRIPS
agreement—or the World Trade Organization agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. In an article published by Paulson Institute, author Joanna
Lewis makes the case for joint development of renewable energy technology as a “bright
spot” in a generally tense relationship. She writes, “But despite this apparently solid and
growing record of collaboration between the United States and China, it is hard to see it
reaching full potential unless the two countries can navigate the pivotal problem of
protecting intellectual property” (Lewis 2). Many business and trade groups make the
argument that strong intellectual property regimes are essential for innovation and
creativity (Conley).
However, once one departs from the category of business-friendly literature on the
topic, it becomes clear that there are other perspectives on the impact of intellectual
property on innovation and dissemination of renewable energy technology (for example,
Zhuang and Hutchison). The issue has been hotly debated at the UNFCCC climate talks
with increasingly persuasive reports indicating that, given the asymmetry between
developing and developed countries with the developed countries holding most of the
intellectual property and developing countries needing technology transfers, rigid
intellectual property regulations such as those promoted by the US and China-asopportunity think tanks, hinder the ability to disseminate important renewable energy
technologies. According to one report, “TRIPS forecloses an effective remedy of
international compulsory licensing in cases where developing countries patents holders
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refuse to license technologies to developing county firms due to fear of competitions”
(Hutchison 517). Another study concludes that intellectual property regulations potentially
exacerbate the erosion of human rights caused by climate change. According to the author,
“States seeking climate change solutions will increasingly deal with tensions caused when
human rights and IP protection obligations conflict” (Kapur 58).
To summarize, the China-as-opportunity lobby characterizes the climate change
challenge as an opportunity to: (1) strengthen the policy of engagement with China; (2)
bring China into compliance with international norms and regulations through diplomacy
and partnerships in international institutions like the WTO and UNFCCC; and, (3) promote
the economic competitiveness and provide short-term economic gains to US renewable
energy companies by facilitating US-China trade and strengthening regulatory tools that
stand to benefit US companies such as intellectual property rights. However, the China-asopportunity lobby fell short in meeting the actual demands of the climate crisis. For
example, the positions outlined above ultimately fail to transcend the zero-sum model of
thinking that is required to address a problem with global implications such as climate
change. The China-as-opportunity threat position remains myopic when it comes to
measures for success. Success, when it comes to renewable energy, is defined in terms of
the financial returns and overall competitiveness of US renewable energy companies. This
is of course an important part of the climate change solution, but it fails to grasp the overall
magnitude of the crisis as well as the collective and global effort needed to respond.
Moreover, these policy positions introduce barriers to progress. For example, the focus on
intellectual property protection forecloses the possibility for necessary global dissemination
and implementation of renewable energy that is essential to long-term progress on climate
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change.
Thus it is no surprise that even while solar and wind power doubled during the
Obama administration (Jacobson) and continued to grow under Trump, neither
administration has helped the United States transform its renewable energy sector into an
industrial base that could realistically supply US energy needs. In this case, the China-asopportunity lobby, with its policy outlook carefully circumscribed by the larger security
and economic concerns related to China’s rise, and its focus on the health of US companies
rather than the planet, present policy options that focus on the protection of the US solar
and wind industries against Chinese competitors rather than working to make them
competitive against fossil fuels.
Renewable Energy and the China-as-Threat Lobby
The China-as-opportunity approach failed to transform the US renewable energy
industry into one that could either compete globally or significantly shift the US energy
industry. Under the Trump administration, the China-as-threat lobby faced the same
questions regarding Chinese dominance in the industries and the need to support the US
economy. However, the China-as-threat approach advocated for policy recommendations
rooted in economic nationalism and trade protectionism. During these years, the China-asthreat lobby transformed the US solar and wind industries into political battlegrounds that
had more to do with questions of American identity and power—and amounted to an
almost emotional response to China’s rise—rather than the logic of either energy or climate
change. Similar to the China-as-opportunity lobby under the Obama administration,
industry groups advocated for their narrow business interests found ways to cast those
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interests in an anti-China framework, the ideological foundation of which was articulated
and promoted by conservative think tanks.
The China-as-threat lobby saw climate change and the Trump presidency as
welcome opportunities to advance their anti-China agenda. In some ways, 2016 marked a
perfect storm of historic events that resonated with and amplified China-as-threat
sentiments and worldview. During this time, the China-as-threat perspective almost became
an emotional response rather than strictly political. It was driven by questions of national
identity, deeply-seated fears about the crumbling of the American economy, the
abandonment of the middle class, and the loss of American power and influence in the
world. All this was combined with the legacy of anti-Asian racism and anti-communism.
As fear and hatred loomed towards China, the China-as-threat perspective evoked nostalgic
visions of a previous prosperous America particularly emphasizing the role of
domestically-sourced fossil fuels in that image of security. Anti-China rhetoric became a
standard in congressional campaign advertisements, mainly for Republicans but many
Democrats adopted an anti-China sentiment, too (Fang, Xiaodong). Trump and many
Republicans harped on the pressure on American manufacturing jobs coming from Chinese
competitors. One study showed that districts in the US that had lost manufacturing jobs to
China also tended to vote for Trump and other right-wing Republicans (Zhang et al.).
Behind the economic anxiety evident in the published reports, articles, speeches and
op-eds of China-as-threat lobbyists, emerged a deeper concern. This has to do with the
erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state itself, the autonomy of America, the
“flattening” of the global economy and the ceding of American power to international
organizations and to the independent forces of the global economy. Many in the China-as97

threat camp blamed not only China, but particularly the China-as-opportunity wing in the
US political establishment for allegedly promoting China’s rise in order to boost profits for
their own class, namely, the one percent, the elitist, Wall Street type Americans who were
invested in China. Many of the China-as-threat lobbyists claim that the American elite,
through the promotion of globalization and free trade, has fueled China’s rise, allowing the
theft of US technology to prop up China’s power for the sake of short-term economic gains.
As one China scholar put it, “China is a screen for the projections and anxieties of US
politics. China [is viewed] as a scapegoat for the contradictions between global political
economy and the nation state form” (Sorace).
The China-as-threat lobby comprises think tanks including the Heritage Foundation,
American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
the Project for a New American Century, and the Committee on the Present Danger. From
the security point of view, these think tanks cohered around the idea that the US and China
are on a collision course and that the Washington political establishment must do
something to counter China’s rise. Their goals include energy independence as a way of
ending perceived exploitation in global energy markets including from China. Like the
China-as-opportunity lobby, they are concerned with the protection of intellectual property,
patent protections for US companies. However, they go farther and are also preoccupied
with perceived threats related to data security and Chinese theft and espionage, issues that
they view as evidence of China’s predatory and illegal practices. To the China-as-threat
lobby, China’s is both a security threat to US power but it also represents an ideological
threat, with the “China model” as a viable competitor to the Washington-centric model of
economic and political development.
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For example, the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute have
long advocated that the rise of China presents an existential threat to the US. Two other
think tanks with Trump ties were even more explicit about their positions. The Foundation
for the Defense of Democracies, which received over $10 million in donations from Home
Depot founder and Trump donor, Bernard Marcus, (Clifton) claimed, “China has been
engaged in a decades-long, systematic, state-sponsored effort to steal US technology.” The
report, co-written by a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, calls for the use
of “targeted measures” like “sanctions, export controls, and investment review” to “force
China to reform some of its unfair practices” (Cooper and Lorber).
The conservative Manhattan Institute published a commentary praising Trump’s
campaign remarks regarding the use of tariffs claiming that because China illegally
subsidizes its steel industry and then “dumps” excess steel into the US market, “there is no
such thing as free trade with China” (Gelinas). The pro-Trump Heartland Institute, which
receives funding from ExxonMobil and the American Petroleum Institute, accused the US
of “coddling” China and frequently reports on China’s failures to reduce emissions and
meet their own low-carbon goals (Burnett).
More conservative think tanks, such as the Steve Bannon-linked Committee on the
Present Danger, or Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy, along with media outlets
Bannon’s Breitbart News and Tucker Carlson-run Daily Caller have made the case against
China even more explicit. A Daily Caller article claims that “Wall Street globalists” have
“bought” members of Congress that passively allow China to turn the US into a “Third
World Colony” (Ellis). Breitbart, which also subscribes to this view of China, regularly
refers to climate change as an invention of “activists, university researchers, and renewable
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energy profiteers determined to assert global governance for their own gain” (Lavelle
“Steve Bannon”). The Committee on the Present Danger, a contemporary revival of a group
that first emerged out of a more hawkish wing of the Republican Party in 1950, claims that
Beijing is seeking “global hegemony” and plans to “weaken and ultimately defeat
America” and “subvert Western democracies”(“Guiding Principles”). Trump’s super PACs,
American First Policies and American First Action, spent millions of dollars on ad
campaigns in swing states during the 2016 and 2020 campaigns advocating the idea that
American must stop Chinese growth and that China is “killing our jobs, stealing
technology, and putting America’s health in danger” (Treene).
Moreover, there was a shifting of blame from globalization itself and from
defending sovereignty and the nation state to China. Fears of economic insecurity resulting
from globalization were directed instead to China as if China were the cause of the erosion
of national sovereignty. With regard to China’s position as the world’s factory, the Chinaas-threat lobby avoided blaming the multinational corporations that lobbied the US to lift
trade barriers, expand globalization, and strengthen trade relations with China so that they
could move productions out of the US and into China to take advantage of low wages and
relaxed regulations to maximize profits. Instead, China was demonized, with the China-asthreat lobby using anti-Chinese language that was often racist and personal (“China’s
Future Premier”).
On the economy, the preferred policy of the China-as-threat lobby is “decoupling,”
the catchword the untangling of US economic and political ties from China. While this
policy has implications across the economy and in other markets where the US relies
heavily on imports from China, such as smart phones, clothing, medical equipment, car
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parts, and semiconductors, “decoupling” had its own implications for renewable energy.
The justification for the policy lies in the argument around American “vulnerabilities” or
the idea that US economic openness to China amount to a national security threat.
Americans, in this view, were vulnerable in five critical ways. First was the issue of energy
independence. The China-as-threat lobby believed that the US must have a reliable and
domestically produced source of cheap and abundant energy. Second was the vulnerability
associated with reliance on raw materials like rare earths that are essential to building the
motors in wind turbines as well as used in other industrial processes including petroleum
refining, battery creation, and the motors used in hybrid and electric vehicles. A third point
of vulnerability had to do with US reliance on inexpensive made-in-China products, from
solar panels to wind turbines to smart grid technology. A fourth source of vulnerability had
to do with Chinese theft of US intellectual property and espionage in general. And fifth, the
vulnerability associated with potential Chinese violations of US data security potentially
used for malevolent purposes.
The ideology behind decoupling was best expressed by Trump trade advisor Peter
Navarro when he explained his view that the American military industrial base is at risk in
a 2018 New York Times op-ed. “Economic security is national security,” Navarro argued.
He offered a list of policies that would restore security and prosperity to America’s
manufacturing base, including “corporate tax cuts and a wave of deregulation to stimulate
investment and spur innovation; steel and aluminum tariffs to bolster core industries; a
stout defense against China’s brazen theft and forced transfers of American intellectual
property and technologies; a significant increase in the military budget; expansion of Buy
American rules for government procurement; and tough steps on trade to level the playing
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field for American workers, businesses and farmers” (Navarro).
It is important to note that the decoupling movement within the China-as-threat
lobby faced some internal opposition. There were some industry lobbyists and pro-business
conservative think tanks and interest groups that balked at the idea of shutting down trade
with China. Conservative think tanks like the Competitive Enterprise Institute were
“concerned about protectionism,” (Scribner) and the normally pro-Trump Americans for
Prosperity recommended that Trump “de-escalate the trade war” (Americans for
Prosperity). In one of the biggest Republican Party ruptures, Koch industries, criticized
Trump’s trade war. Doubling down on the merits of free trade, the Koch brothers called for
the removal of tariffs on Chinese aluminum and steel with the argument that “trade lifts
people out of poverty and improves lives” (Abramson). Neoconservatives William Kristol
and Robert Kagan were also critical of Trump’s “narrowing of US interests.” According to
Kagan, rather than launch a trade war, the US “must keep sacrificing to keep the system it
set up in place” (Kagan). However, the American Enterprise Institute countered, arguing
that the China-as-threat response was that any short-term costs associated with decoupling,
including “higher prices, lower returns on investments, and lost sales” were worth it and
“dwarfed by the cost of continued Chinese economic predation and the empowerment of
the CCP” (Scissors 1).
Indeed, the economic fragility of the US—what became known as the “hollowing
out” of American manufacturing—coupled with the mounting, social, psychological, and
health problems such as addiction, obesity, depression, and suicide, problems that were
more severe in regions of the US particularly hard hit economically, produced a kind of
emotionally-charged whole-hearted rejection of China and everything it stood for.
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Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg echoed this China-as-threat sentiment when he wrote
in a 2018 article that if the US was going to successfully oppose the rise of China, it must
“cast the challenge … in ideological terms.” He wrote, “Geopolitical abstractions and
economic statistics may be important, but historically what has moved and motivated the
American people is a recognition that the principles on which their system is founded are
under threat” (Friedberg).
This sentiment carried over to climate change. While many members of the Chinaas-threat lobby had previously held positions either directly hostile to or at least skeptical of
climate change, the additional factor of China’s technological prowess and economic
advantage over the US dramatically elevated climate change to become a key issue of
contention for the China-as-threat lobby. For example, Bannon, who ran Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign and later served as White House Chief Strategist and Senior
Counselor to the President, called renewable energy “madness” and when tax incentives for
renewable energy was included in a 2015 omnibus budget bill, he referred to it as “crony
capitalism” (Lavelle “Steve Bannon”). The Heartland Institute, which had been one of the
leading advocates of climate denial, claimed wind energy was “dangerous” and also bad for
the environment because of the high-carbon manufacturing process (Flanakin).
The Human Rights Lobbyists
The China-as-threat impulse to isolate and punish China found support from an odd
and non-traditional ally—the human rights lobby. This extended to renewable energy.
Groups like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Human Rights in China,
which are generally associated with the left and the liberal politics of the Democratic Party,
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initiated campaigns to boycott components of solar panels and wind turbines made in
Xinjiang province. The groups echoed the China-as-threat position espoused by the extreme
right including a widespread demonization of the Chinese Communist Party. Although
China-as-threat think tanks like the Committee on the Present Danger, or the Heritage
Foundation, or the Manhattan Institute do not often promote human rights issues as part of
their regular agendas. Some of these organizations were even hostile to the concept of
human rights. For example, the Manhattan Institute published an article mocking liberal
lifestyles and values stating that demands for pet insurance from employers could soon
become a human right as “America’s next entitlement” (Rice). But the anti-China boycotts
initiated by human rights groups lent an air of legitimacy to China-threat anti-China
campaigns and so they embraced the messaging behind them.
For decades, human rights groups in the United States have waged aggressive
campaigns against the Chinese Communist Party that have legitimized and widened the
China-threat claim (Chapter 2 shows this history). One such example is the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), which, while pushing for the expansion of democracy
in China on the basis of principle and human rights, also sought to overthrow the CCP. In
the agenda, these groups advanced or at least found common cause with right-wing Chinathreat think tanks. Groups like NED, which have worked aggressively to sow seeds of
doubt about the legitimacy and benevolence of the CCP within China and around the world,
have been viewed by some as a tool of US foreign policy. While a bipartisan cohort of
elected officials within Washington—for example Nancy Pelosi on the left and Marco
Rubio on the right—have explicitly stated that the CCP should be abolished, they also
realize that abolishing the CCP would involve a process of regime change that would be
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highly politically costly if it were even possible. However, NGOs can do that work without
the political risk. NED, for example, has for many years launched a campaign to
delegitimize CCP leadership, labeling the Chinese government a “clear and present danger”
(Diamond).
In the last decade, these anti-China human rights campaigns have had a direct
impact on the global renewable energy industry. Many groups mobilized to initiate a
boycott of solar panels made in Xinjiang province citing Chinese human rights abuses of
the Uyghur minority living there. According to a report, about one-third of the polysilicon,
a critical raw material that is used to make solar panels, comes from Xinjiang (Copley).
The anti-Xinjiang solar panel campaign is part of a larger push for visibility and
political recognition for the Uyghur people that has captured Washington. Organizations
like the World Uyghur Congress and the long-time anti-communism think tank, Victims of
Communism Memorial Foundation led by Adrian Zenz, have made great efforts to
demonize the CCP and raise awareness about human rights abuses in China. This campaign
calls for boycotts not just of Xinjiang solar panels, but also other agricultural products
including cotton used to make clothing sold at well-known US fashion retail stores.
Another NGO involved in the campaign, called End Uyghur Forced Labor, claims that one
in five cotton garments are “tainted” by Uyghur forced labor (Paton and Ramzy).
The situation in Xinjiang has also had an impact on wind energy. The Xinjiangbased company Goldwind, a major supplier of materials for US wind energy projects, has
also been the target of boycotts (Fromer and Zhou). Citing inhumane labor conditions, and
the Chinese Communist Party’s violations over treatment and working conditions of
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Uyghur Muslims living in Xinjiang, human rights campaigns joined forces with lawmakers
during the Trump administration to launch a campaign to block wind imports coming from
the region.
Collectively, these campaigns have had traction in the US political system.
Demonstrating an example of rare and coveted bipartisan leadership in Washington, the
Uygur Human Right Policy Act was enacted in 2019, introduced by Senator Marco Rubio,
passed in the Senate by unanimous consent and a similar version passed in the House by
407 to 1 (“Actions–S.3744”). Likewise, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,
introduced by Massachusetts House Democrat James McGovern, will go into effect June
2022. The bill presumes that all imports from Xinjiang are the product of forced labor and
therefore subject to the ban. Listed as a priority industry in the ban is polysilicon, which is
used in solar panel production. Nearly half of the world’s supply originates in Xinjiang
(Paton and Ramzy).
In this way, the Trump-era China-as-threat lobby represented a true reconstitution of
the post-Cold War China Lobby. In replay of Bello’s “unholy alliance” concept (see
Chapter 2), amplifying the China-as-threat cause and expanded anti-China sentiment into
more liberal corners of the political spectrum.
Industry Lobbyists
Just as the China-as-opportunity lobby created openings for industry lobbyists to
pursue business goals, the China-as-threat agenda yielded similar opportunities for a
different set of industries. Unlike for think tanks, these concerns were not ideological.
Industry lobbyists sometimes adopted the ideological language of the China-as-threat lobby
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to advance their interests but their goals were rooted in their economic viability. Companies
that sought the China-as-threat ideological cover included wind and solar companies that
were directly threatened by exposure to Chinese markets. Examples include companies like
Suniva, a Georgia-based solar panel manufacturing company, TPI Composites, an Arizonabased company that owns several factories in China that make wind turbine blades, and
General Electric (GE), which is a leading producer of wind turbines in the US. Also
included in this category are semiconductor and superconductor companies like AMSC that
facilitate the flow of electricity from the solar and wind farms into the electricity grid.
For each of the five points of vulnerability addressed by the China-as-threat think
tanks, there was an industry solution. For example, coal, oil, and gas industry lobbyists
promoted the idea of energy independence through reinvestments in fossil fuels. Some USbased solar and wind power manufacturers pushed for tariffs against Chinese solar panel
and wind turbine imports. In this way the US could protect a key aspect of national
security, a safe and reliable source of energy. To capitalize on this opportunity, domestic
producers of fossil fuel based energy—ExxonMobil, Duke Energy, Shell, Murray Energy,
etc.—were in a strong position to make a plea for a reduction of environmental regulations
and a lifting of regulations about where and how to drill for oil. When Trump took office, a
memo drafted by Department of Energy transition team member Thomas Pyle, a former
lobbyist for the oil and gas industry, outlined the fossil fuel wish list including: (1) increase
federal oil and natural gas leasing; (2) lifting the coal lease moratorium; (3) elimination of
Obama’s Clean Power Plan; (4) expediting approvals of LNG terminals; and, (5) moving
forward on pipeline projects including Keystone and Dakota Access (Boren). Many of
these requests became policy during the Trump administration (Gross).
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Second, both US solar and wind installations rely on raw materials such as steel and
aluminum imported from China as well as rare earth metals and cobalt extraction for wind
turbines. These are all industries in which China dominates. Since there is no way of
getting around the need for those materials to manufacture wind turbines and solar panels,
the industry solution was to demote wind and solar altogether and switch to a model that
does not rely on them. Thus the US would avoid Chinese competition by eliminating the
industry altogether. For example, as an alternative to solar and wind technologies, the coal
industry lobby found leverage in the Trump administration becoming one of the
campaign’s largest sources of donations and receiving policy promises to restore the coal
industry and protect coal-mining jobs in response (Tindera).
A third point of vulnerability was the question of US reliance on made-in-China
“green” products such as solar modules and semiconductors used in grid connectivity.
According to Congressional research, 98% of solar panels and their components are made
outside of the US. Most US solar and wind power installations rely heavily on the
importation of parts from China. The US imported $5.1 billion worth of solar modules from
China in 2017 (Young). The industry solution response to this was to reinvigorate
American manufacturing in these areas, a goal shared by the US manufacturing industry
and promoted by its lobbyists and trade groups. In another example of industry lobbying for
protection against Chinese competition, in 2017 two solar companies, Solar World and
Suniva, petitioned the US International Trade Commission to and impose tariffs on Chinese
solar panels claiming that imported PV products caused “injury” to US producers (Pyper
and Spector).
The fourth point of vulnerability was the question of China’s theft of intellectual
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property. At the end of the Obama administration, the Justice Department charged five
military hackers from China of committing “espionage against US corporations” including
against solar company Solar World. The charge claims that an “unidentified co-conspirator
stole thousands of files including information, costs, and privileged attorney-client
communications relating to ongoing trade litigation, among other things” (US Justice
Department). From the industry point of view, these were legitimate concerns but they also
served to reinforce the China-as-threat lobby position. Another high-profile intellectual suit
occurred in 2018, when Beijing-based wind turbine manufacturer Sinovel was found guilty
in a Madison, Wisconsin court for stealing trade secrets from US semiconductors company
AMSC, which claimed a loss of $1 billion in assets and almost 700 jobs as a result of the
theft (Pham). This is just one of many similar cases.
The fifth point of vulnerability related to US data security. Like the intellectual
property issue, there were legitimate incidents of security breaches. However, it is also
clear that this issue was amplified by the China-as-threat lobby to induce fear and paranoia.
The fear was based in the idea that the “smart grid” technology—an essential component of
any modern grid reliant on renewable energy—was corruptible by Chinese forces,
especially if the US were to rely on Chinese-based technologies to enable the
communication between energy generators and end-users. Smart grid technology regulates
flow and measures usage trends using and generating data in a way that is different from
the previous fossil fuel based grid models (Maize). Breaches of data security can occur on
the distribution level, targeting a single energy consumer and violating privacy and safety
concerns. The industry response to this threat is to use US-based software and equipment
and strengthen government ability to monitor and thwart foreign interference.
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In order to create the case for shifting away from wind and solar energy and
reinvigorating fossil fuels, the China-as-threat lobby framed the wind and solar industries
as unfairly bloated. The idea was that they were getting ahead—cheating—and inextricably
linked to liberal democratic agendas that privileged globalized industries at the expense of
the working class. Solar panels were understood as the result of rich people’s whimsical
hobbies, for which they demanded government support as well as a degree of moral
superiority. Those who were hurt by these policies—those who carried the burden of the
new taxes—was the American working class, the same Americans who lost their jobs to
China. According to Pyle, who served as the president of one of the largest fossil fuel trade
groups, the American Energy Alliance, as well as its research arm, the Institute for Energy
Research, “Big Wind succeeded in securing themselves another taxpayer-funded, billiondollar windfall, proving once again they are afraid to compete on a level playing field. You
can bet they are already gearing up to take another run at picking our pockets again next
year….” (AEA Press Office).
Trump’s energy and China policies were largely in line with China-as-threat goals,
although not completely. Both were aligned around the goal of shifting the US energy
economy towards fossil fuels and away from renewable energy. After record level
campaign donations from coal executives and industry lobbyists, Trump promised to revive
a lagging coal industry. Following through on his promise, Trump’s EPA passed the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule in June 2019 to replace the emission-reduction regulations
of Obama’s Clean Power Plan. This allowed many of the coal-fired power plants that
would have closed under the Clean Power Plan to remain open (Wentz).
A second point of alignment culminated in Trump’s China trade war, which grew
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out of mutual concern over both security as well as trade deficits and job losses. The first
step of the trade war was to place tariffs on US imports of Chinese made solar panels.
Trump had also not renewed a solar investment tax credit in a 2020 budget bill, making this
a second blow to the industry. There was a certain symbolism in opening the trade war with
a tariff on solar panels. It was as if Trump was making clear the uselessness of solar power
in his new vision of the American energy market. This was especially true after the US
Chamber of Commerce released a report stating that the greatest areas of US vulnerability
to China’s trade imbalance were the chemical industry, aviation, medical supplies and the
semiconductor industry (“Understanding US-China Decoupling”). Not solar panels.
However, the link between the perceived American vulnerability to China and China’s
growing dominance in the green technology industry was clear. In addition to the trade war,
Trump took other steps to de-emphasize renewable energy, including ending the renewable
energy tax credit that had resulted in steep growth in renewable energy output during the
Obama administration.
The result of these policies, obviously, was to hurt efforts to reduce emissions.
Trump’s trade war made Chinese-made green technology scarce, hurting the US renewable
industry, particularly wind and solar. The tariffs on solar panels led US solar companies to
“cancel or freeze” investments of more than $25 billion (Groom). Estimates show that
Trump’s solar tariffs blocked 10.5 gigawatts of newly installed solar power, enough to
bring electricity to 1.8 million homes (Dickinson). Echoing the China-as-threat perspective,
Trump argued that since the US cannot beat China in renewable energy production, it
should double down in the areas where it enjoys comparative advantage: coal production,
fracked gas, and oil. Like with electric vehicles (see Chapter 4), Trump did everything in
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his power to continue the decoupling of the US and Chinese energy sectors to create
separate technology spheres. Whether it was 5G or self-driving cars, or low-carbon sources
of energy, Trump saw these technologies as potential security threats to the US before he
saw them as opportunities for low-carbon growth and economic rejuvenation.
Trump’s Executive Order 13795, “Implementing an America-first Offshore Energy
Strategy” reversed the Obama-era ban on arctic oil and gas drilling (DiChristopher “Coal
Mining”). Likewise, it was consistent with EO 13783, “Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth,” which directed the EPA to halt Obama’s Clean Power Plan. It was
also aligned with Trump’s campaign promise to revive American coal production.
However, the results of Trump’s efforts to revive coal were mixed. In his first two years in
office, coal mining jobs remained steady, but a only because a surge in US exports offset
the impact of the closure of many coal-fired power plants (Lipton).
To summarize, the China-as-threat lobby comprise elements that both resembled its
China Lobby predecessor and emerged in the Trump administration as a force that—citing
concerns over China’s economic rise—was directly hostile to the development and
deployment of renewable energy in the United States. The priority for the China-as-threat
lobby was to retain national power, resist the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation state
and roll back policies perceived as creating US reliance on Chinese industries. To do this,
the lobby advocated for a policy of reinvigorating fossil fuel production, especially
domestically, and phasing out government support for solar and wind energy. Like the
China-as-threat lobby, and perhaps more dramatically, this thinking fell far short of what is
required to adequately address the global climate crisis. By fixating on the issue of nation
state sovereignty and pursuing policies of economic nationalism, the China-as-threat lobby
112

also failed to transcend the zero-sum game mentality whereby China’s gain is an American
loss. Taken together, this approach not only failed to initiate policies that address the
climate crisis, but it actively worked to undermine them.
The Trump trade war put into action what were previously just dreams of the China
Lobby. Alienating even the moderate pro-business conservative side of the Republican
Party, its sole purpose was to place the US on a trajectory to counter Chinese influence.
And while Trump was able to appease industry lobbyists and other conservative interests
along the way, the ultimate goal was to counter China. As evidenced by the economic
decline during Trump’s presidency—even in the coal industry which he sought to prop
up—all other interests, including the health of the US economy or even some of the
interests of the fossil fuel companies that stood to benefit from cooperation with China,
were secondary to that powerful driving force.
Conclusion
Whether it was the China-as-opportunity lobby during the Obama administration, or
the China-as-threat lobby during the Trump administration, both of these interest group
alignments, driving by think tanks empowered by industry lobbyists, sought policies that
effectively reduced the complex question of renewable energy policy—a policy area that
deals with issues of domestic politics, industry planning, and long-term economic
outlook—to a serve the larger security dynamic inherent in US-China relations. Although
both lobbies adhered to different ideologies and pursued differed policy goals, they both
constrained the development of renewable energy.
During the Obama administration, the China-as-opportunity lobby sought a broader
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vision of global US leadership on climate change and a need to “catch up” with China on
clean energy development. They pursued this in the most efficient way possible—through
short-term economic agreements between US companies and their Chinese counterparts.
However, more important than realizing a long-term transition to a low-carbon energy grid
was the need to protect US companies against Chinese competition with tools like stronger
intellectual property rights and legal protection of patents. Ultimately—like the China-asthreat lobby—this approach failed to transcend the zero-sum model of thinking that
dominated policy circles and stymied climate progress.
The China-as-threat approach under the Trump administration prioritized national
power and independence over long-term planning and the need for large-scale adaptation to
a resource-constrained world. The need to distance the US from China led to a policy of
fierce resistance to green technology. Energy policy was then captured by a revival of
domestically sourced fossil fuel based energy generation. This policy trajectory was
bolstered by a non-traditional ally, the human rights lobby, which launched campaigns to
boycott solar panels made in Xinjiang and the extraction of certain minerals used in wind
turbine production because of labor and human rights abuses in those industries. This
chapter shows examples of how a policy issue like clean energy cane be reduced to a
serving component of US-China relations. Rather than finding a way to make solar and
wind energy contribute to Trump’s campaign goal of seeking energy independence, the
China-as-threat approach to renewable energy was ultimately curtailed by the greater goal
of projecting an image of resistance to China’s economic dominance. In and of themselves,
there was nothing about the industry that ran counter to Trump’s proclaimed energy goals.
Many analysts have made the case that domestically produced renewable energy
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contributes to energy independence. Yet, the solar and wind industries’ association with
Chinese dominance and the memories of failed government investments in the wake of the
Solyndra bankruptcy, made those industries a toxic political issue for the Republican Party.
Instead the China-as-threat lobby—and much of the Republican Party—used that political
moment as a way to advance an anti-China agenda. The flattening of the complex question
of renewable energy resulted in a type of political polarization—a with-us-or-against-us
attitude that led to an unquestionable commitment to fossil fuel based energy.
For both the China-as-opportunity lobby and the China-as-threat lobby, the question
of US-China relations—and the security challenges therein—determined the success or
failure of renewable energy policy. Industry interests animated and amplified the
arguments. Both sides succumbed to zero-sum, short-term thinking. Renewable energy
policy became entangled with these outside political issues and was not able to exist as a
policy area with its own merits and arguments.
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CHAPTER 4
Clean Transportation: Electric Vehicles
Chapter 4 turns to the transportation sector and the US approach to the development
of electric vehicles (EVs) and EV infrastructure as well as the adoption of fuel economy
standards. It applies the analytical model developed in Chapter 3 to describe how the
dynamics of US-China relations affect lobbying over clean energy policies. This chapter
shows the impact of the China-as-opportunity and China-as-threat lobbies on the political
discourse over transportation and particularly EV policy in the United States. It argues that
interest group activity and the two lobbies result in: (1) a reduction of the larger problem of
emissions from the transportation sector into a serving component of the greater security
concerns present in the US-China relationship; and, (2) opportunities for industry lobbyists
to pursue narrow business interests over the broader climate concerns and solutions
recommended by scientists. This chapter will explore what these trends mean for electric
vehicles.
The chapter is divided into two sections, one on the China-as-opportunity lobby
during the Obama administration and the second on the China-as-threat lobby during the
Trump administration. Each section focuses on two policy areas that are central to
decarbonizing the transportation sector: (1) the production and market expansion of electric
vehicles; and, (2) the tightening of fuel economy standards for cars and trucks.
Background – Transportation and Climate Change
The global transportation sector is large and complex and reaches deeply into many
parts of the global economy. Transportation is an important case study to explore the
capacity for US-China collaboration because all leading climate models include large-scale
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electrification of transport as a central part of its strategy. This includes personal cars,
trucks, freight, buses, and trains used in public transportation as well as the entire aviation
industry. In the US and China, 29% and 8% respectively, of the countries’ total emissions
come from the transportation sector (“Sources”; “CO2 Emission”). In China the number is
lower, but transportation is the fastest growing sources of emissions. Mobility in general,
and personal car ownership in particular, will increase dramatically in the coming years. In
the US, emissions from vehicles have now surpassed the power sector as the largest sources
of greenhouse gases (“Sources”). Climate scientists agree that moving towards electric
mobility and progressively stricter fuel economy standards that promote EV options,
coupled with a strong policy towards the transition to renewable sources for the generation
of electricity is the most viable way to meet the targets scientists recommend (UNFCCC).
Another reason to focus on the transportation sector is that unlike other more complicated
climate dilemmas, the technology to decarbonize key sources of emissions exists now.
Moreover, much of the world, citing concerns about energy independence, urban air
pollution, and climate change, are moving in a direction that includes the electrification of
mobility, stricter fuel economy standards, the expansion of public transportation and
cleaner freight and air travel.
Electric Vehicles
International and American climate experts across the board have emphasized that
the global solution to climate change must include the development and deployment of
electric vehicles. The US and China are the two largest economies and have the two largest
car markets in the world, so transitions to electric forms of mobility can hypothetically have
a larger impact in those countries. But the two markets are different. China’s car ownership
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rate is low and growing. America’s is high and many consumers are buying second and
third cars. In American, car ownership has historically been linked to ideas of freedom and
independence and also a sign of status. The great American highway and the extensive
networks the link suburbs to cities creating a commuter culture are bedrocks of American
identity and culture. American automobile infrastructure—highways, commuter-based
residential areas, urban planning from shopping centers to downtown areas—are all
oriented around the personal car.
In China, personal car ownership is relatively new and associated with luxury and
wealth, or at least a comfortable middleclass lifestyle. China’s recent experiences with
urban air pollution, including Beijing’s 2013 “Airpocolypse,” with much of the particulate
matter choking out blue skies coming from heavy city traffic, remain traumatizing and
recent memories. Infrastructure for automobile transportation in China is more recent,
much of it still being built reflecting new planning techniques able to take advantage of the
newest fuel and vehicle technology. Beijing has taken an approach to the development of
the transportation sector that relies heavily on government mandates and financial
incentives that have a direct impact on the sales of electric vehicles (Ritchie). Studies show
that these government incentives are crucial to the EV industry in China. Whenever there
has been a cut in subsidies, EVs sales likewise plummet (Cattaneo).
Fuel Economy Standards
Second to the electrification of modes of transportation, transportation experts and
climate scientists agree that the establishment of fuel economy standards is the most
effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector in the
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United States or any country (“Federal Vehicle Standards”). The US has used the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards since 1975 as a cornerstone of US clean air policy. The
existence of standards prompts auto manufacturers to produce new fuel-efficient
technologies, which can benefit the entire industry. While consumers benefit from the costsavings associated with vehicles that consumer less gas, studies show that consumers
undervalue fuel cost savings, meaning that if auto-manufacturers follow consumer patterns
only, there would be no incentive to make more efficient cars (Ankney and Leard). There
are other benefits, too, that aren’t directly related to climate. Fuel economy standards not
only reduce tailpipe emissions, they also drastically improve urban air quality, which cuts
down lung and respiratory disease in urban populations. There are ample studies that show
that mission standards are an effective way to reduce both greenhouse gas and particulate
matter emissions from the atmosphere. Following the Clean Air Act, the first of a series of
US regulations that limited hydrocrabon, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen oxide emissions in
cars and trucks, the Air Quality Index measured notable improvements in air quality and
national and local emissions levels plummeted (“History”).
The global market for both EVs and fuel-efficient vehicles is increasingly and
largely shaped by China. Electric vehicle sales in China overtook the US in 2010 and the
gap has continued to grow since then (Kolodny). According to a report from the
International Energy Agency, China is expected to hold 57% of the global EV market by
2030 (“Global EV Outlook 2019). China not only holds monopolies on EV technologies
and manufacturing capacity, but it is also the largest source of raw materials including
cobalt, lithium, and rare earths that are used in EV batteries. Chinese EV companies have
been warmly welcomed by other nations—India and Colombia for example—to help
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develop local EV industries. But this is not the attitude in the United States. Historically
both Democrats and Republicans in the United States have supported limiting the imports
of EV components from China and resisted entirely the sale of Chinese-made EVs on
American soil.
Likewise, finding a slow uptake in domestic markets, many US EV makers have
moved production and sales from the US to China. In 2019, US EV manufacturer Tesla
opened a plant in Shanghai that generated $3 billion in profits in 2019 and $6.6 billion in
2020 (Williams). Writing in the Detroit Free Press, auto analyst and Michigan-based
columnist Mark Phelan characterized the industry in this way: “The US auto industry risks
becoming an isolated technical backwater while China surges into the global lead in a
technology its government has targeted as a key to leadership for the 21st Century”
(Phelan).
The debate over clean transportation policy in the US has resulted in polarized
positions amplified by interest groups and exploited by industry lobbyists. In one vision,
electric vehicles and emission standards are the cornerstones of the future, essential parts of
US sustainable development. From the perspective of the China-as-opportunity lobbyists,
with the two countries’ economies as tightly knit as they are, there is a strong potential for
meaningful and productive cooperation between for the two countries to expand the EV
market. For example, one study, “A Roadmap for US-China Cooperation on Energy and
Climate Change,” published by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and the Asia
Society in 2009 recommend “[J]oint efforts should examine how power grids can be
upgraded and expanded to allow for and promote the wide-spread use of plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEV), or fully electric vehicles” (“A Roadmap” 36). And more: “The
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United States and China should lead an effort to develop an agreement among countries
that are major automobile producers or markets to promote a new generation of highefficiency vehicles” (35). A 2009 study by Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow
published by the Brookings Institution states, “As the world’s two largest oil consumers,
the United States and China share powerful security and economic interests in ending oil’s
overwhelming dominance as a fuel for cars and trucks” (Sandalow and Leiberthal).
The opposing view, the China-as-threat perspective, explained China’s
transportation industry advantages as the result of cheating, or unfair trade practices. This
view emphasized China’s currency valuation, abundant cheap labor, suppression of labor
rights and environmental regulations and violations of intellectual property rights as the
basis of China’s advantages in the transportation industry. They argued that the US could
sell products to China, but US companies should not manufacture cars or auto components
in China because they would result in China stealing US patents, remaking those products
more cheaply and then selling it back to the US while the US company goes bankrupt. The
China-as-threat perspective procured the image that low carbon transportation in general
and electric vehicles in particular were “elite” hobbies of the wealthy classes who had made
their money through lucrative relationships with China. They pushed the argument that the
EV market—as well as efforts to strengthen fuel economy standards through regulation—
were part of a scheme that exploited tax money earned by hardworking, middle-class
Americans, and spent it on subsidizing the rich, providing tax breaks to wealthy people,
mostly in California, so they can buy expensive electric cars as their second or third
vehicle. The following sections will focus more closely on each of these lobbies and their
impacts on US-China collaboration on transportation policy in the United States.
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The China-as-opportunity Lobby Under the Obama Administration
During the Obama administration, the China-as-opportunity lobby pushed for
greater collaboration between the US and China on low- or zero-carbon transportation
solutions. Many of the China-as-opportunity think tanks—the Brookings Institution, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Asia Society for example—
called for the creation of a new platform for US-China collaboration, realized, in large part
by the launch of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a series of high-level talks covering
all aspects of their shared economies including climate change (“US-China Strategic and
Economic”). The US Department of Energy through the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
established the US-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) with counterparts in
China including several prominent Chinese universities. Targeting transportation, the
China-as-opportunity lobby enabled and supported the creation of the US-China Clean
Energy Research Center for Clean Vehicles (CERC-CVC), which brought together leaders
from academia, government, and the business community, including the University of
Michigan, MIT and other US universities to establish the US-China Clean Energy Research
Center for Clean Vehicles (CERC-CVC), which focused on improving electric vehicles
models and battery technology (“US-China”).
CSIS characterized the EV challenge in the United States as a need to ramp up
“industrial competitiveness” (Kennedy). One article published by CSIS China Business and
Economics scholar, Scott Kennedy, suggested that the US increase competitiveness through
government financial support and incentives while at the same time develop an antidumping regulatory environment to protect US EV companies from Chinese competition
(Kennedy). At Brookings, David Sandalow, who later became Obama’s Assistant Secretary
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of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the State
Department, published a book in 2009, which made clear the US imperative to increase EV
manufacturing capacity and sales. “No technology has greater potential to end the United
States’ crippling dependence on oil, which leaves the nation vulnerable to price shocks,
supply disruptions, environmental degradation, and national security threats including
terrorism,” he writes. Citing the economic security of America’s middle class, he calls on
the federal government to support research and development initiatives, point of sale taxcredits, federal procurement policies, federally supported battery warranties, and a national
fuel economy standard regime to support EV growth and development (Sandalow 5).
Chiming in from another China-as-opportunity angle, the Center for American Progress
wrote in September 2020, that the lack of investment in electric vehicles in the United
States risks “ceding the competition to China.” In this report, the lack of EV investment is
bad for US workers. The US lagging behind China in the EV market is “threatening both to
the US ability to reach climate goals and the long-term competitiveness of the domestic
auto industry, which has long been a source of high-quality, unionized jobs that support a
strong middle class” (Walter et al.). Ironically, the China-as-threat lobby, make similar
emotional appeals to the economic stability of the middle class. But in their case, the
prescription is completely different. In their recommendation, the US should back out of
EV development all together and focus on what it is already good at producing: the internal
combustion-engine (more on this later in the chapter).
When Obama entered office with clean transportation and climate change and a
more productive and cooperative relationship with China as policy items high on his
agenda, the China-as-opportunity lobby saw an opening to leverage their preferred policies.

123

Just over a year and half in office, President Obama pledged to put 1 million plug-in
electric vehicles on the road by 2015, a goal he reiterated in his 2011 State of the Union
address (and also never reached). Echoing the remarks from Sandalow’s 2009 book on
electric vehicles, Obama stressed EVs because, he said, the US must “break our
dependence on oil” (Obama, “Remarks”). The question was only how to meet this target
and China-as-opportunity think tanks had the answers.
Obama’s other notable achievement on transportation policy was the
implementation of stricter rules on vehicle emissions. In 2011, Obama announced plans to
increase fuel economy standards to 54.5 miles per gallon for cars and light-duty trucks
made in 2025, a target that was on par with the California fuel economy standards already
in place. While the extension of these standards to the federal level was a clear
accomplishment, it didn’t represent any kind of significant federal government pushback
against the auto industry, as Obama had claimed. Rather, because California had already
enacted the standards and many states had followed suit, together amounting to 40% of the
US car market, extending the California standards to the rest of the country did not change
the way the auto industry made cars. Most US automakers had already adjusted to make all
cars meet the California standard. As one author said, it was as if Obama “signed his name
to someone else’s work” (Bookbinder).
Many members of the China-as-opportunity lobby think tanks, such as David
Sandalow at Brookings and Steven Chu who co-chaired a major report on US-China
cooperation on climate change published in 2009 by the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change and the Asia Society Center on US-China Relations, were later appointed to
prominent positions in the Obama cabinet. From these positions, the China-as-opportunity
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lobby participated in a large-scale public-private initiative to promote US-China
cooperation. This was done primarily through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the
CERC-CVC but there were other forums that connected US and Chinese companies as
well. In September of 2010, the US Department of Energy Argonne National Lab hosted
the First US-China Electric Vehicle and Battery Technology Workshop with co-host
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology. The event, which continued annually until the
end of the Obama administration, brought together representatives from industry,
government, academia, to set up joint research and exchange related to EV battery
development between US companies and their Chinese counterparts. The US Department
of Energy produced a report that stated the following: “The United States and China are the
world’s largest automobile markets and oil consumers. Working together to accelerate the
deployment of electric vehicles will improve both countries’ energy security and save
American and Chinese consumers money at the pump” (“US-China Clean Energy
Cooperation”). Similarly, Brooking hosted the “US-China Strategic Forum on Clean
Energy Cooperation,” a two-day summit of industry and government leaders that ended
with signing ceremonies committing US companies to joint ventures with Chinese
counterparts (“US-China Strategic Forum”).
As in the previous chapter, although the China-as-opportunity policy approach
opened new and lucrative opportunities for certain US-based companies, the lobby also
sought ways to protect US companies from Chinese competition, to a degree, playing two
opposing sides. And other industry lobbyists—those that had enjoyed a monopoly over
transportation fuels for decades and were threatened by electric vehicle market growth such
as the oil and gas industry—mounted a credible challenge to EV development. Charles and
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David Koch, known as the “Koch brothers” (David died in 2019) were known for their
political influence, specifically blocking electric vehicles and other carbon reducing
policies. The brothers owned a series of oil refineries and pipelines and became billionaires
in the oil industry. Between 2009 and 2016, the Koch brothers organized donors to spend
$889 million on conservative causes, including climate denial and blocking climate
policies, an amount that puts them on par with the whole of the Republican National
Committee on financial terms (Vogel). Obama was subjected to this political pressure as
well and, as such, was unable to transform the electric vehicles industry into anything more
robust than the one he inherited. A fear of exposing the US auto industry to Chinese
competition, driven by industry lobbyists and supported by the China-as-threat lobby,
stunted the growth of the EV sector in the United States.
These lobbyists won substantial concessions from the Obama administration. After
imposing stricter fuel economy standards, Obama paved the way to allow Shell to expand
drilling in the Arctic coast off Alaska. Additionally, in another gift to the oil and gas
industry, Obama lifted a ban on the export of crude oil, which had been in place since 1975,
which resulted in the flooding of the world with cheap fossil fuels, undermining efforts to
boost energy alternatives all over the world and creating a surge in the plastics industry.
The resulting drop in oil prices created a disincentive to buy both electric and fuel efficient
cars in the US (“Greenpeace Report”).
To summarize, the China-as-opportunity approach to EVs presented many workable
policies in terms of short-term economic gains for US-based industries. However, it failed
to fundamentally change the US transportation industry in a way that moved the country
closer to full electric. While the tax credits resulted in increased EV sales, without sustained
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support from the government, the EV industry could not produce a model at a price point
that would be appealing to the average consumer. The lack of US commitment to the
electric vehicle industry, as well as the volatile state of government incentives, resulted in a
boutique and limited EV market. The industry was championed by wealthy people like
Arnold Schwarzenegger or enthusiastic environmentalists who were willing to pay more to
seek the identity and social capital associated with electric car ownership. Increasing, the
US propped up luxury brands of EVs, like Tesla, which were purchased by people with a
higher than average income to serve as a second or even third car. This has two
implications for climate change and US-China cooperation. First, as a boutique industry, it
is also a stunted market, with growth possible only for Americans with incomes in the top
10%. Second, as the US began to manufacture more luxury EVs and China produced nonluxury EVs at a much lower price point, the two industries became isolated from each other
and could not benefit from trading in parts or technology. To the China-as-threat lobby, this
decoupling was the preferred policy outcome. To the China-as-opportunity lobby, the
evolution of the separate technology spheres was an unintended consequence of nonaligned
policies initiatives and something that must be overcome to maximize US-China
cooperation on EV development.
The China-as-Threat Lobby Under the Trump Administration
The China-as-threat lobby approach to US-China cooperation on electric vehicle
development echoed the values of economic nationalism, energy independence, and
preservation of nation state sovereignty over the global neoliberal trade regime. Here again,
the interest-group driven climate denial platform became a position from which anti-China
policies flowed. Appeasing climate denialists (and the fossil fuel industry), the China-as127

threat lobby pushed to roll back the Obama policies on electric vehicle subsidies and fuel
economy standards and launch a new policy of “economic nationalism” focusing on USbased auto manufacturing and fuels. The China-as-threat lobby recommended policies
aimed to: (1) decouple the US and Chinese economies, including any joint efforts towards
green transportation; (2) undermine China’s economic growth, particularly by denying
China US clean technology market share; and, (3) re-commit the US transportation sector
to one based on made-in-the-USA technology and fueled US-sourced energy. Particularly
in the first goal, the China-as-threat lobby found support from human rights groups
concerned with labor conditions involved in the extraction of cobalt, and lithium in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, two minerals that are key to China’s electric vehicle
manufacturing industry.
In many ways, decoupling was a not a new policy for the auto industry. Years of
protectionism have made it politically unthinkable to consider the idea that China would
export cars to the United States, electric or otherwise. As such the industries have already
been decoupled. Had they not, Detroit might be equally hollowed out. Given their
economically precarious reality, it is hard to imagine that the Nissan Leaf ($31,670), Tesla
Model S ($69,420) or the even the cheapest EV made in the US, the 2020 Mini Cooper SE
($30,000) could ever compete with the Hongguang Mini EV ($4,500), which is made in
China by General Motors. In this sense, the China-as-threat lobby has already dominated
the American vehicles market, where—aside from parts and materials—US vehicles do not
face Chinese competition. Efforts to undermine EV development has already resulted in an
industry-wide decoupling of American and Chinese technological and market efforts to
promote the growth of electric vehicles as a strategic response to the threat of climate
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change. It resulted in an incompatibility between the transportation industries in each
country, thwarting cooperation and collaboration between US and Chinese firms working
towards these goals and seriously undermining any progress towards removing emissions in
the US transportation sector. For the China-as-threat lobby, this was strategic and planned.
And for the China-as-opportunity lobby, this was a barrier to progress.
Under Trump, many elements of the old China Lobby re-emerged in a
contemporary sequel. Within his administration, Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro amplified
the China-as-threat agenda. They spoke about the US-China relationship in a way that
reflected the ideological narrative of the original China Lobby, namely, that is anticommunist, anti-internationalist, anti-“globalist” anti-“elitist” including the economic
arguments about China “stealing” US jobs, or the idea that Chinese and American elite
have weaponized economic integration to undermine the American economy. Also utilized,
are old tropes that relied on class distinctions, pitting the elite, mostly Democrat, prointernational trade “globalists” against the rural, white, blue collar, mostly Republican
worker. This is visible in the many references to electric vehicles amounting to items
purchased solely by rich people, as second or third cars, subsidized by tax credits funded by
working class Americans who struggle to buy even a first car. This not only creates
Republican resentment for policies that promote electric vehicles, it also highlights the
differences in which the Chinese and American EV markets are framed. In America, EVs
are toys for the rich. In China, EVs are a pragmatic utilitarian response to the threat of
climate change marketed to the bottom rung of the income ladder (Harper).
China-as-threat think tanks issued statements that echoed the anti-elitist, antiinternationalist character of the original China Lobby. According to a commentary by the
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Heritage Foundation, the EV market relied on “handouts,” and amounted to the US
government taking money out of working people’s paychecks to buy rich people second or
third cars (Loris “Electric Cars”). Similar commentary was published by other China-asthreat think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, which noted that 80% of the
individuals who claimed the federal vehicle tax credit had annual incomes over $100,000
and about half of those sales took place in California (Perry “Taxpayers”). The China-asthreat think tanks claimed to speak on behalf of America’s working class, arguing that EVs
are a scheme to redistribute wealth to the already rich and that fuel economy standards only
produce inferior and unsafe cars at higher prices (Perry “No”). These think tanks assumed a
very different vision of the future of transportation. Whereas nearly all the China-asopportunity think tanks emphatically assert that the future of transportation is electric, some
China-as-threat think tanks deny that claim. “Listening to politicians, environmentalists and
media pundits, you might think that the gas engine is inefficient and old-fashioned, a relic
of the past that ought to be replaced by alternative automotive technologies like electric
cars and plug-in hybrids,” wrote one scholar from the American Enterprise Institute (Perry
“Technology”). He goes on to argue that fuel-efficient cars using conventional engines will
open up vast new markets and add high-paying jobs in auto manufacturing. Moreover, he
claims, it will preserve America’s leadership in automotive technology (Perry
“Technology”).
US politicians reiterated these concerns. According to John Barrasso (R-WY), who
has received over $1 million over the course of his Senate career in contributions from oil
and gas companies, “Regardless of whether you support the tax credit for electric vehicles
or not, there is no denying taxpayers are overwhelmingly subsidizing Americans that can
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afford to buy their own car” (Mufson and Grandoni). Thomas Pyle, who is the president of
the Institute for Energy Research, the lobbying arm of the American Fuel and
Petrochemicals Manufacturers, a firm that represents oil refiners, has argued against the tax
credit making a similar class argument. “You are basically asking Iowa voters to subsidize
wealthy Californians,” Pyle said (Mufson and Grandoni). Pyle was one of the signatories of
an open letter to Trump that calls on him to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate
Agreement, increase federal oil and natural gas leasing, and reconsidering the
“endangerment finding” that determined greenhouse gasses to be a threat to public health
and welfare (Fisher “Thomas Pyle”).
Trump’s rhetoric also amplified the economic anxieties presented by the China-asthreat lobby but added a xenophobic twist. Rather than figure out a way to get American
car companies—struggling in economic doldrums for years and bailed out by the US
government—to accomplish technological leapfrogging and adopt a new national
transportation vision based on the energy efficiency, Trump’s policies aimed to reorient the
economy with the sole purpose of defending itself against a perceived Chinese threat. His
goals were made clear when he created the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy and
appointed Peter Navarro to direct. Navarro and this office became key parts of two major
Trump economic initiatives, “But American, Hire American,” and his infrastructure plan.
Trump followed up with executive orders designed to boost domestic manufacturing,
technological superiority, and particularly relying on US manufactured products, materials
and technologies in his giant infrastructure project, including EO#13805 “Establishing a
Presidential Advisory Council on Infrastructure,” EO#13806 “Assessing and Strengthening
Supply Chain Resiliency in the United States,” EO#13881 “Maximizing use of American-
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made goods, products and materials,” and finally, EO# 13858 “strengthening Buy-America
preferences for infrastructure projects” (“List of Presidential Executive Orders”).
The China-as-threat lobby aimed to overhaul and reorient the US economy to
become less reliant on Chinese imports, especially on industries related to security or
technology. But by doing this, it cut ties between most advanced technologies, including
energy efficiency, renewable energy, communication, or technologies related to electric
mobility—the industrial foundation of low-carbon transportation. Thus, if the goal is to
isolate the US from China and reduce reliance on or communication between US
technology and manufacturing companies and their Chinese counterparts, supply chains
and trade partners, it was also essential to sever any collaboration between the US and
China on electric vehicles.
The China-as-threat anti-EV position, which found traction in the Trump
administration, had profound impacts for US-China relations. It amplified and privileged
the China-as-threat perspective within Washington policy circles. By casting electric
vehicles as luxury cars for rich people that exist because of a coercive socialized
government plan that places tax burdens on the working class, the China-as-threat lobby
reinforced the link between the exploited working class in the US (many of them Trump
supporters) and the American Wall Street-connected elite who benefit from trade with
China at their expense.
In keeping with these goals, the Trump administration pursued policies that limited
financial and tax incentives for EVs and privatize many of the government operations that
could be capable of managing a transition to a low carbon transportation economy. Despite
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efforts spearheaded by the legislators from Michigan to extend and expand the tax credit,
Trump successfully eliminated the expansion of the tax credit on the claim that it would
save $2.5 billion over a decade, “money that mostly goes to rich people” (Catteneo). He
also weakened the Obama-era CAFÉ standards for cars and light duty trucks, and revoked
California’s ability to create state-level fuel economy standards (Popovich et al.). Instead
the China-as-threat lobby pushed Trump to follow policies that promoted oil-burning cars,
further deepening the divide between China and the US vehicle markets.
In both the US and China, EV sales have been largely driven by financial and nonfinancial incentives put in place by their respective government. In the US, financial
incentives have been minimal but not non-existent. As a result, EV sales are low. Because
government incentives to produce EVs are also minimal, high-end vehicles, such as Tesla
and other luxury electric cars, have defined the market. Because of the anemic government
support and push towards privatization, EVs in the US have evolved into a boutique
industry mostly geared towards wealthy consumers. This hamstrings the growth potential
of EVs but also introduces a class narrative that frames EVs are luxury items. The US EV
strategy is ultimately incompatible with China’s strategy, which is essentially the opposite
–to subsidize EV companies so that they can provide inexpensive EVs to first-time buyers.
This sentiment is echoed in a statement by the president of the Chinese electric car
company BYD, Stella Li. “We are in a different market than Tesla,” Li says. “Tesla is for
rich people. We are for normal people.” (“The Electric Cars of the Future”).
The Human Rights Lobby
Through both the Obama and Trump administrations, human rights groups like
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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have made the case that purchasing an
electric vehicle is not as ethical as many assume. In January of 2016, Amnesty International
published a nearly 100-page report about the human rights and child labor abuses in the
cobalt-mining industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the source of more than half
of the world’s cobalt supply (“This is What We Die For”). The report cites “chronic
exposure to dust,” resulting in “hard metal lung disease,” and other chronic respiratory
problems and claims that workers “do not have the most basic protective equipment, such
as gloves, work clothes or facemasks” (5). The report says that mines are not safe, lacking
critical support and ventilation. Moreover, according to UNICEF, approximately 40,000
children work in these mines (6). One of the largest companies in the Cobalt trade is Congo
Dongfang Mining Industry, is owned by Huayou Cobalt Company Ltd based in Zhejiang
province, which supplies many producers of lithium ion batteries including the ones made
for electric cars (9).
Not generally known to be champions of human rights issues, conservatives groups
like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation began to add the human
rights issue into their commentaries demonizing China’s dominance in the battery industry
(Perry “Without Reform”), thus reconstituting the “unholy alliance” once again. While the
human-rights based arguments and those rooted in economic nationalism remained distinct
pillars of thinking, they legitimized each other and offered political credibility from one
side of the political spectrum to the other. The two lobbies provided an air of bipartisanship
by arriving at the same conclusion: business with China was bad.
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Industry Lobbyists
EV and fuel economy policies have been heavily lobbied by the oil industry. In
particular, the Koch brothers blocked EVs in several ways. According to a report in
Politico, Koch brother-backed groups were “waging a state-by-state multi-million dollar
battle to squelch utilities plan to build charging stations across the country (Bade). One
trade group that represents 98% of the oil refining capacity in the US, the American Fuel
and Petroleum Manufacturers (AFPM), blocked a zero-emission vehicle mandate in
Colorado and opposed charging stations in Kansas and Missouri. API and Americans for
Prosperity, funded with Koch money, opposed EV developments in Illinois and Iowa and
blocked charging stations in Massachusetts, Maryland, and Arizona (along with efforts by
trade group Western States Petroleum Association) and tried to block an EV bill in
California (Bade). “We feel like we’re on the side of angels here in terms of wanting this to
be a free market and not wanting people who don’t use the service to have to pay for the
service,” said Derrick Morgan, AFPM senior vice president. Charles Drevna, then president
of AFPM testified in Congress in 2012 and said, “While weaning the United States off of
oil is a good talking point, artificially forcing the market to adopt expensive new
technologies that rely on the fair trade practices of China could bring a new set of
challenges.” He continued, “in the meantime, the US can instead develop its own abundant
supply of energy, which can increase our energy, economic and national security” (Fisher).
In a widely reported study released by InfluenceMap, API and AFPM were both listed in
the Top Ten lobbyists responsible for rolling back vehicle emission standards and other
climate policies (Palmer).
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Conclusion
Thus, the China-as-opportunity clean transportation policies were shaped first by a
vision of US-China relations and second by the interests of the US electric vehicle industry.
For the China-as-opportunity lobby, transportation policy was an opportunity to expand
US-China business ties with the intent to lure China into international regulatory systems.
These ideological and security related goals trumped the more delicate policy
considerations inherent in the US transportation sector. The electrification of mobility is
primarily an engineering and science-based policy that requires strong government
oversight and investment. It must be looked at from the point of view of domestic politics:
urban development, infrastructure, consumer protections. Instead all these issues were
marginalized and EV policy was swept into the larger echo chamber of US security in the
face of China’s rise. This position opened up opportunities for isolated business ventures
related to EV development with Chinese partners. But it failed to go beyond that in a way
that would transform the transportation system in the United States.
The China-as-threat lobby also folded transportation policy into a US-China
security paradigm. Fearful of China’s dominance, the China-as-threat lobby employed antielitist, anti-internationalist and anti-China rhetoric and arguments to demonize electric
vehicles and cast them as unnecessary luxury items that channel public funds to the
wealthy. They characterized electric vehicles as anti-America and re-committed themselves
to a nationalist vision of American power rooted in fossil fuels—a missed opportunity for
large-scale thinking about strategic shifts away from an increasingly constricted resource
and a found opportunity for the companies still selling that resource. With human rights
lobbies amplifying the anti-China rationale, the China-as-threat lobby was able to adopt a
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policy of decoupling that appeared to have bipartisan underpinnings. For both lobbies, the
China considerations hemmed in the opportunities for electric mobility in the US.
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CHAPTER 5
Cooperation and Leadership: The Paris Agreement
This chapter turns to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the signing of the 2015 Paris Agreement, an international climate pact that has become
a measure of US commitment to reducing emissions domestically and to climate change as
a global issue. It will be shown that two powerful China lobbies, opposing each other and
battling for political influence, exploited the economic interests of different sectors of the
energy industry to advance a China-related agenda in ways that undermined the success of
the UNFCCC process. With the China-as-opportunity lobby promoting corporate power
and US-China joint leadership and cooperation, and the China-as-threat lobby defending
nationalism and the rights of the nation state as well as aiming to sever US-China ties,
neither approach fit the UNFCCC’s brand of internationalism, collective thinking, and the
idea of the global citizen. This chapter considers the case study of US-China cooperation
during two administrations and examine their respective approaches to the Paris
Agreement—signed by President Obama in September 2016 and cancelled by Trump a year
later—despite the fact that just 13% of all voters supported a Paris withdrawal (“By More
Than”).
This chapter argues that the key to understanding the US approach to the Paris
Agreement—and the UN climate talks that led up to it—lies in the political dynamics of the
US-China relationship, particularly the powerful role that private interest groups and
political actors have played in the formation of US policy. The China-as-opportunity lobby
viewed climate change and the Paris Agreement as ripe opportunities to expand their vision
of globalization and international engagement with US-China cooperation a key strategy to
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lure China into the global infrastructure of norms and institutions. The China-as-threat
lobby, on the other hand, also exploited UNFCCC process but to different ends. To them,
climate change was not a real threat. Instead, the threat was embodied by the UNFCCC
itself and the liberal international order that supported that type of multilateralism, which
was viewed as eroding American leverage and identity—and the power of the nation state.
US-China Relations and the UNFCCC
Similar to the dynamics described in Chapters 3 and 4, the China lobbies amplified
the interests of powerful American industries, which stood in contrast to the larger interests
of the climate. At the UNFCCC climate summits, the China-as-threat lobby made the case
that not only was the agreement a bad idea because it exploited the US and allowed other
nations to free-ride on the backs of US economic sacrifice and political clout as well as
funds promised by the US government—they disagreed with the core mission of the
UNFCCC. Instead of reducing global reliance on fossil fuels, the China-as-threat lobby
sought to revitalize US production of these high carbon fuels as a way to achieve energy
independence and restore American power in the world. Both lobbies argued to some
degree that the fundamental basis of the agreement—the idea of “common but
differentiated responsibilities”—imposed an unfair dynamic between the US and China
allowing China free reign to pollute, and to continue unfettered economic growth, while
placing a harness on the American economy. Through the UNFCCC climate talks,
however, both sides further synchronized their position on global climate change with their
political goals related to China such that one was not imaginable without the other.
The impact of the two lobbies—and their interactions with one another—limited the
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possible discourse over climate policy. The breakdown in political imagination limited the
role the US could play in such an international forum and made the US an awkward fit with
many of the over-arching UNFCCC principles. Similar to the trends observed in Chapters 3
and 4, this chapter argues that the collective impact of the two lobbies ultimately reduced
the Paris Agreement to a serving component of a mounting geopolitical competition
between the US and China in ways that cause: (1) a reduction of the climate problem to
serve the greater security concerns of the US-China relationship; and, (2) opportunities for
industry lobbyists to pursue narrow business interests over the broader climate concerns
and solutions recommended by scientists.
The US commitment to the Paris Agreement—revealed in a highly publicized joint
announcement between US president Obama and CCP leader Xi Jinping just before the
Paris talks were to begin—was to reduce emissions in the US from 2005 levels by 26%28% by 2025 (“Fact Sheet: US Reports”). In order to fulfill the Paris commitment, the US
relied on the carbon-reducing impact of five broad policy initiatives, together called the
Climate Action Plan. The initiative includes: (1) shifting to cleaner energy; (2) developing
“a twenty-first century transportation sector;” (3) eliminating energy waste in homes,
business, and factories; (4) reducing other greenhouse gas emissions; and, (5) leading at the
federal level (“The President’s”). Chapters 3 and 4, have already examined the policy
developments in points (1) and (2). The remainder of this chapter will focus on the role of
the two lobbies in each respective administration and the signing of the Paris Agreement.
The China-as-Opportunity lobby and the Paris Agreement
The China-as-opportunity lobby viewed the Paris Agreement as a chance to further

140

unite the US and China around mutual goals and strengthen US-China cooperation around
clean energy. In many ways, the UNFCCC process provided the potential for US-China
joint leadership and action that ticked off many of the China-as-opportunity lobby goals:
deeper integration of the two economies, high profile joint leadership between Beijing and
Washington, and an opportunity for China, which had already clearly demonstrated that
climate change and energy efficiency were core strategic issues, to move further into
compliance with the international community, perhaps allowing key enforcement
mechanisms of the agreement—like the third party auditing of emissions reductions—to
make China’s political and economic system more transparent. In fact, the UNFCCC
platform, as viewed by the China-as-opportunity lobby, had the potential of forcing China
to subject its domestic structure to international scrutiny in unprecedented ways. Eager to
leverage this opportunity, the UNFCCC climate talks became an unusually important
diplomatic moment for the China-as-opportunity lobby. However, the China-as-opportunity
lobby also supported US companies benefitting from China’s cheap labor and relaxed
regulations in the form of inexpensive imports. The business world tete-a-tete that was
possible through the UNFCCC talks, was attractive. The China-as-opportunity lobby could
only seek to exploit the Beijing-Washington economic relationship if it also had a longterm plan that addressed China’s domestic situation, which in this case, it did.
From the perspective of the China-as-opportunity lobby, the UNFCCC talks
presented a perfect opportunity. As the two largest emitters, the convention demanded joint
leadership. There was ample opportunity to secure US business partnerships with Chinese
companies through the UN platform and beyond in US-China bilateral channels. But the
UNFCCC also provided a unique opportunity to pressure China to abide by international
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rules and norms and to do so in a visible forum, with international media outlets present
and ready to write headlines, and with the participation of US allies.
Industry Lobbyists
As in the previous cases, this ideological vision opened opportunities for industry
lobbyists. On one side, fossil fuel and clean technology companies sided with China-asopportunity perspectives and viewed the agreement as a chance to received government
funding and incentives to develop new industries. They eagerly sought potentially lucrative
clean energy joint-venture projects under the guise of the Paris Agreement. Indeed, the
integrity of Obama’s pledge would hinge the business success. Without it, the
administration would find it impossible to sell the idea of US participation in the talks to a
domestic audience.
From the beginning, the Obama administration signaled that it would pursue
policies that matched the globalized vision of the China-as-opportunity lobby. In November
of 2008, from a pre-taped video, newly elected Obama gave a speech to a climate
conference hosted by then California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, at which a large
Chinese audience was present. Obama said, “Few challenges facing America, and the
world, are more urgent than combating climate change. The science is beyond dispute and
the facts are clear.” He continued, “And once I take office, you can be sure that the United
States will once again engage vigorously and help lead the world toward a new era of
global cooperation on climate change” (Mason).
Obama was also clear about making climate policy a priority. This led to a flurry of
industry lobbyists with some viewing impending regulations as an opportunity for growth
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and others seeing it as a potentially costly regulatory burden that could profoundly impact
their competitiveness. In a joint address to Congress in February 2009, just over a month in
office, Obama said, “I ask this Congress to send me legislation that places a market-based
cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable energy in America”
(“372: The Inauguration Show”). Later, the president clarified what he envisioned the bill
would do including that it would put the US on track to achieve an 80% reduction in
emissions from 1990s levels by 2050 (Lavelle “The Climate”).
The bill, the America Clean Energy and Security Act, which passed the House in
June 2009, roused one of the biggest rounds of industry lobbying in the history of
Washington politics. To many observers, this was an example of private industry blocking
an otherwise popular piece of legislation, the demise of which profoundly undermined the
US bargaining position at the UNFCCC talks. The bill, sponsored by Democratic
Representatives Edward Markey of Massachusetts and Henry Waxman of California and
called for cap and trade mechanism to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emission
similar to the European Union model. The regulation would place an emissions cap on key
segments of the economy and then allow entities to buy and sell emission allowances,
measured in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, on an open market. The cap proposed would
have been consistent with a UNFCCC agreement similar to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
(Robinson 128). The bill combined emissions targets that would become stricter over time
with government investments in renewable energy and other “transitional support”
measures to help companies meet the caps with efforts to protect US industries from less
regulated foreign competition as well as opportunities to submit offset credits (129).
Regardless of their perspectives on the climate talks, both sets of industry groups—
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those that would seek government grants and MOUs with Chinese partners and those that
resisted climate policies altogether—lobbied aggressively to block the Waxman-Markey
bill. As Marianna Lavelle reports, there was a “climate change lobby explosion” during the
early years of the Obama administration, particularly around the Waxman-Markey bill.
Between 2008 and 2009, more than 770 companies and interest groups hired close to 2,340
lobbyists to influence climate change policy (Lavelle). This represented a 300% increase in
climate lobbyists from five years earlier. It also marked a diversification of the industries
represented by the lobbyists (Mulkern). Five years earlier, most lobbyists engaged in
blocking climate change legislation were coal, oil, and electric companies, as well as some
heavy industries like cement and steel. However, this group of lobbyist extended to include
manufacturing and transportation, reflecting the growing fear that climate legislation would
not just hurt energy industries that directly consume fossil fuels, but that imposing
emissions regulations in general would result in a contraction that would echo through the
entire US economy leaving many different industries more vulnerable to the already
substantial competition from China (Lavelle). Among the leading lobbyists blocking the
Waxman-Markey bill were FedEx ($35.84 million), Boeing ($27.74 million), American
Electric Power ($14.4 million), UPS ($11.28 million), Duke Energy ($9.59 million), WalMart ($9.34 million) and Ford ($9.1 million). Even firms that stood to gain from the cap
and trade proposal in the bill lobbied against it, including GE ($53.7 million), PG&E
($49.66 million) and Chevron ($18 million) (McMahon). ExxonMobil spent $27.6 million
in lobbying that year, a near record high (“ExxonMobil Profile”).
In what may appear to be a contradiction, many of these industry groups later
pledged their support for the Paris Agreement. But, as became clear later, this was not
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because they had a change of heart. These companies were able to support the agreement
precisely because they knew that without domestic climate legislation, the US would not be
able to support the original and more robust version of the deal. Instead, the US sought to
weaken the Paris deal in order to sign it and then used the momentum of the political
moment in Paris to secure new business ventures for American companies.
An example of this is Duke Energy. As was shown in Chapter 3, Duke Energy
lobbied to block the Waxman-Markey bill, but later secured multimillion dollar contracts to
work with Chinese companies to develop the clean coal technologies that would help the
US fulfill its Paris pledge. Later, when Trump withdrew, industry giants Wal-Mart and
Amazon and fossil fuel companies PG&E, BP, Shell, National Grid as well as mining
companies Rio Tinto and BHB Billiton joined a Michael Bloomberg funded campaign to
support the Paris Agreement, stating that they were “Still In” (“We Are Still In”).
ExxonMobil also declare support for the Paris Agreement (Trelenberg).
These companies sought to block the bill because it would have imposed new
overhead costs on them and required them to subject aspects of their business practices to
external verification to ensure compliance with emission rules. Joining the many studies
that show the ways in which industry lobbyists have successfully blocked climate
legislation in the United States, an investigation by Ashwin Rode and Kyle Meng at the
Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, concluded that “the greater the stakes
or material loss a firm can anticipate, the more of an incentive it has to lobby against the
Waxman-Markey bill.” Their findings also show that lobbying “reduced the possibility” for
the bill’s success (Meng and Rode).
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Indeed, lobbying against the Waxman-Markey bill had an impact. Internal
discussions between Obama and his staff revealed a subsequent policy U-turn in the Obama
administration, which many viewed as a direct response to industry lobbyists and the threat
of political gridlock from the Republican members of Congress that had accepted large
donations for fossil fuel companies. A Guardian article reported that in March of 2009,
Obama held a secretive off-the-record meeting with members of his “green dream team”
that revealed his “strategic decision” to de-emphasize the climate change problem and
instead reframe the climate issue around green jobs and economic opportunity. The
message in the meeting was that because of the 2008 financial collapse, industry lobbyists
would not allow any legislation that might further hurt their bottom line. They wanted
Washington to prioritize the recovery of the American fossil fuel-based energy sector.
According to the Guardian article, one participant recalled, “I took away an absolutely
clear understanding that we should focus on clean energy jobs and the potential of a clean
energy economy rather than the threat of climate change.” Another said, “My most vivid
memory of that meeting is this idea that you can't talk about climate change…. The real
sense at that time was that talking about clean energy jobs, green jobs, was the way we
were going to be able to gain momentum and usher in real change. Talking about climate
change and global warming was not going to resonate as much.” The article concluded,
“After industry and conservative groups mobilized to attack Obama’s policies and climate
science in the summer of 2009, the topic was seen as an even greater liability and
politically toxic” (Goldenberg).
Fossil fuel lobbyists were also represented at the UN conferences. Several
international lobbying groups, for example, the Copenhagen Climate Council, the
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International Chamber of Commerce, the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development and the International Emissions Trading Association include members such
as BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, and Duke Energy. These organizations generally have a heavy
presence at the UN climate conferences. They host parallel conferences, side events and sit
on panels that focus on the ways fossil fuels can play an integral part of a climate response
rather than being the source of the problem that would be ultimately replaced by new
sources of energy. At the COP15, the Copenhagen Council hosted a series of high-level
events at a venue near the main conference with hundreds of fossil fuel industry
participants.
Although many of them had succeeded earlier in blocking the Waxman-Markey bill,
another set of industry lobbyists viewed the UN talks as opportunities for new areas of
growth. These industry groups sided with the China-as-opportunity lobby, pushing for US
involvement in the UNFCCC. They viewed the Paris Agreement as a handshake between
the US business community and the Obama administration, committing the businesses to
meeting the emissions reductions targets, but also guaranteeing that the US government
would support their undertakings. According to Elliot Diringer, who works for a climate
watchdog group, following Trump’s decision to leave the Paris Agreement, “a lot of US
businesses [were] concerned about the potential trade ramifications of a US withdrawal ...
They think it’s important that the US remain in Paris to ensure them access to the growing
clean energy markets around the world, and they see that a US withdrawal could hurt their
access to those markets” (“28 Majors”). The ways that US businesses were able to benefit
from these policies were described in more detail in Chapter 3 on renewable energy and
Chapter 4 on electric vehicles, two policy areas that were central to the US Paris
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commitment.
Without a domestic climate bill passed in the Senate, the US negotiation team was
not able to sign an official agreement at the UN climate talks. European climate negotiators
reportedly said they were concerned that the US position would destroy prospects for a
meaningful deal and that negotiating a new deal would take years. According to one
European climate negotiator, “In Europe we want to build on Kyoto, but the US proposal
would in effect kill it off” (Adam). UN Climate Chief, Yvo De Boer, who oversaw the
Copenhagen conference, was also critical of Obama. “What Obama did at the end of his
second term was fundamentally undemocratic,” he said, “to sign up to a Paris agreement
without going to the Senate and the Congress and instead doing it via executive order”
(McGrath).
The need to pass domestic climate legislation in order to participate in the global
deal put the United States in a precarious situation. The US had already failed to ratify an
earlier climate deal, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, because it lacked domestic support. Without
passage of binding legislation like the Waxman-Markey bill, the US would not be able to
sign a similar agreement. That is, if the new UNFCCC climate agreement carried over the
same enforcement mechanism included in the Kyoto Protocol.
Championing a position that would demonstrate leadership and resolve but
workable without the domestic mandate that Waxman-Markey would have demanded the
need for new ways of thinking about the US’s role at the climate talks. The China-asopportunity lobby was eager to guide the way. The next section will outline the ways in
which the China-as-opportunity lobby helped shape the US approach to the global climate
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talks and by so doing dimmed prospects for success. By imposing its own interests related
to the protection of the American economy, the China-as-opportunity lobby approach
struck a compromise that enabled US leadership resulting in the successful signing of the
Paris Agreement in 2015, but it also severely limited the scope of the conference
framework and therefor possibilities for global action.
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
Even while the China-as-opportunity lobby enthusiastically supported US-China
joint leadership at the UNFCCC, they also pursued policies that undermined the very
success of the talks and indeed the integrity of the UNFCCC as an institution. The
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities or CBDR clause in UN vernacular, was rooted
in the idea of climate justice, restorative climate action and a polluter-pay model, required
richer developed nations to act first. The clause appears in the UNFCCC charter documents
written in 1992 as well as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and was the key concept that gave the
UN climate agreements meaning and traction. Stating that that each nation would act “in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
and their social and economic conditions,” it represented the idea that countries should act
based on their level of development (“UNFCCC Charter”). Thus, developing countries,
where a large percentage of emissions are the result of basic economic growth (subsistence
emission), would be given a pass while developed countries, which had contributed the
bulk of the historic and cumulative emissions and where a significant percentage of
emissions were “luxury” emissions—coming from oversized or second houses and cars,
excessive climate control of office buildings and shopping centers, and leisure travel—
would be required to act first.
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Indeed, some have argued that the principles embedded in the UNFCCC conflict
with the principles that underpin other international organizations governing global
interactions, like the WTO, with which the China-as-opportunity lobby is more aligned.
According to a report on US-China cooperation on climate change published by the
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, “the WTO and UNFCCC reflect fundamentally
different assumptions about the appropriate role of markets and governments in trade and
climate policy” (Aldy et al. 36). The report claims,
“The WTO was designed to promote the liberalization of markets and the
free flow of goods and services across national borders…[whereas] … Implicit in
the UNFCCC is the assumption that governments should actively intervene to
reduce GHG emissions, including by adopting various policies that are designed to
influence the behavior of markets and industries, such as subsidies, taxes, regulatory
requirements, and other measures to advance low-carbon technologies and
practices” (36).

This conflict of principles also exists between the UNFCCC and the China-asopportunity lobby approach, which adopts many of the WTO assumptions about free trade.
Ideological differences extended to the issue of intellectual property as well. A
Harvard report claimed, the WTO “adheres to the principles of non-discrimination in trade
and includes various rules to protect intellectual property, address subsidies and
countervailing duties, and discourage dumping.” However, the UNFCCC negotiating
bodies have worked actively to find ways around boundaries erected by intellectual
property rights. Based on a growing body of research showing that intellectual property
rights may impede rather than facilitate global action on climate change, negotiating bodies
primarily from the global south began to emerge with new proposals about how to
minimize the negative impacts of intellectual property rights on climate mitigation efforts.
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Contradicting the WTO’s TRIPS agreement (the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights), which the China-as-opportunity think tanks supported and sought to
strengthen, the group of Like-Minded Developing Countries in Climate Change (LMDC)
introduced the idea that the UNFCCC help fund the patent buy-outs and licensing fees
necessary to extend technology transfers to poorer nations (Baker et al. 51). At the
UNFCCC conferences in Copenhagen (COP15) and Cancun (COP16), negotiators from
Brazil, India, China, and South Africa claimed that intellectual property rights created a
barrier to the successful dissemination of climate friendly technologies. At an intercessional
meeting of the UNFCCC parties in Bonn in 2009, the G77+China, another negotiating bloc,
advanced the idea of a “no patents” proposal called the “Global Technology Pool for
Climate Change” (Shashikant). These initiatives exposed an important double standard in
the US/China-as-opportunity approach. According to a report by the Center for Economic
and Policy Research co-authored by economists Joseph Stiglitz, Arjun Jayadev, and Dean
Baker, “Public support for private research through IPR [intellectual property rights
regimes] is encouraged but direct public support for research”—such as what is practiced in
China—“may be considered an unfair subsidy even though such research produces a public
good” (Baker et al. 51).
Indeed, the underlying notion of CBDR assumed that developed nations, primarily
the United States and Europe, became rich through their economic exploitation of the
developing world. Underpinning CBDR was the reality that through their respective
industrial revolutions, largely financed by the neocolonial extraction of natural resources
and labor in developing countries, the US and Europe had historically contributed the bulk
of the climate change causing gasses. According to one report, “the underlying
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interpretation of CBDR was that developing countries today suffered from the past
overexploitation of the global environment by developed countries in multiple ways,
resulting, for instance, in unequal economic capacity today” (Prys-Hansen 363). This
assumption clashed with the corporate protectionist model of the China-as-opportunity
lobby.
As anyone attending the UNFCCC climate talks knows well, the US and China are
the two largest emitters in the world. But their emission profiles are very different. Since
2006, China has become the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases (Rapier). However,
the United States is historically a much larger contributor to the climate crisis than China
(Irfan). Moreover, on a per capita basis, China’s emissions are still relatively small, and
smaller than the per capita emissions rate in the US (“Each”). But the most complicated
issue relates to trade. Studies show that nearly one-quarter of China’s emissions are the
direct result of the manufacturing and shipping of products that sold in Western countries
(Wang). Some have argued, that one of the main methods by which the US has reduced
emissions is by exporting “dirty” industries to other countries with less stringent
environmental regulations. With China’s abundant cheap labor, US corporations were able
to pollute more while making the same products more cheaply to the benefit of the US
consumer. This system lasted for a long time, but eventually challenges emerged. The
CBDR clause in the UNFCCC founding charter was one such challenge. In it, the drafters
of the agreement asserted that that developed countries owed a “climate debt,” which they
could pay back only if they initiated the global shift to a low-carbon economy, absorbing
whatever financial burden was associated with restructuring away from fossil-fuels.
Rather than paying that debt, the US pursued a different tact entirely. At the United
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Nation’s COP15 conference in Copenhagen in 2009, hamstrung by the lack of a domestic
mandate for a stronger deal, the US negotiating team advanced the industry-supported
position of “synergy”—or equal and not differentiated responsibility—between the US and
China. The CBDR clause was eventually removed and replaced with a new model that
required all parties of the convention to submit Nationally-Determined Contributions, the
extent of which was decided entirely by each country with no connection to the efforts of
other nations. Rather than holding countries to a certain standard for climate action based
on economy size or past pollution, the Paris Agreement simply required member countries
to “outline and communicate” their respective targets (“Nationally Determined
Contributions”).
China-as-opportunity lobby groups supported this change. The US Chamber of
Commerce, represented by Steve Eule at the COP15 blogged throughout the conference
about the need for “parallel” responses between developed and developing nations
(Letourneau) and lobbied hard to include language that would specifically protect US
industries in the agreement (Raman 107). Even Obama changed his tone. After making
repeated speeches about American leadership, he later stated that developing countries like
China should be “getting out of that mindset,” of waiting for the US to lead the way and
instead should be “moving towards the position where everybody recognizes that we all
need to move together” (Vidal “Low Targets”).
The US treatment of the CBDR issue at the UNFCCC had clear implications for
US-China cooperation on climate change. According to many accounts, the two-week
conference in Copenhagen in 2009 was reduced to a “chaotic and contentious” debate
between US and Chinese negotiators over the CBDR principle (Broder and Rosenthal). It
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was so tense at times that leaders on both side became physically agitated and negotiations
went late into the night (Corn). By eliminating the CBDR clause, the United States was
essentially stripping developing countries—including China—of their economic status and
eliminating any special considerations to which they are entitled as a result. China pushed
back. Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, articulated this position when he stated that the US
was acting like a rich person who had gone out to an expensive dinner and when the poor
person showed up late for dessert he expected him to pay the same bill (Ball). The Chinaas-opportunity approach agreed with the elimination of CBDR because it overlapped with
their goal of protecting US green technology companies against Chinese competition.
However, the removal of CBDR clause from the agreement compromised the
integrity of the deal in the eyes of many. Much of the world expected the conference to end
with an extension of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The hope was that this time, with indicators
that the political will for such a deal existed for the first time in Washington, the agreement
would include US participation. The US declared the Copenhagen Accord a “success.” But
climate scientists, activists and developing country delegates largely saw it as a profound
failure. A delegate from Sudan, a country that stood with China as part of the G77+China
negotiating bloc, called it a “suicide pact, an incineration pact, in order to maintain the
economic dominance of a few countries” (Mathiesen). Not only did the agreement have
little merit, but, by stripping the convention of the CBDR clause, the COP15 set a
precedent that weakened the foundation of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which included no
national or regional targets.
The outcome of the UNFCCC negotiation process illustrates well the dovetailed
nature of the industry and China policy lobbyists in the US. They were successfully able to
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simultaneously weaken the legal integrity of the international agreement—a boon for fossil
fuels—and at the same time, push China into a higher level of global responsibility on par
with developed nations, all the while projecting an image of US global leadership and
successful US-China cooperation without compromising US dominance.
To the great disappointment of members of the international community already on
board with the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC climate talks were reduced to a rupture
between the US and Chinese delegations over the issue of who should take responsibility
for the emissions in the atmosphere. The China-as-opportunity lobby viewed the UNFCCC
talks as a perfect opportunity to achieve parallel goals: projecting US global leadership
while bringing China into compliance with international regulations and norms while at the
same time securing business opportunities for US companies with Chinese counterparts
while ensuring their protection again Chinese competition. Even while rejecting the
UNFCCC principles about collective thinking and the marginalizing of intellectual property
protections in favor of widespread climate technology dissemination, the China-asopportunity lobby saw the UNFCCC as an opportunity to further their vision of a
globalized world, where national boundaries are flattened, and global norms prevail.
Through the convention, the US demanded that China subject itself to third party
international inspectors to measure and verify any carbon reductions China claimed to have
made. To China, this was an important breach of sovereignty—the advancing of a political
issue unrelated to carbon emissions per se. To the Chinese leadership, the gesture exposed a
lack of trust in China’s own statistics and a breach of national sovereignty, which went
against core Chinese values. It also revealed another important US goal in the talks, which
was to push China to play by the rules of international institutions and allow themselves to
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be subjected to UN auditors and rule enforcers. This piece of the US strategy was consistent
with China-as-opportunity efforts to break open China’s closed economy and to force
China to comply with international norms and expectations that would be friendlier to US
companies. According to the US negotiators, this condition was so important, that the US
would withhold any financial contributions to the Global Climate Fund until China had
agreed to US terms (Vidal “Climate Aid”). By forcing concessions from China and using
the UNFCCC as a platform to advance the agenda of US lobbyists, the US negotiators
undermined the only working global effort to fight climate change. According to Susanne
Dröge, a policy analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in
Berlin, “The US dominated the international agreement so it would be in sync with US
domestic policies, and now those policies are not in place” (qtd. in Berwyn).
To conclude, for the China-as-opportunity lobby, the Paris Agreement was an
opportunity to showcase American leadership in a globalized, flattened world. But it also
provided an opportunity to pressure China to adopt political and economic reform.
The US negotiators positions at the UNFCCC aligned with the China-asopportunity lobby in that it protected the green technology industry as well as promoted a
vision of US-China cooperation that did not undermine US dominance. It promoted and
protected opportunities for US companies to benefit from Chinese partnerships while
simultaneously undermining China’s political autonomy and economic growth. Because it
was not legally binding, the Paris Agreement did not have to be ratified by Congress, thus
lacked enforcement at both the international and domestic level. Ultimately, it represented a
successful effort on the part of the China-as-opportunity lobby to fold US climate policy
into the greater narrative of US-China relations reflecting their vision of two integrated
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economies, free and abundant trade with few barriers, and lucrative economic opportunities
for US businesses.
This political impulse resembles the pro-engagement arguments made during the
Clinton administration in favor of MFN status. It is the political descendent of the Chinaas-Opportunity lobby that emerged after World War II representing US restraint and
globalism. It pressured presidents Truman, Nixon, Carter, Bush, Reagan and Clinton to not
estrange Beijing and to keep Beijing close as a political ally during the latter part of the
Cold War, even if that meant abrogating a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, a
potentially potent security ally in the region. The China-as-opportunity lobby was powerful
enough to achieve this even despite the political fallout from the powerful China Lobby.
The China-as-threat lobby under Trump exposed a similar pattern but in the inverse
and with drastically different outcomes. The China-as-threat lobby protected a different
segment of the US economy—those industries that were threatened by increased trade with
China, for example, manufacturing, automobiles, domestic drilling and energy production.
Through this lens, climate change was seen as an issue that emphasized China’s technical
advantages, driving the China-as-threat lobby to deny the reality of climate change itself.
The China-as-Threat Lobby and the Paris Agreement
When Trump declared that climate change was a Chinese hoax he invoked a
political vision that galvanized a new generation of the China-as-threat lobby. Through the
climate-denial movement—driven aggressively by interest groups—the China-as-threat
lobby found a new foothold in Trump’s Washington, one that equated climate science with
gullibility, green technologies with hobby projects of the elite, and climate negotiations
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with international scams designed to exploit the US. The China-as-threat lobby viewed the
collaboration between the US and China on low-carbon development as just another way to
get screwed by Beijing. The way back to American power was not about renewable energy
or electric vehicles, but through fossil fuels, preferably drilled on American soil.
The China-as-threat lobby was able to gain notably more influence during the
Trump administration than in any previous administration Democrat or Republican. As a
result, relations with China took a sharp turn and this had a direct impact on US climate
policy. Just as in the previous administration, with a new president in office, a new cohort
of interest groups stepped forward to gain influence. In this case, the China-as-threat lobby,
led by think tanks like the Committee on the Present Danger, the Heritage Foundation, the
American Enterprise Institute, the Manhattan Institute, and the Heartland Institute folded in
the interests of industry lobbyists like ExxonMobil, Entergy, and Koch Industries and
sought to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, claiming it was predatory
in nature and unfair to US interests. Moreover, the China-as-threat lobby rejected the
embedded values of internationalism and multilateralism of the UNFCCC and instead
promoted the sovereignty of the nation state and economic independence. Some of the same
oil and coal companies that supported Obama joining the Paris Agreement later lobbied
Trump to withdraw from the deal (Fang “CEOs”).
The China-as-threat lobby framed his entire economic strategy around China,
particularly the vulnerability associated with dependence on Chinese supply chains.
Climate, although neglected, was a part of that. According to Steve Bannon, who became a
prominent voice in the China-as-threat lobby as Executive Chairman of Breitbart News,
later through his role at the Committee on the Present Danger and through official White
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House channels as chief executive officer of Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and later
White House Chief Strategist, “I think [China] is the central reasons why [Trump] is
president of the United States. … His whole populist, economic nationalist message was
about the central issue of our time and that is the relationship between the United States and
China economically, culturally, and militarily” (“Steve Bannon”). On the campaign trail,
Trump excoriated China for “unfair” trade practices and for “cheating” in the international
trade system. Trump openly called for standing up to the Wall Street and corporate elites
that he believed had facilitated China’s rise and thus were to blame for America’s economic
suffering. One recent study showed that regions in the US that faced disproportionate
import competition from China were more likely to vote for Trump (Zhang et al. 103).
According to Bannon again, “We’ve learned a lot that we were told was not true by the
global elites and the financial community and the corporatists that have exacerbated the rise
of China and the detrimental [sic] of the United States of America, and particularly the
workers of America.”
The following section show how the China-as-threat lobby found an ideological
home in the Trump administration, and advanced the political momentum of the fossil-fuel
industry-drive climate denial movement to downplay the climate threat, ridicule political
opponents, and establish a political narrative that supported both industry interiorities:
reinvigorating the fossil fuel industry in the US; and, China-as-threat priorities: abdicating
American global leadership and resurrecting the power of the nation state, and isolating the
United States from Chinese economic influence. Together these three goals culminated in
the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017.
The Polarization of Climate Denial
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The climate denial movement marked one of the most extraordinary interest-group
driven political shifts in American history. According to Jane Mayer, author of Dark
Money, a book that focuses on political spending by organizations that are not required to
disclose their donors, the climate denial movement amounts to the “most astounding
example of influence-buying in modern political history” (Mayer “In the Withdrawal”).
The climate denial movement demonstrates the powerful impact of private lobbyists to
distort public policy towards their narrow interests. It also shows how interest groups
polarize the policy debate around climate change in a with-us-or-against-us type of
approach. From the right, if you do not question the science, than you are a gullible
apocalypse monger. From the left, if you are not outraged and joining climate protests, you
are duped by Big Oil.
The climate denial movement facilitating a trend towards the flattening of the
complex climate issue into a serving component of US-China relations. For the China-asthreat lobby, the climate denial movement became inextricably linked with China policy.
Decoupling, undermining, and distancing the US from China could be more easily justified
when the industries in which China was dominated—green technology, electric vehicles
etc.—were not essential. If there is no climate problem, then there is no need to consider
emission reductions. If there was no climate crisis—or at least that crisis was exaggerated
and not that bad—then there is no problem doubling down on domestic fossil fuel
extraction and combustion.
The climate denial campaign was long in the making but reached a particular
threshold of influence during the Trump presidency. In the late 90s, the American
Petroleum Institute (API) hired a public relations consultant who suggested that in order to
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avoid direct hits to their profits that would come from climate legislation, the API should
launch a campaign to alter public opinion on climate change (Lawrence et al.). At an event
that included senior executives from ExxonMobil, Chevron, and representatives from
several trade groups and conservative think tanks, API introduced a plan to hire
sympathetic scientists and promote climate-skeptic ideas that would be amplified by the
media and think tanks, which they would fund through their lobbying group, the Global
Climate Coalition (Lawrence et al.). Through this plan, coal utility Southern Company
hired an aerospace engineer from the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to
provide sympathetic “research” in exchange for more than a million dollars (Readfern).
API also worked with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), Americans for
Prosperity, and Charles and David Koch of Koch Industries, the billionaire brothers who
own a chain of refineries and pipelines and were referred to by Greenpeace as the
“Kingpins of Climate Denial” (Wisniewski). According to an API memo, the project goal
was for the American public to “recognize that significant uncertainties exist in climate
science.” The memo continues, “victory will be achieved when … recognition of
uncertainties become part of the conventional wisdom. … and those promoting the Kyoto
treaty on the basis of extant science appear to be out of touch with reality” (Lawrence et
al.). The campaign had an impact. According to the Pew Center for the People and the
Press, 71% of those polled in 2008 believed there was “solid evidence the Earth is
warming” but that number dropped to 57% the next year (Oreskes and Conway 169-170).
Industry lobbyists
Interest group lobbying during the Trump administration led to the prioritizing of
the narrow economic agendas of a handful of oil and gas companies over the multi-variable
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interests involved in the climate debate (including economic competitiveness). Added to the
momentum Trump was able to gain from the climate denial campaign, was the fact that
many of the usual industry lobbyists that pushed back on Obama’s decision to join the Paris
Agreement, applied pressure on Trump to leave it. According to a report by a British think
tank, InfluenceMap, US lobbyists “dominated” the list of the world’s most influential trade
groups that block action to mitigate climate change, including the US Green New Deal and
the Waxman-Markey bill (Palmer). Included in the report are the National Association of
Manufacturers and the US Chamber of Commerce, two groups that lobbied for the US to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement. They were listed as the two most successful interest
groups in blocking climate policy. Other lobbying groups named in the report were the
American Petroleum Institute (API), the American Fuels and Petrochemical Manufacturers
(FPM), the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Auto Alliance), the National Mining
Association and the American Legislative Exchange Council (InfluenceMap). According to
the report, these groups have “stoked, harnessed, and guided” Trump on his climate policies
since 2016, including to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Additionally, the report
named 22 senators who wrote a letter to Trump urging him to leave the Paris Accord after
receiving more than $10 million in donations from oil, gas, and coal companies
(InfluenceMap).
One of the clearest examples of the China-as-threat lobby exerting influence over
official presidential policy was Trump’s decision to use a lobbyist-generated study to
justify leaving the Paris Agreement. In his famous speech in the Rose Garden, in which he
announced plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, Trump argued that the deal “could
cost Americans as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025,” including 440,000
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manufacturing jobs (Becker). While the job loss appears to be a general interest and
therefor a legitimate reason to leave an agreement, the statistics were not accurate. Trump
exaggerated and even created negative economic impacts of the Paris Agreement in order
to send a message that these types of agreements make the United States less competitive.
He named China explicitly as the principle foe: “China will be allowed to build hundreds of
additional coal plants. So we can't build the plants, but they can, according to this
agreement.” And later, “14 days of carbon emissions from China alone would wipe out the
gains from America—and this is an incredible statistic—would totally wipe out the gains
from America's expected reductions in the year 2030, after we have had to spend billions
and billions of dollars, lost jobs, closed factories, and suffered much higher energy costs for
our businesses and for our homes” (Clark and Letherby).
The numbers in his speech were pulled directly from a study produced by the
consulting firm, the National Economics Research Associates and was paid for by the
American Council for Capital Formation and the US Chamber of Commerce, two interest
groups that are known for being friendly with the fossil fuel industry (Levin; Chen). Many
economists criticized the report, stating that it went against data from the US Department of
Energy and, according to Yale professor Kenneth Gillingham, does not account “for the
jobs in the energy economy that are created” (qtd. in Becker).
The coal lobby was another significant political foe to the Paris Agreement. And the
political rationale of the coal industry lobby overlapped or dovetailed with China-as-threat
policy positions. According to analysis, the coal industry is able to maintain political
support because: (1) it contributes to national security, (2) it is able to provide low-cost
electricity options, (3) it contributes to the global competitiveness of energy intensive
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industries, and finally, (4) it has a significant influence in regional economies and, as a
result, effects voting patterns in Congress (Robinson 136). States that disproportionately
represent coal interests also tend to be demographically poorer states. They are also more
vulnerable to “China import shock syndrome”—the name given to describe the impact of
Chinese imports to the United States (Kuk et al. 103). For example, according to research,
the top six coal producing states, Wyoming, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Illinois and
Kentucky, which contribute 41%, 12%, 6.3%, 6.3% and 5.5% respectively (“What are”),
each contains districts that rank among the highest in terms of the China import shock
syndrome. That is to say that key parts of America’s coal producing regions, including
Appalachia (West Virginia, Alabama, Eastern Kentucky, and Pennsylvania), the Midwest
(Illinois, Indiana, Texas and Oklahoma), and the Western Region (Montana, Wyoming,
Utah and North Dakota) line up with the regions most impacted by Chinese imports (Kuk et
al. 112).
The withdrawal from Paris Agreement
How does all this culminate in the symbolic moment when Trump announced US
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement? So far, it was clear that core Trump policies in many
ways were extensions of China-as-threat goals. Trump’s approach to climate change was
rooted in his political campaigns such as America First (anti-internationalism), Buy
American (economic nationalism) as well as his campaign goal of returning to energy
independence through a resurgence of US-drilled fossil fuels (industry priorities). Touching
on all these initiatives, Trump cast the Paris Agreement as inherently unfair, allowing free
reign to China while disadvantaging and exploiting the US. The Paris Agreement, to
Trump, was “about other countries gaining a financial advantage over the US” (Clark and
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Leatherby).
China-as-threat think tanks used similar language. The Hartland Institute referred to
the UNFCCC process as a “giant wealth transfer scheme” referring to the exploitation of
US finances and the freeriding of China (“At UN”). The Heritage Foundation characterizes
the Paris Agreement as a financial squeeze on American families—costing them $20,000
each—despite there being no evidence to back up this fact (Loris “Staying”). A Manhattan
Institute commentary claimed that the conference was searching for “miracles” predicting
that the main vessel behind the technology innovation plan will fail (Mills). Citing similar
“unfairness” and inevitable failure, a Manhattan Institute report on the UNFCCC talks,
called “Leading Nowhere,” recommends that, “The US Congress should pass a resolution
preemptively rejecting any agreement that omits enforceable developing-nation
commitments to emissions reductions or that transfers substantial wealth to the developing
world” (Cass “Leading Nowhere”). According to Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute, Benjamin Zycher, “the Paris agreement is silly and destructive as a strategy to
engender environmental improvement, but it works beautifully as a mechanism to
transform the climate industry into a perpetual motion machine” (Zycher).
Additionally, to the China-as-threat lobbyists, for example the Committee on the
Present Danger, the UN climate talks represented an attack on state power and an erosion of
state capacity to defend against a rising China. The rise of multi-state actors and
international organizations, and the corresponding de-emphasis of the nation-state and
concepts like national sovereignty, forced China onto a more level playing ground with the
US. It also emphasizes the role of diplomacy—and de-emphasized military power—in
international relations. These positions, particularly the idea of national identity being
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ceded to the globalized interests of multinational corporations, who they saw as driving the
Paris Agreement, were deeply concerning to the China-as-threat lobby. China threat
surrogate, Steve Bannon, made this explicit. He claimed the “party of Davos” (or the
“donor class” as he sometimes says) financed China’s rise and that Wall Street “deindustrialized the democracies of the West.” “The globalists gutted the American working
class and created a middle class in Asia,” he said in an interview (Wolff). He continued,
“We’ve learned a lot that we were told was not true by the global elites and the financial
community and the corporatists that have exacerbated the rise of China and the detrimental
of the United States of America, and particularly the workers of America.” And then in a
statement designed to stoke American anger he turned his argument on China: “China looks
at us as a tributary state. A Jamestown to their Great Britain.” “The China trade deal,”
Bannon said, “is the beginning of the end of the managed decline of the United States”
(Wolff).
Industry groups lobbied to undermine the Paris Agreement, too. Their greatest
impact was in lobbying the Waxman-Markey bill—the piece of US legislation that would
have allowed the UNFCCC to be successful—in order to protect themselves from “material
loss,” China-as-threat think tanks and trade groups went beyond avoiding overhead costs
and framed the resistance to the bill more explicitly in terms of overall US competitiveness
and trade relations with China. Among trade and industry group lobbyists, the US Chamber
of Commerce and the National Association of Manufactures spent large sums to block the
bill, launching several campaigns in different states. NAM called it an “anti-energy, antigrowth, anti-jobs” bill (Streeter). According to the American Petroleum Institute, which
represents ExxonMobil, the Waxman-Markey bill would raise gas prices to over $4 per
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gallon and put a “disproportionate burden on all consumers of gasoline, diesel fuel, heating
oil, jet fuel, propane and other petroleum products,” The Heritage Foundation issued a
report called “The Economic Impact of the Waxman-Markey Bill,” which described it as a
“costly bill” and outlined a bleak economic scenario of job losses, energy price hikes, and
reduced competitiveness. “The result is government-set caps on energy use that damage the
economy and hobble growth—the very growth that supports investment and innovation”
(Kreutzer). The Heritage Foundation issued similar reports for each of the 50 states with
statistics matching each state economy and lobbied against US participation in the UN
climate talks. Writing in an Op-Ed for the Washington Post, one Heritage analyst pointed
out that Waxman-Markey type legislation would not only be costly to the US economy, but
that any emissions saved as a result would be more than made up for by increases in
emissions from China (Liberman).
Links to the Past
Under Trump, the China-as-threat lobby nimbly reoriented itself to the new political
landscape and pursued a policy of US-China economic decoupling. The China-as-threat
lobby drew new links to climate denial and American economic nationalism, but also
advanced old goals that were central to the China Lobby of the 1950s-1980s: undermining
China’s economic growth, emphasizing American military, cultural, and economic
supremacy, pursuing policies that are anti-internationalist in nature. In the 1950s and into
the 1980s, the China Lobby joined forces with the Navy in such a way that representatives
from regions in the US that manufactured goods for the Navy tended to vote with the China
Lobby in Congress (see Chapter 1). This is still the case. But the China-as-threat lobby has
expanded to include the people, companies, and representatives from the parts of the US
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that have been economically hard-hit, either by import competition from China or for other
reasons not related to China. Trump capitalized on this by blaming the US manufacturing
slump on China blaming China for “whole sale theft” of American technology and
launching a protectionist trade war that severed US green tech companies from their
Chinese counterparts (Rappeport).
Echoing the position of the China-as-threat lobby, assistant to the president and
Director of Trade and Manufacturing, Peter Navarro, published several books focusing on
the China threat and recently produced a documentary film called “Death by China.” It
argues that “from currency manipulation and abusive trade practices, to deadly consumer
products,” China, and particularly its ruling Communist Party (CCP), posed the biggest
threat to the world. The CCP, he argues, is a threat even to the people of China, who must
be liberated (presumably by America). Navarro who also pushed for US withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement, wrote in an op-ed in USA Today published in July 2017, “President
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the disastrous Paris climate accord will save the US
economy an estimated 6.5 million industrial-sector jobs … He has unleashed America’s
energy potential—a great boon for American manufacturers and consumers” (Navarro
“Trump”). Some of this was unfounded, however. The idea that growth in the coal industry
would result in increased energy jobs never materialized. In fact, coal consumption
decreased while Trump was president due to increases in natural gas supply (Fox).
However, the larger point about the hollowing out of American manufacturing job and the
reluctance on the part of those concerned that trade with China in green technology would
again leave the United States behind, remained politically salient points.
Together Bannon and Navarro gave a voice to a modern day sequel to the China
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Lobby, albeit with a friendly ear in the White House. They share many of the same traits as
the old China Lobby. They follow an ideology and world outlook that overlaps with their
Cold War cousins and they pay lip service to the idea that communism is evil (Seymour).
They believe in American exceptionalism and an idea of manifest destiny that has biblical
origins. Chapter 1 of this dissertation quotes a line from Franz Schurmann’s book, The
Logic of World Power, providing an explanation of the China Lobby in America. He writes,
they were “small-town provincial businessmen” who resented big government,
internationalism, and “foreign-minded academia.” [For these individuals] … the essence of
America was the small town with its white, middle-class population, its generally
Protestant, or decently Catholic religion, its values of individualism, private enterprise and
national pride” (151). The coalition of voters that elected Donald Trump in 2016 aligns
demographically with this description. They were largely white, Protestant, middle-class,
and from rural parts of America. They believed in the values of individualism, private
enterprise and national pride, and resented “big government,” internationalism, and
“foreign minded academia” (Frey). One key difference is that Trump voters
disproportionately lacked college education. But it is interesting to note that although
written 45 years ago, Shurmann’s description of the 1950’s China Lobby supporters is a
pretty good match to the description of today’s Trump supporter (“An Examination”).
The China-as-threat lobby also had new concerns. While these individuals were
vocally anti-communist and often spoke about China as evil (Zuylen-Wood), the heart of
their concerns lay in American decline rather than a unique hatred of China, although often
the lines are blurred. Still, a key difference between the China Lobby of the 1950s and
today’s China-as-threat lobby is that the China Lobby assumed that American strength and
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military power could roll back China’s communism and put an end to the Chinese
Communist Party. The China-as-threat lobby of today is less preoccupied with regime
change and more focused on how to manage the real decline of American cultural and
economic power and magnetism.
Conclusion
This chapter shows the ways in which industry lobby groups and policy think tanks
polarized the climate debate in both the Obama and Trump administrations. From the
China-as-opportunity perspective, the China factor constrained the US ability to enter a
meaningful international agreement on climate change. Industry lobbyists blocked the
domestic climate bill that would have made an agreement possible. In a series of trade-offs,
the China-as-opportunity lobby urged Obama to use the UN climate talks as an opportunity
to first, reign in China, and, second, expand diplomatic relations between Washington and
Beijing to project an image of US leadership but also to seek lucrative public-private
partnerships between US energy companies and their Chinese counterparts.
Under Trump, the climate denial and economic nationalism themes polarized
leaders and demonized China, distracting from the broader issues related to climate policy.
The China-as-threat approach to climate change was to downplay, or even deny, its
existence or, at least, the severity of its impacts. Matching this sentiment, on the campaign
trail, Trump frequently stated plans to withdraw the US from the 2015 Paris Agreement, a
gesture he delivered in November of 2019. The withdrawal had both symbolic and practical
impacts. Symbolically, the withdrawal amounted to an abdicated of US leadership on one
of the largest global issues of the time. It also opened an opportunity for China to become
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the world leader on climate change (for example, Cohen, Graham, Savage). US withdrawal
was a puncture to the momentum for global change that crested at the Paris talks. Even
while the United States was a reluctant participant in the UNFCCC process from the
beginning, the fact that Obama had facilitated the completion of a global agreement in 2015
lent momentum and energy to the global climate response. Many countries responded to the
US withdrawal with a feeling of hopelessness. If the US—the richest country and the
second largest emitter in the world and historically the largest emitter—refused to take
action, why should they? (Shear).
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
Why hasn’t the United States been more successful in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions? Each of the existing theories mentioned in the introduction of this
dissertation—nation-state democracy creates collective action problems, capitalism
engenders a parasitic relationship between the global economy and the planet’s natural
resources that is ultimately unsustainable, or, corporate lobbying distorts policy towards
narrow private interests—all reveal some truths that bring us closer to an answer to this
question. But none captures the specific political mechanisms that constrain US behavior.
The theory about democracy shows us how pluralism can have a dark side. US
policy making reflects the ordering of chaos that comes from a relatively unorganized,
free-flowing community of lobbyists, politicians, and bureaucrats vying for power and
influence with little distinction between public and private forces. Just as James Madison
predicted in the Federalists Papers, interest groups jockey for influence and leverage
power by whatever means necessary, including exploiting the current political situation,
whatever it may be. However, sometimes interest groups can become too powerful, and
can find new sources of political leverage by attaching a narrow agenda to a larger
security issue.
A former Bush State Department official said of the reshuffling of China policy
after the fall of the Soviet Union, “Everything became equal. So then the real issue is who
has the loudest voice, who screams loudest and gets the attention of the White House”
(qtd. in Ross 53). Drawing a similar conclusion, politics and military specialist, Joseph A.
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Gagliano, summarized the policymaking process as “a storm of forces, where
government institutions become components alongside other organizations, including
interest groups, corporations, and unions” (Gagliano 34). Reflecting these observations,
this dissertation demonstrates how within this “storm,” interest groups have loud voices.
Some can shape policy discussions and others advance their more narrow interests by
hitching their agenda onto the momentum of a pre-existing policy position.
However, the theory about capitalism also makes important contributions,
although it is likewise limited in its application. A basic principle of capitalism states that
redundancies must be eliminated across the world in the pursuit of efficiency. According
to this logic, China’s role as the world’s factory of cheap clean technology makes sense.
That is because in this logic, the manufacturing of solar panels and wind turbines should
gravitate to the location with the greatest comparative advantage, and that is China. The
US must learn to adapt and rely on imports from China and ignore any security concerns
associated with this relationship. However, this logic cannot explain US inaction. It may
condemn the world to a race to the bottom where one country can never have both strict
labor and environmental regulations and the ability to manufacture the equipment needed
to meet them, but it doesn’t explain why an issue that is essentially about relative
power—the US’s response to the rise of China—shapes climate policy.
Neither does the answer to the problem simply boil down to corporate lobbying.
This dissertation does show that corporate lobbying is indeed a major factor in US
climate policy outcomes. However, this explanation fails to include the crux of this
analysis, which is that corporate lobbying becomes amplified by a broader coalition of
political influences that together form a lobby that creates a specific policy-making
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environment that: (1) narrows and reduces the climate policy questions at hand into
serving components of a greater US-China dynamic; and, (2) opens opportunities for
industry lobbyists to pursue business-related interests at the expense of climate policy
more general.
In the first point, the policy options for both the China-as-opportunity lobby and
the China-as-threat lobby are rooted in concerns about security and China’s rise. The
China-as-opportunity lobby has traditionally sought engagement with Beijing. Gradually
over time, the “engagement” approach has shifted to be more focused on achieving shortterm economic gains for US corporations (including their protection from Chinese
competition through intellectual property rights) rather than simply a commitment to
internationalism and the spread of US values. The China-as-threat lobby emerged as an
anti-communist ideology that gained momentum through the campaign to support
Taiwan, and a conflation of values extended from human rights to nationalism to
economic independence. Over time, the China-as-threat lobby has shifted from
undermining Beijing’s influence globally to protecting US economic interests through a
rejection of globalization entirely and a complete decoupling of the two economies. Thus,
the two lobbies remained the same in many ways but shifted their goals slightly as the
power parity between the US and China changed with China emerging as a more
formidable economic and political partner.
For each issue within climate policy—international agreements, clean
transportation, clean energy—the policy making process became a turf war between two
factions in the US over how to respond to China’s rise. To one faction, the China-asthreat lobby, the powerful dynamics of US-China competition that have to do with which
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country benefits more from mutual trade and which country is more powerful in
establishing and influencing global trade norms and regulations—becomes more
important than the individual calculations of each climate policy decision. For the other
lobby, China-as-opportunity, short-term opportunities for economic growth in isolated
sectors or even companies, becomes the key goal. In some cases, as this dissertation has
shown, those opportunities for growth can also lead to isolated burst of climate-friendly
initiatives in the US, for example, the US signing of the Paris Agreement, or Obama’s
doubling of renewable energy, or increases in electric vehicle sales. But these “burst” fall
short of real or meaningful shifts in climate policy toward a comprehensive climate
response, similar to policy trends in Europe or even China. In some cases, components of
these policies—for example intellectual property rights—undermine climate mitigation
efforts.
This study has demonstrated that a China lobby has become a yoke around an
issue that is already subjected to intense industry lobbying. And while the lobbying is not
directly related to the US-China security calculation, it further subjects the issue of
climate change to private political forces, resulting in a decreased chance that climate
policy will be made on its own merits and not based on the interests of other political and
economic concerns. As such, the United States is suffering from structural impediments
that make it unable to adequately address the climate crisis through policy.
Today, there exists a new “China Lobby.” Its ideological blueprint lies in the past,
but its contemporary composition reflects a changing relationship, one of greater parity
where the US is provided with fewer options in the face of China’s rise. The new China
Lobby is gaining leverage in the debate over climate change not because it cares about
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the climate but because it sees the debate as an important way of steering US-China
relations. According to one observer of US-China relations under Trump, the US policy
of decoupling “is also a contest to set the rules by which international intercourse takes
place” (Stevenson and Mozur). The two lobbies expanded their respective justifications
for their position in ways that amplify each other. The China lobbies are made stronger
by the climate lobbies and vice verse creating a new iteration of the 1950s China Lobby
that focuses on climate and key policies areas involved—technology, intellectual
property, and manufacturing—as ways to leverage a China-related agenda. As such, US
climate policy is hemmed in—and marginalized by—the larger question of US-China
relations.
China Lobby 2.0 has emerged at least since 2008 and has found its footing in the
intersectional space between economic policy and national security that has emerged in
the wake of China accession into the WTO and has grown stronger as the US-China trade
imbalance has become more extreme. A new coalition of forces—echoing its political
predecessors—was carved out by Trump in his 2016 bid for president and expanded upon
during his administration. But the lobby existed before Trump came to power. It was
effective in pressuring Obama to transform an international agreement on climate change
into a document that had as its most notable feature language that calls upon China to join
developed countries in taking the lead on global climate solutions. It was effective in
steering the electric vehicle market away from Chinese competition and leading Trump to
create policies designed to revamp US infrastructure in such a way that eliminates the
participation of Chinese construction. It was effective in marginalizing US renewable
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energy production in order to protect against Chinese theft of US intellectual property in
the solar panel and wind turbine industries.
Both lobbies have evolved over time but they have also become more powerful
and more central to US foreign policy debates in general. Climate change is a new
frontier for both lobbies, a challenge that perfectly matches their ideological stances
regarding globalization, trade, and the US role in international crises. The China-as-threat
lobby has grown not only more powerful but encompassing of a broader political agenda.
Having once represented the military, particularly Navy interests, it now speaks for the
many working class Americans that feel left behind in the American Dream. Rather than
blame the corporations that procured China to become a manufacturing hub of the world,
interest groups and political activists like Steve Bannon and Frank Gaffney tell American
voters to blame China. The China-as-threat lobby has also maintained strong overlap with
allies from the left including human rights activists angered by the Communist Party’s
treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, or Buddhists in Tibet, or the political repression and
treatment of protesters in Hong Kong. Discerning parents and food lovers are susceptible
to China-as-threat rhetoric when they become concerned about toxic materials in
children’s toys or the ways in which China’s food industry is eroding organic standards.
There are several hypotheses that could flow from these observations. Further
study would be needed to reveal the level of influence these lobbies have on US policy.
First, and foremost, is that given the role of interest groups in the US political system, the
US is structurally unable to adequately address the climate crisis. The impact of this
would be enormous and may be felt in many ways. As the global power that dominated
the twentieth century and historically the largest emitter in the world, the United States
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sets a signal of political will that other nations may emulate. If the US takes action to
reduce emission it not only sends a political signal that may encourage other nations to
follow suit, but the economic reality is that if the US makes green technology and clean
energy mainstream, this will impact the price and availability of these products in the
global market in a way favorable to strong climate policies. US leadership at the
UNFCCC has already proven to be instrumental in catalyzing action around the world.
When Trump withdrew from the agreement, it punctured the momentum of a global
movement.
However, perhaps US leadership will not be needed to make this global shift. If
large sections of the United States continue to slip into economic insecurity and
politicians continue to point to China, rather than multinational corporations, as the
culprit for the hollowing out of the nation, then it is conceivable that China-as-threat
policies will dominate in the near and even medium-term future, greatly diminishing
prospects for a low-carbon America.
A final hypothesis and potential implication that follows from the observations
made in this study is that US China and climate policy have been essentially privatized,
captured by private industry and think tank lobbyists and vocal minorities. Many
observers have noted over the last decade that while climate policy remains a priority
among voters (despite the public opinion campaigns behind climate denialism), US
policy continues not to deliver on those policies (Ganz et al.). There are some specific
cases, such as the Trump withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, in which policies that
were widely unpopular were executed without real challenge. This dynamic is worth
investigating further. While this dissertation begins to map out the key players, what
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drives them, as well as their relationship to one another, more work needs to be done to
begin to measure their impact on policy outcomes. Indeed, these political forces
potentially undermine the concept of national interest and pose a major challenge to the
effectiveness of democracy in responding to major threats.
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